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ABSTRACT OF A THESIS 
SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, 1990. 
"The Political Ideas of William Hazlitt, 1778-1830" 
MARK ALAN GARNETT 
Department of Politics, Durham University. 
The purpose of the thesis was to examine William Hazlitt's political 
thought from the viewpoint of the history of ideas. Such a study should lead 
to a greater appreciation of his value as a political critic. The received 
notion that he was a radical provided a starting-point for investigation. 
Hazlitt's theoretical work in philosophy and politics was found to be 
of interest, but his views on contemporary personalities and events are more 
revealing. He opposed hereditary despotism, but not all fo.rms of monarchy, and 
he was ambivalent about the possibility and propriety of constitutional 
reform. His criticism of "progressive" thinkers such as Rpbert Owen was more 
destructive than his critique of the conservative Edmund Burke, despite the 
superficial hostility of the latter work. Emotionally, he sided with Whigs 
and reformers, but this was a half-hearted commitment, and his analysis 
reveals some sympathy for their opponents. 
In order to properly judge Hazlitt's political position, a framework 
was devised by which ideological evidence may be appraised with maximum 
objectivity. Ideologies, it is argued, are ethical understandings of the world 
which arise from varying views of human nature. It was found that Hazlitt's 
view that human nature is a mixture of passion and reason was more pessimistic 
than that held by most contemporary liberals. His position is best described 
as conservative liberalism. It was not radicalism, which implies a rigid 
notion of the best form of human society. 
This interpretation helps to explain some of Hazlitt's views which 
have puzzled previous commentators, such as his admiration for Napoleon. His 
ambivalence permitted him to respond to characters and events with unusual 
flexibility when his volatile temper allowed, although it made systematic work 
unlikely. He is a perceptive and often objective critic who deserves greater 
recognition outside literary studie~. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While William Hazlitt seems to have secured a chapter in most 
literary histories, he is a footnote at best in the history of political 
ideas. His views are regularly quoted in connection with such contemporaries 
as Burke, Godwin and Bentham, yet his own political thinking has not been made 
the subject of any full-length study. There are several good reasons why this 
should now be rectified. Firstly, Hazlitt has interested so many generations 
that he must be recognised as "essentially a great man - a master-mind", 
1 
worth tracing through all his diverse fields of interest. As Crane Brinton has 
noted, politics coloured most of his work, and Hazlitt felt confident that he 
2 
had much of value to say on men and affairs. Secondly, a proper study of 
Hazlitt's work may shed stronger light on his contemporaries. If we know the 
stand-point from which he discussed the Utilitarians, the Owenites and the 
anti-Jacobins, we may quote his words with renewed confidence - or with 
greater caution. Thirdly, it will be possible to examine Hazlitt's credentials 
as a chronicler of events. Hitherto it would be fair to say that historians 
have not recognised him as a trustworthy authority, except when they have 
required telling quotations about certain of his contemporaries. This seems 
to be inconsistent; surely, if unacceptable bias afflicts his interpretation 
of events, then his views on personalities should be equally inadmissible, 
since Hazlitt personalised politics to an unusual degree. It is certain that 
without a thorough investigation of his political position, judgements 
concerning his reliability would be premature. Once Hazlitt's bias has been 
identified, his readers will be able to allow for it. It is the primary 
purpose of this thesis, therefore, to establish Hazlitt's position in the 
ideological context of his time. 
It would be wrong to deny that much of value has already been 
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3 
written on Hazlitt's politics. In any work on his ideas, political concerns 
would be impossible to disentangle from the chosen material. Recent accounts, 
however, have concentrated heavily upon his contribution to literary 
criticism. It is understandable that these studies have not been directed 
towards a close scrutiny of his political ideas. But this is work that must be 
done, not only to establish Hazlitt's credentials in the field, but also 
because an element of caricature tends to creep in when political positions 
are accepted without criticism. Samuel Johnson, for example, was clearly a 
Tory in his political allegiance, and by most critics in the past this 
was interpreted to entail a position on many issues which Johnson himself 
would have rejected. A similar fate, I would argue, has befallen Hazlitt; he 
has been labelled a radical, and critics have imposed upon him a set of 
standards - some relevant to the historical context, but others wildly 
anachronistic - by which his consistency and value has been measured. In the 
case of Johnson, critics have at least begun to re-examine the validity of 
4 
the traditional view. It is time that the same compliment was granted to 
Hazlitt. 
There are many pitfalls awaiting all students in the history of 
ideas, and in the case of Hazlitt some of these dangers are unusually acute. 
For instance, there is a great danger of being kidnapped by one's subject; 
since Hazlitt was a powerful political writer his views are peculiarly 
seductive. It is tempting to find as few faults as possible with his message, 
and even to join with him in battles which are long over. When we do find our 
hero in error, we are always ready with a plausible excuse. If he sounds 
"modern" we hail his acheivement, but if his views are out-dated we argue 
that he should not be measured by the standards of the present. I hope that I 
have succeeded in confining my judgements to a comparison with the views of 
Hazlitt's contemporaries, only bringing in more recent interpretations when 
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these provide insights which Hazlitt seems not to have entertained through 
bias. This is a delicate e-xercise, but at. least appears to be more promising 
than a slavish acceptance of the "Hazlitt line" in everything. 
In composing a study in the history of ideas, one must always be 
conscious of shifting trends in the historical perspective of the period under 
review. Since Hazlitt's period is at present the subject of controversy, the 
problem of identifying an acceptable interpretation is particularly acute. The 
Marxist viewpoint found in Mr. E.P Thompson's The Making of the English 
Working Class, which has exerted great influence (not least among literary 
students), has been both assaulted directly and subtly undermined in recent 
5 
years. It is proper to state at the outset that although Thompson's work is 
admirable in terms of the painstaking research involved, the overall 
interpretation is so coloured by ideological purpose that careful 
qualification is essential. Recently, Dr. Jonathan Clark has expressed a 
contrasting ideological interpretation, and his dogmatic presentation has 
devalued what is otherwise a timely reminder of the central role played by 
6 
religion in the period. There is, however, a more balanced account of the 
7 
British "Counter-Revolution" notably in the work of Mr. Clive Emsley. This 
argument rejects the notion of a Pittite "Terror", pointing out that 
although the legislation directed against domestic radicals was severe, it 
was not stringently applied. Furthermore, although political activism amongst 
the lower orders was probably increasing, there is no reason to pronounce this 
time as the nativity of a class-conscious workers movement. Most of the 
radicals and reformers were well-to-do, and the masses demonstrated against 
men like Paine more than in their support. It should not be argued that the 
friends of the "people" were mistaken in their fears of repression, or their 
hopes for the people. But such an interpretation implies that their 
assessment of the situation amounted to an ideological reading of events no 
less than the response of the government. It cannot be asserted with 
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confidence that this interpretation will never be supplanted, but I have 
adopted it because it does not seem to be designed in order t.o uphold a 
particular ideological position. 
A rather different problem for the historian of ideas is whether 
to take a chronological or a thematic approach. In taking the latter option 
for the present work it might be suggested that I have pre-judged the 
important issue of Hazlitt's consistency. Although this question will be dealt 
with in the conclusion, it should be noted here that the thematic approach 
does allow for the discussion of inconsistency. Few writers are free from 
changes of mind and self-contradiction. Journalists like Hazlitt, responding 
to events as they occur, are particularly prone to these. Where Hazlitt seems 
to have self-consciously shifted his ground, or has done so without 
realizing the implications, it will be noted if it is judged to be important. 
A thematic approach may impose greater clarity on a thinker than exists in his 
own pages. A degree of this is unavoidable, but I do not believe that there is 
a standard of consistency below which an author is of no value, and so the 
creation of an artificial unity in Hazlitt's thought will be kept to a 
minimum. 
Another difficulty which confronts a study of this kind is the 
question of influence. The problem is two-fold: which thinkers can be shown 
to have influenced Hazlitt, and upon whom did his own influence make itself 
apparent? There are many cases in which a thinker's ideas are obviously 
inherited from a predecessor, and often the writer in question will 
acknowledge his debt. We may find that later writers ascribe their own views 
to our subject, or that the echoes of his work are too evident for there to be 
a mistake about the origin of the idea. But it is more common for these 
relationships to be a matter of guesswork. In these cases there will be no 
direct evidence that the possible source was ever consulted, or even heard of. 
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It is rare for two thinkers to independently arrive at the same conclusions by 
identical routes, but we must accept that this is possible-; it is even rribre 
likely that thinkers may reach similar conclusions in similar ways. In these 
cases, speculation about intellectual relationships may be an agreeable 
indulgence, but it can lead to an exaggerated impression of our subject's 
influence, or a conclusion that his capacity for independent thought was not 
as great as was truly the case. With these dangers in mind, I have kept the 
discussion of intellectual debt to a minimum. The problem of the subsequent 
influence of his political work seems easy to solve; there is little evidence 
that his work made a significant impact on any important writing after his 
death. We are left with the task of providing possible explanations of this 
fact, which will be attempted in the conclusion. 
Hazlitt wrote on so many issues that I have been forced into 
selectivity. The themes examined here will be those which best illustrate the 
general tendency of his thought. Firstly, I have examined the theoretical 
foundations, his moral philosophy and his one essay in abstract political 
theory. Hazlitt claimed to have resisted Burke's influence by means of a 
"metaphysical clue"; it will be seen whether this claim is sustained through 
a close examination of this aspect of his work. After a methodological 
discussion of ideology which provides a framework for classifying Hazlitt's 
ideas, I will proceed to examine his work on the issues and personalities of 
the period. The issues selected here are the monarchy, political parties, 
patriotism and religion; the personalities are "Friends" (Godwin, Owen and 
Mackintosh) and "Foes" (Burke, the Lake Poets and Malthus). A whole chapter 
will be devoted to Hazlitt's writing on Napoleon Bonaparte, and its 
ideological implications. Finally I shall examine Hazlitt's view of human 
nature in a discussion of the view that he was a misanthrope. 
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Hazlitt is undoubtedly one of our great prose-stylists, but 
despite great efforts on his behalf since the last War, he still lacks proper 
recognition as a thinker and, perhaps more vitally, as a great personality. 
Obviously this conviction was the primary motivation for this study, and it 
is hoped that it presents an interpretation of his politics which may enhance 
his importance to historians as a contribution to this process. However, it is 
likely that no brief study can do full justice to his work. Hazlitt was 
thinking of Burke when he said that the only true specimen of his work is 
8 
"all that he wrote", but this applies equally to himself. 
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PART ONE: THEORETICAL 
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HAZ-LITT' S- PHILOSOPHY 
1 
According to William Hazlitt's original tombstone, "He was 
The first (unanswered) Metaphysician of the age 
A despiser of the merely Rich and Great: 
A lover of the People, Poor or Oppressed: 
A hater of the Pride and Power of the Few, 
as opposed to the happiness of the Many; 
A man of true moral courage, 
Who sacriced Profit and present Fame 
To Principle ... 
. .. He lived and died 
The unconquered Champion 
of 
Truth, Liberty and Humanity, 
"Dubitantes opera legite". 
Yet although Hazlitt's death was not entirely ignored by his 
contemporaries, he should not be listed among the most celebrated authors of 
2 
his age. It is by no means unusual to discover hyperbole in epitaphs. But the 
claims of this one are more than a little disingenuous. Hazlitt was indeed an 
"unanswered Metaphysician" - no-one thought it necessary to counter his 
philosophical arguments in print. Rather than sacrificing profit and fame to 
principle, it might be fairer to say that the moderate rewards he received 
in both these fields resulted from his defiant oppositionist stance. 
Presumably his prose-style would have suffered some loss of purity from a bout 
of literary prostitution, and while Hazlitt died in financial distress, a more 
prudent spender might have lived on his income fairly comfortably. 
It is, however, of some interest that Hazlitt's epitaph was 
composed by a certain Charles Wells, who terminates the effusion by assuring 
the reader that his "heart is with him in the grave". Surprisingly, this man 
is not mentioned in any other context by Hazlitt's biographers. Evidently, 
the dead man could inspire fierce devotion, even if this was no nation-wide 
phenomenon; and his admirers chose to celebrate his philosophical works as 
- 11 -
highly as the more occasional pieces by which he is remembered today. 
Hazlitt's Essay on the Principles of Human Action, however, 
fell still-born from the press both in 1806, when it was first published, and 
when it was posthumously reprinted. It was not until quite recently that 
commentators began to chew over the "tough, dry, metaphysical choke-pear" in 
order to investigate its value for a proper understanding of the author's 
3 
literary criticism. These writers have argued persuasively that the Essay 
can tell us much about his subsequent views, and they have also traced its 
sources and placed it within the philosophical context of Hazlitt's day. Their 
general verdict has been that the Essay is derivative, and of little value 
4 
for its own sake in its brief moments of originality. 
Some sort of apology for dragging Hazlitt's ethical theory back 
into view is therefore probably in order. First of all, the issue of 
originality should not deter us. If we were to rank works of philosophy on 
this standard, we would arrive at an unfamiliar league table; presumably 
Thales would be top, with everyone else tied for second. The issue is of 
special interest to us, since Hazlitt brought the charge of plagiarism against 
almost all of his contemporaries and many of his predecessors. We sense that 
such jibes were unfair, and that we should be more careful in treating either 
himself or his victims in this manner. Whatever the merit of Hazlitt's 
attacks, it is clear that he was confident of his own originality, and this 
confidence should at least be respected by a reservation of judgement in his 
case. While commentators have denied his claim to philosophical importance, 
there must be some suspicion that the unsuccessful history of the work has 
provided this conclusion for them. The Essay was most certainly a failure, 
but it is at least valid to look around for other possible reasons for its 
5 
rejection by the reading public. 
Secondly, although a reasonable consensus exists among literary 
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students of Hazlitt's work, there has been very little attention from 
historians of political theory. Such an i-nvestigation would inevitably 
emphasise different aspects of the material, even if it should reach the same 
verdict in the end. For instance, while Hazlitt's Lectures on English 
Philosophy of 1812 have not received prominent attention, his attitude to past 
writers such as Hobbes and Locke is of special interest from the political 
angle. 
Hazlitt's work is also worthy of study as a reflection of the 
age in which he lived. As the work of a thoughtful and eloquent man, it should 
illuminate the climate of thought in the early nineteenth century, and 
possibly yield interesting questions for further study. It is hoped that this 
will assist in, and help to justify, the overall purpose of this chapter, 
which is to evaluate the importance of Hazlitt's philosophy to an 
understanding of his political ideas. 
********* 
Hazlitt's main reason for writing the Essay on the Principles 
of Human Action is clear. He believed that ethical theories based upon the 
primacy of self-love were dominant, and needed to be refuted. Such selfish 
doctrines, he believed, "could not have gained the assent of thinking men but 
for the force with which the idea of self habitually clings to the mind of 
6 
every man." The prevalence of such a philosophy, Hazlitt believed, could be 
exploited by the wicked to serve their own ends, or to mislead those who might 
otherwise choose benevolent courses. 
Against this kind of egotism, Hazlitt brought forward what he 
later called his ''metaphysical clue", the product of frustrating years through 
7 
which he struggled for words to clothe his thoughts. The basis of the theory 
was a new examination of human identity, which Locke and others had also 
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discussed. Hazlitt realised that while it was reasonable to speak of a uniform 
individual identity persisting from birth to death, there was a clear 
disjunction between one's past and future self. It is futile to wish the past 
undone, and such actions are no longer the objects of volition. If free will 
is possible, the present is a suitable opportunity for the exercise of choice. 
But the same cannnot be said of our actions in the future. Although we can be 
fairly certain that our future being will represent the continuation of our 
present consciousness, we cannot be sure of the desires and aversions which 
may affect us then. In a sense, therefore, the past is more real than the 
future; and, when I act in accordance with what I take to be my probable 
future interest, I am projecting my existence forward in time by a leap of the 
imagination. 
The next step of Hazlitt's argument was to compare this 
procedure with the origin of benevolent actions. Surely, the use of the 
imagination is common to both? We are generally ignorant of the precise 
feelings of others, but this is no less true of our future selves. Hence, 
although humans are by no means exclusively benevolent in their actions, there 
is something disinterested in all motivation, and benevolence is just as 
natural as self-interest. 
Up to this point it may be agreed that Hazlitt's argument is 
quite an original contribution to the debate over self-love and benevolence. 
A similar thesis had, in fact, been advanced by Bishop Joseph Butler in the 
previous century, but only for the purpose of refutation. Butler could not 
accept such a notion, as it cast doubt upon the possibility of immortal life. 
Hazlitt did not feel these scruples. His problem, however, was to indicate 
how his discovery might be applied in practice. An advocate for self-love 
might confess that his theory over-simplified the internal working of the 
mind. But, granting that selfish behaviour might result from an imaginative 
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projection, Hazlitt's opponent might still argue that our sole motivation is 
what we take to be our own futUre benefit, and riot that of others. In short, 
while Hazlitt may have shown how we come to behave morally, he has not 
provided a thorough account of particular moral actions, nor has he explained 
why we should prefer the interests of others to our own. 
This problem exposes the weaknesses of Hazlitt's work, which we 
will discuss more fully later. Returning to his argument against egotistical 
theories, we find him borrowing Butler's argument that while all actions must 
relate to the self in some way, there is a distinction between actions 
motivated by a purely selfish concern, and those which are designed primarily 
to help others. Self-love is a natural attribute of humanity, but for the 
virtuous man it complements benevolence, rather than conflicting with it. 
Butler presented conscience as a presiding faculty of the mind, ensuring the 
co-operation of self-love and benevolence in most cases. But Hazlitt is much 
more vague about the manner in which benevolent actions are generated. On his 
account, for example, we tend to act in our own perceived interest most often, 
because we can form a better idea of such interests than those of our fellows. 
In the case of parents, the well-being of their own children will be preferred 
for similar reasons, we will benefit a neighbour rather than a stranger, a 
compatriot before a foreigner, and so on. Hazlitt clearly is realistic about 
the strength of benevolent motives, probably in part because he had noted the 
implausibility of the wide sphere allotted to them by William Godwin. But it 
is possible to suggest that his theory restricts benevolence more narrowly 
than he intended. For most of his contemporaries, with a restricted circle of 
close acquaintance, the exercise of benevolence would be severely limited. For 
the most part they would only be capable of recognising the most obvious 
interests of themselves, their family and their few friends; they could 
never give ear to the sufferings of an outsider. Indeed, Hazlitt himself had 
first-hand experience of his theory in action. He was driven from the Lake 
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Disrict in 1803 because, in a dispute with a local girl who was probably no 
better than she should be, the vil~agers quite naturally dissented from 
8 
Hazlitt's point of view. Obviously, Hazlitt wished to make wider claims for 
benevolence than this. In order to bolster the theory, he advances arguments 
common to many eighteenth-century theorists. He postulates an innate 
propensity in the mind to desire good for its own sake. We are not born fully-
armed with a moral code; Hazlitt is too aware of Locke's legacy to embrace 
innate ideas. Rather, we acquire our moral ideas through association (although 
9 
Hazlitt qualifies his adherence to Hartley's theory). "There is", he writes, 
"something in the very idea of good, or evil, which naturally excites desire 
or aversion ... which impels the mind to pursue the one and to avoid the other 
10 
by a true moral necessity." A baby, for example, can recognise good before it 
is aware of its self; it only prefers what turns out to be its own interest 
because it is more conscious of its own desires. Therefore, we choose the 
good irrespective of whether it is ours or another's. 
Hazlitt's opponent, I believe, would be unimpressed by this. 
Granting that we learn to recognise the good through a process of association, 
he might suggest that this only provides the selfish man with a better 
understanding of what is good for him. The egotist might agree that we learn 
to choose the good by necessity, but his case, that this good is purely what 
relates to ourselves, remains unanswered. Hazlitt would reject such an 
assertion, although his case is not greatly clarified by his definitions. 
"[The] knowledge of various good must be accompanied with an intermediate, 
composite or indefinite idea of good, itself the object of desire" , he 
writes. "This idea will no doubt admit of endless degrees of indefiniteness 
according to the number of things, from which it is taken, or to which it is 
11 
applied, and will be refined at last into a mere word, or logical definition." 
Our imaginary critic might shift his ground at this point, and 
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announce that he has unveiled Hazlitt's true position; he has not managed to 
refute the egotistical position because he is a Utilitarian. This idea of the 
good is not merely my own good, but that of the greatest possible number. 
Despite the mystical terminology, what Hazlitt means by "good" is really 
pleasure; we have seen that good and evil excite desire and aversion which 
impels us to choose the one and shun the other. This critic could also point 
to passages where Hazlitt appears to concede that ''pleasure" is a synonym for 
"good". However, one such passage proceeds to undermine the Utilitarian theory 
in a manner reminiscent of John Stuart Mill; although, he writes, there may be 
a strong similarity between "all that is really good or pleasurable in any 
sensation, ... I cannot ... persuade myself that our sensations differ only as to 
more, or less, or that the pleasure derived from seeing a fine picture,., .that 
the gratification derived from doing a good action and that which accompanies 
12 
the swallowing of an oyster are in reality and at bottom the same pleasure." 
"Why", he asks, "should there be only two sorts of feeling, pleasure and pain? 
I am convinced that any one who has reflected much on his own feelings must 
have found it impossible to refer them all to the same fixed invariable 
standard of good or evil, or by (sic) throwing the mere husk and without 
losing any thing essential to the feeling to arrive at some one simple 
13 
principle." "Some sensations are like others; this is all we know of 
14 
the matter, and all that is necessary to form a class, or genus". It must 
must also be remembered that while Hazlitt speaks of desire and aversion 
motivating our actions, these words are not synonymous with "pleasure" and 
"pain"; rather they are emotions which are strictly the cause or the effect of 
such sensations. 
Hazlitt, therefore, adopts a more complex view of good than the 
Utilitarians; we shall return to this theme later. However, even if we should 
agree that he exhibits a more realistic attitude to the problem of the good, 
we must recognise that he has brought us no further to a complete moral 
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theory through his rejection of Utility. Hazlitt, in fact, seems to hold an 
intuitive theory of moral actions, with plenty of appeals to what goes on in 
the human breast, but not much amn1unition against the owners of hardened 
hearts. The suggestion is that the fully-developed moral agent will choose the 
good of others whenever necessary, although at other times he will naturally 
prefer to benefit himself or his loved ones. However, this is left as little 
more than a suggestion. The illustrations of moral activity which he provides 
are not felicitous. The story of the child threatened by fire is a familiar 
one, showing how we might act, through sympathy, to prevent an injury; but 
this is a kind of negative benevolence, which most people can easily identify 
with. Hazlitt obviously intends to argue for the wider exercise of 
benevolence, and thus needs to demonstrate how it is that we prefer another 
man's good to our own in more typical situations; when, for example, we must 
choose between relieving the starving in a distant land and buying vin mousseux 
instead of champagne. Such examples are not forthcoming. 
Another serious problem for Hazlitt arises from his assertion, 
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borrowed from Kant, that "The mind alone is formative". We do not merely 
receive impressions from outside, and respond blindly to them. These 
impressions are sifted, judged and moulded by the mind. Hence, the moral 
faculties are not merely built up by the association of ideas. The original 
disposition of the mind plays a major role in deciding the form which such an 
association will take. This is of central importance to Hazlitt's theory, 
revealing a careful, critical study of Hartley absent from the work of many 
contemporaries. But while others oversimplified the association theory in 
order to advocate environmental training, Hazlitt's qualifications make it 
difficult to see how the habitual wrong-doer can be reformed. He writes that 
"where the habitual connection of certain feelings with certain ideas does not 
arise from a predisposition in the mind to be affected by certain objects more 
than others, but from the particular direction which has been given to the 
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mind or a more frequent association between those feelings and ideas, a 
contrary habit may be produced by giving the mind a different direction and 
bestowing a greater share of attention on other subjects ... The force of 
previous habit is and always must be on the side of selfish feelings, 
[therefore] it is of some consolation to think that the force of the habit we 
may oppose to this is seconded by reason, and the natural disposition of the 
16 
mind." Here one can only conclude that Hazlitt is in a self-inflicted muddle. 
Firstly, his belief that habitual associations might not "arise from a pre-
disposition in the mind" restores the hated Lockeian tabula rasa in fact if 
not in name, unless of course such "neutral" minds are rare (in which case, 
why pay them so much attention?). But perhaps more seriously, later in the 
quoted section he contradicts his statement that "the original disposition of 
the mind, it's (sic) tendency to acquire or persevere in this or that habit is 
17 
alone fixed and unvariable". If this is so, and the original disposition 
of the mind "is, and always must be" selfish, then it is difficult to see how 
reasonable counter-arguments can bring it back to its "natural" state of 
disinterestedness. The problem arises, I think, because Hazlitt is unwilling 
to accept the limited consequences of his doctrine. In the Remarks on the 
Systems of Hartley and Helvetius, which was appended to his Essay, he 
reveals that "I stand merely on the defensive. I have no positive inferences 
to make, nor any novelties to bring forward, and I love only to defend a 
18 
common-sense feeling against the refinements of a false philosophy." 
Whether intentional or not, this posture is also found in the Essay, and it 
is unsurprising that when he over-steps his self-imposed limits he loses his 
theoretical balance. 
Although there are serious difficulties with Hazlitt's ethical 
philosophy, this is not an unusual situation, and as in many other cases the 
very difficulties are instructive. Firstly, it is interesting that Hazlitt 
felt compelled to attack materialism, self-love and sensationalism. For an 
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English philosopher of the period, these targets may appear strange at first 
sight. The materialistic selfishness of Hobbes had sustained much damage 
throughout the eighteenth century. Shaftesbury, Butler, Hutcheson, Hume and 
Smith were only a few of the writers who took up the cudgels against pure 
self-love, and in Hazlitt's own time Thomas Reid and Dougald Stewart returned 
to the charge. A notable critic in the present century has, in fact, claimed 
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that Butler's refutation of egotism killed off the controversy. However, 
Hazlitt's attitude was by no means unique to himself. Coleridge, for example, 
having presumably found Butler inadequate for his purposes, popularised the 
work of Kant on this subject. Sir James Mackintosh confided to a friend that 
his main purpose in writing the Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical 
Philosophy was to shore up Butler's general position. The explanation for 
this renewed anxiety appears to be the influence of the French writers, such 
as Helvetius and Condillac, who had imbibed the teachings of the 
sensationalist school without, perhaps, fully appreciating the British 
thinkers who had subsequently attacked them. The influence of these theorists 
affected British writers in turn; and although men such as Priestley and 
Bentham intended to uphold the greatest happiness of the greatest number, 
their opponents saw the spectre of Hobbes looming over them. They believed 
that if the mind is regarded as wholly passive, the logical outcome would be 
apologies for untrammeled selfishness. 
In this context it is proper to note Hazlitt's response to 
various earlier philosophers. It is clear that he regarded Hobbes as a 
profound and original author, despite the unfortunate message he conveyed. 
We find Hazlitt making awkward excuses for Hobbes' despotism; his theory 
clearly inspired the Social Contract, Hazlitt tells us, but we never accuse 
20 
Rousseau of pandering to tyranny! Similarly, he quotes Hobbes' own apology for 
writing about the man who locks up his doors and chests before he goes out. 
Hobbes had replied that the charge of misanthropy is misplaced; it is the man 
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locking his doors who is accusing mankind, not the reporter! Clearly, 
Hazlitt' s respect for the power and clari-ty of Hobbes' arguments helps to 
explain why he feared their continuing influence. 
By contrast, Hazlitt had no time at all for John Locke. His 1812 
lecture on Hobbes is, in fact, an anticipation of an article published in 
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1816, entitled "Mr. Locke a Great Plagiarist". In this piece he writes, "Mr. 
Locke has at this day all over Europe the character of one of the most 
profound and original thinkers that ever lived, and he is perhaps without any 
exception, the most barefaced, deliberate, and bungling plagiarist, that ever 
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appeared in philosophy." This hostility can, I believe, be explained 
because while Hobbes was either forgotten or reviled on religious grounds, 
Locke's work had been accepted by the establishment. The suspicion arises that 
if Hobbes had been generally acclaimed, Hazlitt would by no means have spared 
him. Furthermore, as we have seen, Locke's work influenced continental writers 
who were unaware that he had been pre-empted by Hobbes in many respects. 
Hence, Locke's bloated reputation earned such ideas prestige, and the salutary 
example of Hobbes' use of the same theories went unnoticed. Locke, therefore, 
stands condemned as perniciously wrong, unoriginal, and lucky. Hazlitt's 
belief that Hobbes was a far superior prose stylist might also have affected 
his judgement. 
Of the eighteenth-century philosophers, Hazlitt is more 
respectful towards Hume and Adam Smith, who obviously influenced his account 
of the sympathetic imagination to some extent. Yet in his article on Locke 
he calls Smith "the tenth transmitter of a foolish creed", and claims that 
23 
Hume had been over-rated in comparison to Hobbes. "Nothing can be done 
towards a true theory of the mind", he writes, "till philosophers are 
convinced that all ideas are ideas of the understanding"; Hume and Smith fail 
this test. Hazlitt does express warm and unequivocal praise for Kant, whose 
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categorical imperative is "the only lever by which the modern philosophy can 
24 
be overturned." Yet it is not clear how well Hazlitt was acquainted with 
Kant's writings, which were brought to the public attention largely through 
25 
the verbal services of Coleridge. 
The philosophers of Hazlitt's day impressed him very little. 
Godwin is dismissed with faint praise, probably because they were friends to 
some extent. But not only does the refutation of Utilitarianism apply to him, 
but Hazlitt's lecture on ''Free Will and Necessity" is a flat contradiction of 
Godwin's famous creed. It is, Hazlitt believes, nonsensical to speak of free 
will in terms of an unmoved agent, but since man is not a creature of 
unthinking responses to external impulses, there is a sense in which we are 
responsible for our actions. While Godwin had claimed that the assassin is no 
more guilty than the knife he wields, Hazlitt is at pains to prove that 
punishment is justified. Explosions, for example, are caused not by the spark 
alone, but by the action of a spark on gunpowder. "So it is in the mind. 
Motives do not act upon it simply or absolutely, but according to the 
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dictates of the understanding or the bias of the will." Obviously 
Hazlitt was ready to admit a vital importance for the faculty of reason, but 
he does not make claims comparable to those of Godwin. 
Hazlitt is more directly hostile to the Utilitarians, and has 
been praised as the first systematic critic of the school. While this may be 
an accurate verdict, it is quite clear that Hazlitt merely regarded Benthamism 
as a contemporary flowering of a weed which first took root in Hobbes' work. 
The doctrine of pleasure and pain had been borrowed from Locke, who had 
filched it without acknowledgement from the Sage of Malmesbury. It is also 
debatable whether the Utilitarians were regarded as important enough to merit 
attack until the late 1820's, when Macauley and Mackintosh both levelled their 
heavy guns against them. This issue aside, it is interesting to note the 
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apparent motives for Hazlitt's assault, and the ground he chose. First of all, 
he compares the Benthamites to a relig-ious sect, a theme also found in 
Mackintosh and Macauley. Not only does this convey a sense of the group's 
isolation in intellectual society, but also it reminds the reader of the 
eighteenth century's dislike of "enthusiasm". Hazlitt, of course, does target 
Bentham's attitude to poetry for particular censure. But perhaps more 
insistent is the Malthusian theme. He asks, "Do they not wish to extend 'the 
greatest happiness to the greatest numbers', by putting a stop to population-
to relieve distress by witholding charity, to remedy disease by shutting up 
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hospitals?" He returns to this subject again later. But he is equally 
appalled by the over-optimism of the school regarding general benevolence. "Am 
I to screw myself up to feel as much for the Antipodes (or God knows who) as 
for my next-door neighbours, by such a forced intellectual scale? The last is 
impossible; and the result of the attempt will be to make the balance even by 
28 
a diminution of our natural sensibility." His basic theoretical 
disagreement is that while the Utilitarians uphold the rational faculties, he 
places "the heart" at the centre of his moral system, and, for him, "the 
29 
senses and the understanding are its two extremities." 
The attack is powerful - and unfair - enough to merit wider 
recognition in the debate over Utility. But it is impossible not to notice the 
inconsistency which has re-emerged in Hazlitt's psychology. The heart, or 
sentiment, is placed at the centre of his moral system in this passage; and 
this does appear to be the most important element in the theory. Yet we have 
seen that he believed all ideas to be the product of "the understanding", and 
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elsewhere he speaks of this as the "superintending faculty." 
The problem here appears to be no more than a clumsy use of 
terminology. But the inconsistency is real enough, and seems intrinsic to 
this sort of position. Hazlitt believed that reason, passion, intuition and 
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sensation all have roles to play in the formation of character and the 
exerci-se of- mora-lity-. But he fe±t -induced eo <:!mph_a_s-~se d-ifre-rerff. facurties 
in different polemical contexts. One of his favourite maxims was "The web of 
our lives is as a mingled yarn", and he probably found it easier to express 
such an outlook in an epigram than a closely-argued treatise. Perhaps in 
recognition of this fact, from the 1812 lecture series onwards Hazlitt 
confined his philosophy to occasional journalism, when consistency could be 
safely regarded as secondary to the purposes of criticism. 
Hazlitt's philosophical work, therefore, exhibits his critical 
ability more fully than any solid constructive powers. As elsewhere, he stands 
on the defensive, feeling that his position represents the common-sense view, 
but unable to erect this into a system. The purpose of this chapter, however, 
is to examine this aspect of his work for its political implications, and to 
this we must now turn. 
********** 
Students of Hazlitt's philosophy have normally been searching for 
the basis of his literary criticism. This is an established approach, and it 
is not my present purpose to argue that it is inappropriate in Hazlitt's case. 
However, a similar method does not lead to any firm conclusions in the field 
of political ideas. Although the various aspects of his thought cannot be 
cleanly disentangled, it would be a mistake to regard him as a systematic 
political thinker in the mould of Hobbes or Locke. Hazlitt would have regarded 
himself as a frustrated painter and philosopher, who supported himself by 
composing "abortive" essays and criticisms for the periodical press. There was 
no requirement for doctrinal rigidity in such a career, and outside the elite 
circle of the Edinburgh and its competitors, little enough scope for the 
clear exposition of philosophical politics. 
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An example of how philosophy, literature and politics interweave 
in Hazlitt's_work-can -be -founci- icn- h-is -att:ack on ttre Ut~LttC:friaifs-in "Tfie New 
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School of Reform", Here we find a philosophical dispute fuelled by literary 
factors (Bentham's dislike of poetry) and political concerns (the impact of 
the Malthusian doctrine) . Even personal grievances suggest themselves as 
motives; Bentham had evicted Hazlitt from his house, and the latter had an 
interest in striking at the Westminster Review which had been attacking his 
employers at the Edinburgh. It is open to us to look for solid evidence 
of Hazlitt's political position from such sources, but only with a good deal 
of caution. 
Some tentative conclusions might be drawn from Hazlitt's attack 
on Helvetius, and, by implication, Godwin. In dismissing the view that the 
mind is merely the passive recipient of external stimuli, he is also 
questioning the possibility of environmental determinism. But we could not 
conclude that Hazlitt is a believer in the natural inequality of mankind from 
the Essay alone. Man has innate capacities, but it is nowhere urged that 
these differ widely from one person to the next. The underlying theme, of 
course, insists that men are at least equally capable of benevolence, and 
environmental determinism might be said to re-enter through the back door in 
Hazlitt's discussion of the development of benevolent character. All that can 
be firmly stated is that the Essay is pessimistic compared with the work of 
some contemporaries; but to be less optimistic than followers of Condorcet and 
Godwin is not to be submerged in preternatural gloom. One can merely conclude 
here that the Essay occupies a central position in the contemporary debate, 
with a leaning towards the liberal side. 
Similarly, while it is noticable that many of the sacred demons 
of contemporary radicalism were admired by Hazlitt, no definite conclusions 
arise from this fact. He may have revered the power of Hobbes' mind, (just as 
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he was impressed by Burke), and his relish for Mandeville is very unusual for 
the time. Also, his abusing of- Loc:Ke, and insfinct:ive hosti1lt_y_ for tne "New 
School of Reform" would not be expected from a radical. But the reasons for his 
philosophical tastes are complex. He seems to have regarded admiration for 
Locke as mere cant, and his antipathy to the Benthamites was shared by 
observers of many political persuasions. Mandeville was at least a fearless 
thinker, and both he and Hobbes might appeal to Hazlitt's love for the 
underdog. The idiosyncratic manner in which Hazlitt chose his heroes must 
form part of a proper assessment, but is conclusive neither one way not the 
other. 
The philosophy itself, as we have seen, echoes through many 
of Hazlitt's performances, often unexpectedly. For example, we discover that 
his emphasis upon innate characteristics re-surfaces in such phrases as "No 
man is ever wiser from experience or suffering, or can cast his thoughts or 
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actions in any other mould than that which nature has assigned them." This 
comes from the Life of Napoleon Buonaparte, where the theory illuminates 
the behaviour of Lafayette, but can also explain Hazlitt's view of Louis XVI, 
whose fate was sealed on the day that he was born an absolute monarch. This 
is in line with his emphasis upon innate qualities, but flies in the face of 
his assertion in the Essay that men can be reasoned or conditioned out of 
their selfishness. Similarly, the Life and the Essay both contain 
gratuitous attacks on the French national character, which are neither 
consistent with each other, nor with the thrust of Hazlitt's philosophy, which 
implies that such generalisations are inadmissible in such contexts. 
Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the Essay is the fine 
peroration, beginning "There are moments in the life of a solitary thinker 
which are to him what the evening of some great victory is to the 
33 
conqueror and hero ... " Even at the very outset of his career as an 
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author, Hazlitt saw himself as an isolated figure, attached to no school and 
unw_ilJ_i_ng to co_ur_t_ one of- his own. Wdoto-h an att-itude lJ:ke Eliis, it -is 
unsurprising that the prophecy was fulfilled. Ironically, the Essay contains 
a brisk attack on Sir James Mackintosh, who stood as close to Hazlitt's 
philosophical position as almost anyone; much later, this writer honoured 
Hazlitt's Essay with perhaps its most important contemporary recognition-
34 
in a footnote. 
Rather paradoxically, this fierce individualism helps to explain 
both the power of Hazlitt's criticism and the neglect he has suffered. He owed 
his allegiance to nothing other than the truth as he saw it, but he lived at a 
time when an isolated thinker such as Hobbes would have had great difficulty 
in capturing any public attention. The intellectual world of Hobbes' day was 
so closed that an unpublished paper could establish a Europe-wide reputation. 
But in Hazlitt's time, the rapid growth of the popular press and a 
simultaneous loss of public interest in ethical philosophy meant that without 
a suitable platform, a willing band of co-workers and, perhaps, an eye-
catching reductivist principle such as Utility, oblivion was likely to follow. 
Hazlitt's philosophical writings are of sufficient interest to 
reward his modern admirers, however neglected they have previously been. The 
central theme might not have been startling in its originality, but had he 
written no more he could still be regarded as an acute thinker and a careful 
reader. For the student of political ideas, more evidence is required to 
flesh out the essentially negative implications of the Essay. But one may 
clearly recognise the style and approach of Hazlitt's more celebrated 
productions. As a noted fives player, Hazlitt was well used to thinking on his 
feet, and would regard fluffed strokes, or tripping over himself, as no more 
than occupational hazards. The point of the game, in essay-writing as in 
fives, was to deal as many telling blows as possible, and, hopefully, to 
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wear his opponent into submission. Hazlitt, in short, always has something 
worth saying, and he -delivers--it in- a fashion which makes study -of him bot-h 
entertaining and instructive. It could be argued that, like Hazlitt, we should 
occasionally exercise positive discrimination in our judgements, and favour 
unfashionable thinkers. After all, no modern philosopher has ever avoided 
errors, contradictions, or plagiarisms, and if the neglected writers have 
been forgotten because their faults were unspectacular, this does not rule 
them out as fit subjects for our study. 
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THEORY OF POLITICS 
While Hazlitt's moral philosophy is of definite interest to the 
historian of ideas, therefore, it does not seem to provide any positive 
clues about his ideological position. In this chapter, I intend to examine the 
theoretical element of his poltical writing. Although it is likely that this 
work was even less influential than his philosophy, it is worth evaluating the 
coherence and plausibility of his ideas, even if we should conclude that it 
does not help towards an understanding of his thought as a whole. Hazlitt 
clearly believed that he might make a valuable contribution to the theory of 
government; if our investigation should lead us to deny this, it would still 
be informative. Finally, the doctrine must be placed within its historical 
context, and its most probable sources identified. 
********* 
Hazlitt's exercise in abstract political theory is to be found in 
1 
his "Project for a New Theory of Civil and Criminal Legislation". It was never 
published in his life-time. It is likely that Hazlitt's intention was to 
include it in a volume outlining topics such as law, philosophy and economics; 
this work never appeared, and it is possible that the "Project" in its present 
form is only a preliminary draft. Hazlitt explains that the essay originated 
in a school exercise written when he was fourteen. The theme had arisen from a 
dispute "between my father and an old lady of the congregation, respecting the 
repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts and the limits of religious 
2 
toleration." 
The essay begins with Hazlitt's definition of a right. A right 
is "not simply that which is good or useful in itself, but that which is 
3 
thought so by the individual, and which has the sanction of his will as such." 
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This is because there are endless disagreements about what is good in itself, 
and-because- a man is the~ ~best judge ~of hi-s own -interests, -and a good is of 
no account without its capacity to excite the will of an agent. Once the will 
has chosen its object, nothing can interfere with its appropriation except the 
will of another. 
The obvious question which arises from this account is "What 
happens when the wills of several agents conflict?" In the first instance, 
Hazlitt appeals to self-interest, or, perhaps more precisely, a prudential 
element within self-interest, which prevents us from coming to blows during 
such controversies. But this cannot always be relied upon, and the public 
peace requires the notion of "political justice" to enter at this point. 
Political justice "is that which assigns the limits of these individual rights 
4 
or their compatibility or incompatibility with each other in society." Having 
brought up the phrase "political justice", Hazlitt seizes an opportunity of 
attacking William Godwin's belief that rights entail corresponding duties. 
This, he asserts, rests upon a mere confusion of terms. A man may have a 
duty to waive his rights on certain occasions, but "rights are seconded by 
force, duties are things of choice." "This is the import of the words in 
5 
common speech." In fact, for Hazlitt the possession of a right implies little 
more than its common possession by others. "Right, in a word, is the duty 
which each man owes to himself; or it is that portion of the general good of 
which (as being principally interested) he is made the special judge, and 
6 
which is put under his immediate keeping." 
Hazlitt proceeds to examine the nature of law, and the grounds 
which justify government. He begins with a definition of terms: "Law is 
something to abridge, or, more properly speaking, to ascertain the bounds 
of the original rights, and to coerce the will of individuals in the 
7 
community." The right to exercise this power arises from self-defence, the 
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requirement that equal rights are ensured for all against aggression. The 
-:r-ights of- soeiet;;y -a-rederived~from t-he aggregate of individual d:-ght:s;-these 
are conferred on the government. However, Hazlitt denies that laws are the 
mere creation of any social compact. Rights are prior to government and 
social living. For example, the right to self-defence must exist regardless 
of institutions. There can be no right of society to interfere with the 
rights of its members under normal circumstances; government may only step in 
when an infringement of individual rights has taken place. Hazlitt, therefore, 
seems to be an unequivocal natural rights theorist. Natural rights are, for 
him, "those the infringement of which cannot on any supposition go 
8 
unpunished." 
Hazlitt believes that several corollaries follow from this 
doctrine. Firstly, he believes that he has shown liberty and equality to be 
compatible. Rights are equal by nature, and the task of government is 
simply to ensure that they are not unduly circumscribed. Secondly, universal 
suffrage is a principle of "great importance" - to ignore the opinion of a 
single man is the first step towards a tyranny which ignores the whole 
community. It also follows that no man can be born a slave, that trade unions 
are just as legal as combinations among the masters, and that "one man has 
not a right to the produce of another's labour, but each man has a right to 
the benefit of his own exertions and the use of his natural and inalienable 
9 
powers." 
The next step in the argument is to show what "a man may 
10 
especially call his own." These are listed under four headings; his person, 
his actions, his property, and his opinions. That a man has a special 
interest in his own person would seem to be already established. Apart from 
the more obvious cases which are covered by the principle of self-defence, 
what of offensive smells and noises? Do these constitute an illicit attack on 
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our bodies? Hazlitt believes that they do. He rejects the notion that these 
probl~Jits can he decided- by an appeal- to utilitarian criteria;- "We want to 
know by given marks and rules what is best and useful", he writes," and they 
assure us very wisely, that this is infallibly and clearly determined by what 
11 
is best and useful." A different criterion must be used, and Hazlitt 
decides that the motive for the act is the decisive factor. If, for example, 
a man sets fire to some wood in his garden with the single intention of 
annoying his neighbours, he can be lawfully restrained or even punished. In 
the case of noises, a flautist practicing on a public staircase should not be 
molested, whereas a person banging a drum beneath someone's window is 
"altogether disagreeable", and the man should be made to move away. Factories 
are a nuisance, but necessary; they should be situated outside towns if 
12 
possible. 
For Hazlitt, "The object and principle of the laws of property, 
... is this: 1. To supply individuals and the community with what they need. 
2. To secure an equal share to each individual, other circumstances being the 
same. 3. To keep the peace and promote industry and plenty, by proportioning 
each man's share to his own exertions, or to the good-will and discretion of 
13 
others." Identifying the state of nature with one of "solitary independence", 
Hazlitt asserts that here the individual has a right to possess everything. In 
society this right is limited by the claims of others. There are several 
methods of settling claims to property. Firstly, the goods can be divided 
equally; but this "applies only to the case of joint finding". Secondly, 
priority of possession is a just title, on the principle of "first come, first 
served", and because to deprive a long-term proprietor is to run against a 
law of human nature. A third right is established by labour, and a fourth by 
inheritance. Here Hazlitt takes issue with primogeniture, since he believes 
that a testator should be free in the dispersal of his goods. Finally, in the 
case of air or water, there can be no property as there is no competition for 
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these plentiful commodities. He comes very close to justifying poaching on the 
same -prinGiple. Ato wor-st, this is a "kind of hon-est thieving", aiid th-e 
injustice of the game laws threaten to provoke a revolution, as it had already 
14 
done in France. 
As for opinion, Hazlitt does not think that points of view 
should be subject to punishment. No-one is forced to like another; indeed, the 
use of constraint is the likeliest way to produce hatred. In the case of 
libel, the practise of anonymous writing should be stopped, and the shame of 
public exposure should be enough to deter would-be calumniators. Society can 
exert its vengeance by shunning indecent or libellous scribblers. This is as 
far as it should go. The liberty of the press must be preserved, and its good 
name no longer sullied by cowardly abusers. 
The liberty of action should "have no limit but the rights of 
persons or property aforesaid". "Everyone has a right to use his natural 
powers in the way most agreeable to himself ... provided he does not 
15 
interfere with the corresponding rights and liberties of others." Laws 
impeding such activity should be as few as possible. For instance, morality 
cannot be enforced by law "because morals have to do with the will and 
16 
affections, and the law only puts a restraint on these." If the 
majority of the population disapprove of drunkeness, for example, this 
signifies nothing. The agent himself suffers the natural consequences of his 
insobriety. But, it might be argued, so do his wife and children. Hazlitt 
says that if the wife is ill-treated, she may apply to the Justice of the 
Peace for redress. The parish would be within their rights if they refused 
assistance to her. Similarly, a man should not be prosecuted for attempting to 
take his own life unless he does so in a manner which endangers others. 
Duelling is permissible or not under the same circumstances. All religions 
should be tolerated, and atheism too - the existence of unbelief does not 
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prevent others from church-going. "There should be no secular interference in 
sa_cred thil}gp; _no laws to suppress or establish any church o-r sect in 
17 
religion; no religious persecutions, tests, or disqualifications." In these 
words Hazlitt produces his view of the controversy which had inspired the 
original essay. 
In short, Hazlitt believed that "a system of just and useful 
laws may be constructed nearly, if not wholly, on the principle of the right 
18 
of self-defence, or the security for persons, liberty and property." A man is 
not bound to pay taxes to help government defend the community. However, it 
follows that government is not bound to support him in such a situation. 
Governments are always the servants of the public, and must be continually 
scrutinized. Because the extent of individual rights is not always clear, it 
is best to trust the "general voice" for "settling the boundaries of right 
19 
and wrong", and, more importantly, keeping the authorities in their place. 
Short as it is, the essay is not without serious ambiguities, and 
these need to be discussed before moving on to the implications of the work. 
Firstly, we must take a closer look at the discussion of rights which 
begins the essay. Hazlitt originally seems to identify natural rights with 
natural powers, dependent upon the individual will. Since such powers differ 
between persons, and conflict is almost sure to arise, governments are created 
in order to ensure fair play. There is a bare minimum of rights which 
government must ensure to all. Thus, although "coming into society ... 
circumscribes my will and rights", it does so in a manner which makes rights 
20 
more secure. Hence, Hazlitt believes that, like Rousseau, he has shown 
liberty to be compatible with equality, in the sense of equality in the eyes 
of the law. 
There are many difficulties involved in this theory, and 
criticism is not assisted by Hazlitt's opaque prose. Hazlitt thinks that in 
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the common estimation, rights are "seconded by force", while duties are 
ma~ter-s of choi-ce-, This is a strange posit-ion; if anything it i-s mor-e common 
for these definitions to be reversed. The notion that the possession of a 
right by an individual implies an obligation upon others cannot be dismissed 
so easily as Hazlitt seems to believe. In his doctrine, government is designed 
to lend force to existing rights; it appears to follow that in doing so it 
enforces a duty in others to respect such rights. It might be possible to 
regard this as an irrelevant aside, were it not for the fact that a theory of 
obligation is lacking from the body of the text. Subjects in Hazlitt's state 
certainly have a prudential motive for obeying the government, but this is not 
made explicit. At the very best, this is an unnecessary confusion; the 
discussion of rights, which may well owe much to Hobbes, would have been 
reasonably straight-forward without this gratuitous attack on Godwin. 
Hazlitt's essay also lacks a plausible account of the process by 
means of which the pre-social beings he portrays are brought to place their 
cherished rights under the power of a majority. Although Locke and Rousseau 
had given plausible solutions to this problem, Hazlitt seems to shy away from 
it. Hence, he has no coherent account about the formation of society; men 
apparently just come into it. As for the formation of government, it "is not 
21 
necessarily founded on common consent." Although contemporary writers such 
as Jeremy Bentham dismissed the problem of origins, they were entitled to 
since for Utilitarians the question is of academic importance. Hazlitt, as a 
natural rights theorist, seems to have no such dispensation, and his neglect 
is a major reason for the failure of the essay. 
The concept of the "general voice" seems reminiscent of 
Rousseau, who must be regarded as the major source for much of the argument. 
It is hardly necessary to say that Hazlitt does not address the difficulties 
which Rousseau wrestled with here. For example, Rousseau distinguished 
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"natural liberty, which is bounded only by the strength of the individual", 
22 
and civil liberty,- whi-ch is limited by the Gen-era-l Will". Ha:tlTtt seems 
unaware of differing spheres of liberty, which is the more surprising since 
his early teacher, Joseph Priestley, distinguished "political" from ''civil" 
liberty. Rousseau believed that the general will should be regarded as more 
than a simple numerical majority, and at least attempted a solution to the 
difficulties involved with the concept. By contrast, Hazlitt never clearly 
defines the general voice, nor places restrictions upon its legitimate field 
of operation. Thus, the dangers which have been identified in Rousseau's 
theory are, if anything, accentuated in Hazlitt. A simple majority may elect 
to protect individual rights in the manner which he envisaged; however, 
it may determine on a contrary course. Obviously society and government 
are formed to protect certain inalienable rights; but if the appeal from a 
tyrannical government is heard by an equally tyrannical public, there is 
no further recourse for the lovers of liberty. In view of Hazlitt's other 
writings on this subject, the naivety of these pronouncements is little 
short of startling. Overall it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that 
Hazlitt's discussion of rights and the theory of government that arises from 
it is defeated at the outset by superficial analysis and incoherent 
exposition. 
Despite this inescapable conclusion, it may be of some interest 
to examine the more detailed aspects of Hazlitt's theory, and for this 
purpose perhaps the section on property is the most interesting. As we have 
seen, the purposes of property are "1. To supply individuals with what they 
need. 2. To secure an equal share to each individual, other circumstances 
being the same. 3. To keep the peace and promote industry and plenty, by 
proportioning each man's share to his own exertions, or to the good-will and 
23 
discretion of others." At first glance, this appears to be something like the 
Marxian exhortation "To each according to his needs, from each according to 
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his abilities". But closer inspection reveals that these guidelines are far 
too vague to support any system o-f- drstrrbueion. While it might be argued 
that "1" and "2" are compatible, they become meaningless ln juxtaposition 
with "3". "Other circumstances being equal" in proposition "2" could be taken 
to tally with "1", since the unequal circumstances might refer to unequal 
needs; the more a man needs, the more he will be supplied with. But it is 
clear that "proportioning a man's share to his exertions, or to the good-will 
and discretion of others" conflicts with this. Good-will and discretion 
could lead to more productive workers sharing their surplus with the less 
fortunate or idle. But this charitable urge can only be self-imposed, 
since we have seen that for Hazlitt rights do not pre-suppose duties. He 
seems to be appealing to the sort of benevolence which he upheld in his 
Essay on the Principles of Human Action, but it should be noted that the 
individualism of this essay runs counter to the tone of the earlier treatise. 
It is more reasonable to assume that Hazlitt has merely cobbled together these 
propositions as a means of advocating a fairer order of society than that in 
which he lived. His general position on luxury and the Poor Laws can be taken 
as supporting this conclusion. It should be noted that in doing this 
Hazlitt has moved from a discussion of a whole new basis for human societies 
to urging piecemeal reforms of early nineteenth-century England, and that 
this is only one of several instances of the unexplained intrusion of the 
real into the ideal. 
Once again, a comparison with Rousseau is illuminating, 
although it is likely that here the direct influence of the latter is less 
evident. Hazlitt certainly lacks Rousseau's moral antipathy towards the 
institution of property in general. What Hazlitt objects to is a situation in 
which the many starve while the few live in plenty. To ensure that this 
is not the plight of England, the Poor Laws must be retained. This is a 
perennial theme in Hazlitt's work, and his humanitarian fervour explains this 
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particular "intrusion" of reality. Yet, on his own principles, it is 
easy to. defend the evas.ion- of rat-e-payi-ng. If a man can refuse his ta-xes to 
the government, as Hazlitt claims, then he can turn away the officials of the 
Parish. The only sanction in both cases is that the government may refuse 
him protection from aggression, or, one presumes, can deny him Parish relief 
if and when he requires it himself. But this solution to the problem is 
unclear. If the starving revolt against their superiors because the Poor Laws 
are widely evaded, it is likely that they will be indiscriminate in their 
revenge. Similarly, an invasion force would not single out for special 
tortures those enemies who have run down national defence by witholding their 
taxes. Clearly Hazlitt is confronted with a problem which must face all 
humanitarian individualists. "The greater part of a community ought not to 
be paupers or starving", he asserts, but, on his own principles, it is 
24 
difficult to see why not. He would presumably rest his case on the underlying 
principle of self-defence. But we are then confronted by the problem of the 
"general voice"; if a majority of the public thinks that the poor should not 
be supported in this way, then clearly they will prevail. 
The example of the drummer and the flautist also presents 
Hazlitt with difficulties. What we have here is Hazlitt's solution to the 
problem of self and other-regarding actions. Just as J.S Mill can be said to 
have permitted the magistrate to interfere extensively despite a theory which 
is intended to keep such activity to a minimum, it is difficult to see where 
government action is invalid on the basis of Hazlitt's principles. The case 
of the man who maliciously lights his fire seems tolerably clear. The motive 
is bad, and therefore the nuisance should be prevented. But when dealing with 
the drummer, Hazlitt shifts his ground. This man can be removed from the area 
of his choice unless he has an "extraordinary motive" to stay, despite the 
fact that only the relative difficulty of playing the flute distinguishes the 
25 
cases. Therefore, Hazlitt has not really succeeded in distinguishing 
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nuisances which should be abated, and those which are permissible. All he has 
done is to show that the law can reach further-in1:6 people's lives than he 
would like. For instance, while he denies that a drunkard should be 
restrained from sinking one pint too many, he would be liable to arrest if he 
left the pub singing. 
While Hazlitt's magistrate has extensive powers once a "crime" 
like this has been committed, he seems to be impotent up to this point. For 
example, he believes that opinion is free, and that force is inappropriate in 
this area. Thus, if a man sends me a death-threat, and I alert the 
authorities, they will shrug their shoulders and hurry off to remove a 
noisy percutionist from outside my enemy's window. Yet Hazlitt actually 
asserts that "government is bound to prevent ... violations of liberty and 
26 
justice". On his own theory they can only prevent recurrences. 
The case of the flautist and the drummer is an example of the 
use Hazlitt makes of illustrations and analogies in the essay; almost without 
exception, they are poor. Hazlitt compares government to a clock, which must 
be repaired or replaced if it goes wrong. The replacement of the clock is the 
revolution, which is likely "whenever the interests of the many are regularly 
27 
and outrageously sacrificed to those of the few." This is problematic in 
practice; it is difficult to see how the societal clock can be replaced, even 
on the most individualistic theory. But this is quibbling. The flaws in the 
analogy are relatively unimportant, since its purpose is to urge reformation 
on the existing government, not to advocate a revolution. Other examples are 
more unfortunate. He compares individuals to tiles in a mosaic, thus 
unintentionally implying that the whole of society is in some way more 
valuable than the parts (the same, of course, is true of the clock). Hazlitt's 
literary abilities and critical sense seem to have deserted him in the writing 
of this essay. 
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Hazlitt's belief in universal suffrage is not straight-forward 
either. It is- cleaiC tchat, li~e most theoretica-l demacrats a:t the time, he 
begged the whole question at issue by assuming that the newly-enfranchised 
masses would follow the guidance of their superiors. To prove his case, he 
produces another poor analogy. There is a wide reading public, but the 
verdict of qualified critics is still largely adhered to. But in fact 
qualified judges disagreed violently, very often on political grounds. The 
persecution of John Keats is an obvious example of this, but Hazlitt's 
own objections to the work of Robert Southey are clearly more political than 
literary. Furthermore, while people normally do not read novels for selfish 
reasons, the conservative case partly rested upon the belief that the poor 
would use their votes to expropriate the wealthy. But, more seriously still, 
while the literate public might defer to qualified judges in such matters, 
opponents of universal suffrage were concerned about the attitude of the 
illiterate. Significantly, Hazlitt has nothing to say on the subject of 
public education, even though this was widely discussed at the time. In view 
of the weakness of Hazlitt's case here, it is unsurprising that elsewhere in 
his work we find him very lukewarm on this subject. 
Overall, the essay is therefore a very baffling performance. We 
have seen that Hazlitt's moral philosophy is not of a kind which leads 
directly to political conclusions. His political theory is fully in line with 
this. The atomistic picture of society, and the lack of a theory of 
obligation, are difficult to square with the advocacy of benevolence which 
features in the Essay on the Principles of Human Action. There is no 
discussion of co-operative behaviour, just a vision of individuals 
successively irritating each other and complaining of their neighbours' 
aggressions. In the earlier essay, Hazlitt had demonstrated how the altruistic 
emotions develop. In this performance, the circle of benevolence seems to 
begin and to end with ourselves. 
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What appears to have happened is that Hazlitt has fallen between 
two stools. He has attempted to expouna an abstract theory of government. But 
he cannot resist bringing in contemporary illustrations which marr his case 
rather than enhance it. As we have seen, some sort of argument for the Poor 
Laws could have been derived from the principle of self-preservation. But 
while Hazlitt does speak of "the right which society has to defend itself 
against all aggression", this kind of collective self-preservation is not 
28 
argued for in the essay. Rather, Hazlitt treats society as an aggregation of 
individuals rather than what Rousseau described as a people. Without a 
collective feeling that no-one should be left to starve, or the corresponding 
conviction that society will dissolve unless action is taken, individuals will 
indeed opt out of their payments. The essay therefore rests on the assumption 
that governments will always tempted to abuse their power, while the general 
voice will always be right in its verdicts. Neither assumption is supported, 
and they could hardly be convincing in the absence of any thorough 
investigation into the nature of either society or government. 
Indeed, Hazlitt's essay is doomed from the outset. He candidly 
states that it is based upon a school exercise. It is clear that he makes a 
genuine attempt to recall the contents of this essay; but the reader can only 
anticipate that the result will be essentially incomplete. Even more 
surprising is the statement that the "Spirit of contradiction" will "rule over 
subluminary affairs, as the moon governs the tides", until "the unexpected 
29 
stroke of a comet throws up a new breed of men." He reaches this conclusion 
from his interpretation of the recent repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts 
(1828). This came about not from a sense of justice, or "the liberality of the 
30 
age", but rather from a sense of indifference. Now this characteristic 
digression gives us a clue to the extent of Hazlitt's failure. The point of 
an abstract theory of government must be to give the reader a standard by 
which to measure contemporary institutions. It is not unusual for such a 
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society to be peopled with "a new breed of men", in order to present moral 
standards by which-our-own can be appraised. What Hazlitt ha-s c-:Learl.y done is 
to draw an ideal state for the present race of men. In this he is following 
31 
Rousseau, who had avowedly taken "men as they are and laws as they might be". 
It would appear that such an approach depends in part on a belief that men "as 
they are" might be capable of improvement. But clearly, the men in Hazlitt's 
society would still be governed by the "spirit of contradiction''; the 
government would never introduce or repeal legislation for moral reasons, and 
the people would go on living much as they already do, constantly worrying 
about infringements on their rights, and occasionally glancing to the skies in 
fearful anticipation of the approaching cornet. 
The suggestion, therefore, is that the "Project for a New Theory 
of Civil and Criminal Legislation" is not so much a new theory as a proposal 
to remedy certain abuses which threaten the peaceful workings of an already 
flawed constitution. This explanation is born out by a brief examination of 
contemporary practice and thought. Obviously the initial reaction, that 
government interference bears no resemblance to that of today, would be an 
anachronism. The eighteenth-century obsession with arbitrary power was quite 
real, however flimsy we may count the evidence for such a threat. But it is 
true to point out that Hazlitt would have been far more original had he 
suggested a wider role for the state. Earlier writers such as Blackstone and 
De Lolrne had noted that England was a little-governed nation; for Paine, the 
state was at best a necessary evil, and Godwin had urged that eventually we 
should discard it. On the conservative side, Burke may have made metaphysical 
pronouncements about its sacred nature, but he also said that "Whatever each 
man can seperately do, without trespassing upon others, he has a right to do 
32 
for himself." During the Napoleonic Wars, the press-gang and the tax-collector 
represented an unpopular face of government, but these menaces were largely 
withdrawn with the corning of peace. There were a large number of punishable 
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offences, many of which carried the death penalty. But as Hazlitt himself 
pointed out, the numbeJ; of pr-osecut-ions- and convictions under the-se Act.s 
was falling markedly. It is very likely that the original motive for Hazlitt's 
essay remains its most sensible justification; the attempt by government to 
interfere with religious and political beliefs. Clearly Hazlitt has a point 
when he asserts that opinion cannot be forced. In the case of religion, the 
government could be said to have interfered if it denied any man civil rights 
on the basis of his creed. But Hazlitt's views are not particularly relevant 
to the controversy; full toleration is likely to seem a self-evident 
33 
proposition to a man upon whose shoulders religion sits lightly. His 
suggestions on libel are more interesting. Although he successfully sued 
Blackwood's magazine after it had described him as "pimpled Hazlitt", he 
clearly believed that press freedom could not flourish under such laws. 
However, here again the mixture of the real and the ideal cast doubt on 
his solution to a problem. Unlike J.S Mill, he believed that public 
ostracism could be appropriate at times; in this case, when a writer has 
offended against public morals. Hazlitt must have been aware that such an 
informal system of punishment could inflict worse penalties than the letter 
of the law. So, in order that such a sanction might be consistent with 
justice, the "general voice" would need to be infallible; the comet would have 
arrived already. This conflicts with the underlying assumption of the essay, 
and thus one of its more promising suggestions falls to the ground. 
Although Hazlitt's excursion into abstract political theory 
must be counted a failure, it is in many ways an instructive one. The essay is 
that of a critic of his times who finds it impossible to overlook the faults 
of mankind by constructing his "Utopia" on anything but solid earth. 
Therefore, if we are to properly understand the value of Hazlitt's work in 
this field, we must turn away from such work to his engagements with men and 
events. In the remainder of this thesis we will find that, paradoxically, 
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apart from the masterpiece The Spirit of the Age, Hazlitt's most lasting 
achieveme-nt is to oe fo-und in his "occasional" work. It is probably fortunate 
for Hazlitt that despite his evident fondness for the "Theory of Civil and 
Criminal Legislation", it was never reprinted during his lifetime. 
Finally, it is of some interest to identify possible influences 
upon the essay, since it is likely that these influences may be discerned 
elsewhere. While it may be illicit to name one over-riding mentor in an 
incoherent essay, it seems that Rousseau played a major inspiring role, and 
the outstanding illustrations of this have been noted. Evidently Hazlitt's 
reading of Paine and Godwin was also important. The individualism based upon 
natural rights, the plea for toleration, the humanitarian concern for the 
poor coupled with suspicion of any governmental efforts to educate them can 
all be traced widely in the writings of the "Eighteenth-Century 
Commonwealthsmen", especially the later representatives such as Priestley and 
34 
Price. Perhaps most interesting of all is the similarity between Hazlitt's 
arguments and those of Sir James Mackintosh in his Vindiciae Gallicae. 
There we find the natural rights, the desire for extensive reform, the hatred 
of arbitrary power, the belief that unequal property is natural but must not 
be accentuated by government abuses. Mackintosh also uses the analogy of 
the clock, and it is possibly to him that Hazlitt owes his echoing of 
Machiavelli - the belief that when a state has become too corrupted, it must 
return to first principles after a revolution. We find Mackintosh stating 
that "The multitude have natural and sufficient knowledge to value the 
35 
superiority of enlightened men", through the benign influence of the press. 
The relationship between the two thinkers is discussed in greater detail 
below; here it is sufficient to suggest that Mackintosh's belief in the 
progressive nature of society is the most outstanding divergence in their 
beliefs; for him, the arrival of a comet would be cause for regret. 
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********* 
Although the "Project" was Hazlitt's sole exercise in political 
theory, there is another short piece which it is appropriate to mention here. 
This is the concluding part of the "Speeches in Parliament on the Distresses 
36 
of the Country", which Hazlitt mysteriously omitted from the Political Essays. 
Originally written in August, 1816, it contains Hazlitt's proposed remedies 
for the problems which had arisen from the post-war dislocation of the 
English economy, and is presented as his alternative to Coleridge's recently-
advertised Lay Sermon. Briefly, the suggestions are that a tax of twenty 
per-cent should be laid on the salaries of public officials which exceed one 
hundred pounds; that all sinecure posts, and undeserved pensions should be 
abolished; that a tax should be levied on landed property which yields over 
a hundred pounds per annum; that the taxes on consumption, labour and 
manufacturing should be removed, and the Poor Laws and tithes scrapped. 
This is an interesting package of measures, which certainly 
appears to be radical at first sight. Hazlitt's hostility is directed against 
abuses which had been perceived by most opponents of government since the 
Civil Wars at least; standing armies, well-paid positions devoid of duties, 
taxation, and luxury. However, a comparison with Thomas Paine's Rights of 
Man, Part Two, which is invited by the tone and content of the essay, 
leads to a different conclusion. Paine's tract was a genuinely radical 
document, since it went beyond the traditional complaints about corruption and 
waste, and outlined a scheme which anticipates welfare benefits in many ways. 
Hazlitt, who was acquainted with Paine's work, has no plans for wealth 
distribution. His attitude seems to be that government should be paid for by 
the well-off, since they benefit disproportionately from its existence. The 
poor should be left in peace, to earn their own sustenance in their own way. 
They should be relieved from the taxation which is the major cause of their 
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troubles, but this in turn should relieve the wealthy of the Poor Rates which 
were a growing burden for them. In short, the essay represents a compromise 
solution to poverty and corruption, rather than an anti-aristocratic manifesto 
like the Rights of Man. The government envisaged by Hazlitt might have less 
patronage at its disposal, but Hazlitt's intention is merely to cut away the 
corrupt accretions of the post-Revolutionary period, not to re-construct the 
institutional system in any far-reaching manner. The impression of moderation 
is re-inforced when it is recalled that Hazlitt regarded his article in the 
light of an "experiment", seemingly thrown off as a basis for discussion. It 
appeared at a time when he was particularly embittered, and when the Whig 
opposition seemed to have the government in trouble on the question of 
expenditure. It might be suggested, therefore, that the occasion was ideal for 
Hazlitt to expound his most radical schemes; what we find, however, is a plan 
for major reform which falls short of radicalism. Indeed, apart for the 
proposal to tax land rather than consumer goods, the article would not have 
seemed out of place in the eighteenth-century Craftsman, mouth-piece of the 
conservative Viscount Bolingbroke. 
Another notable aspect of this essay is its brevity. In fewer 
than seven pages of the collected Works, Hazlitt deals with complex aspects 
of economic and social policy, predicting the yield from his new taxes and the 
resulting benefits to society with a refreshing lack of supporting evidence. 
Indeed, we may be justified in regarding this essay as a moral exhortation 
rather than a blue-print for reform. As in the case of the "Project", there is 
a tendency to superficiality in his work which indicates that Hazlitt did not 
excel in this kind of writing. The fact that he took so long to work up the 
"Project" for publication suggests that Hazlitt was aware of this; such a 
recognition is also the probable explanation for the omission of the third 
instalment of the "Speeches in Parliament" from the Political Essays. He 
not be rejected as a political writer on this basis, however. It might be 
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argued, indeed, that students of political theory have a snobbishness which 
leads them to concentrate upon the most ambitious or obscure thinkers to the 
exclusion of the great minds who were modest enough to concentrate on current 
events. The demolition expert may not win the sort of admiration accorded to 
a great architect, but this is an analogy which should not apply to the 
history of ideas. 
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HAZLITT AND THE PROBLEM OF IDEOLOGY 1789-1830 
The ideological protagonists of Hazlitt's period are classified 
under many different names. If they are men of the "left", they might be 
anarchists, socialists, liberals, revolutionaries, radicals or reformers. 
The groupings on the "right" are normally less diverse; they are either 
conservatives or reactionaries. Otherwise the opposing forces are drawn up 
under the party names of "Whig" and "Tory". 
While historians have sometimes differed bitterly over who fits 
where in this scheme, the scheme itself has rarely received much attention. 
Hence, there is no universal agreement about what these terms denote. 
There is no consensus over the exact meaning of the word "ideology" itself. 
At first glance it seems surprising that this situation has continued for so 
long. But the issues involved are highly complex and controversial, and since 
students in the field of political theory have not reached agreement, it is 
1 
pardonable that historians have flinched. 
There is no doubt, however, that without stable terms of 
reference, disputes over the ideological identity of historical characters 
cannot be satisfactorily solved. Each critic may come to his conclusion on 
impressionistic grounds, which means there is little room for argument with 
someone who has received a different impression. Since such approaches tend to 
be readings of a thinker's work in the light of contemporary circumstances, 
this process of thesis and antithesis may go on indefinitely. Interesting new 
light may be shed on the original text by this means, but it is likely that 
greater illumination will be shed on present-day concerns. 
The problem of anachronism is closely related to that presented 
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by students who are themselves overtly ideological. The Marxist, liberal and 
conservative are convinced that ideology is confined to the other camps, while 
their own thought is either "scientific" or "common-sensical". The problem is 
not that these critics automatically come to erroneous conclusions. But 
they are likely to concentrate on different kinds of evidence, which makes 
constructive discussion very difficult. The Marxist, conservative and liberal 
may well agree that Locke contributed to the liberal tradition. But for one 
he is a bourgeois apologist, another sees him as a rationalist, and the last 
rejoices in his true picture of the world. However interesting this committed 
work might be, it will tell us as much about the present-day critic as the 
thought of Locke. 
In contrast to the impressionistic and the ideological writer, 
the historian of ideas must attempt to gain a sympathetic understanding of the 
subject and his context. Although complete detachment is impossible, he should 
try to place himself and the reader in the position of a perceptive onlooker 
who knows the participants personally, and only votes for one side on the rare 
occasions when his principles are so threatened that he must intervene. Since 
a major task of this thesis is to place Hazlitt's political ideas within their 
ideological and historical context, we must now attempt to describe a 
2 
methodology which might permit the maximum degree of objectivity. 
1) The Concept of Ideology 
Many theories of ideology are little more than products of particular types 
of ideological thinking. For the Marxist, ideology is developed by a class in 
order to validate its own interests. The working class, however, chooses its 
goals by means of a scientific study of the historical process. Liberal 
theorists identify ideology with totalitarian beliefs; in doing so, they 
define "totalitarian" in a special way which excludes themselves. 
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Conservatives agree with this in part, but their particular animus is directed 
towards evidence of abstract, "rationalistic" theorising. Such accounts of 
ideology cannot all be right. Indeed, the suspicion arises that they are all 
wrong; that the use of each will simply result in ideological writing. 
There is, however, a more promising theory, which does not appear 
to have a favourable account of any ideology built into it. This is based upon 
the argument that all ideological positions are underpinned by a theory of 
3 
human nature. These give rise to diverse ethical understandings of the world, 
and a belief in political and social arrangements best fitted for man. This 
approach to the subject is best expounded by noting its positive implications 
for the history of ideological ideas, together with any difficulties which 
immediately arise. 
Perhaps the most revealing application of this theory is the 
light it sheds on political debate. Armed with contrasting views about the 
proper end of man's activity, convinced ideologists of different camps might 
agree on particular policy issues, but their reasons for doing so will rarely 
be the same. For example, a person convinced of man's basic depravity may 
welcome proposals for the extension of welfare benefits, even if these are 
brought forward by someone who sees all men as brothers. In the first case, 
the intention may be to interrupt the natural progression from poverty to 
theft; in the latter it is to reduce one of the gratuitous barriers between 
kindred souls. This latent clash of principle might be obscured for some time, 
and a coalition built up. But if the "pessimist" were to advocate the return 
of capital punishment in view of some spectacular crime, his ally would urge 
that punishment has purely reformatory purposes. It would become clear that 
the partnership was founded on transient grounds, and it would soon return to 
a state of "every man for himself, and God for all of us". The historian of 
ideology, therefore, must always look beyond the cause supported to the 
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reasons advanced. In this subject, words speak more loudly than deeds. 
An effective spokesman for this view of ideology has noted how 
ideologists use "pseudo-descriptive" terms, which are in fact loaded with 
4 
ethical pre-suppositions. Thus, although an ideologist may purport to give an 
objective account of a politically-significant event, he will present his 
"facts" in such a manner as to lead his listeners to the desired conclusion. 
This is a perennial feature of historical writing, and Hazlitt's period is 
particularly affected. There is a good illustration in the debate between 
Burke and Paine over the treatment of Louis XVI and his Queen at Versailles. 
In this case, more than the "facts" were in dispute. Even if the protagonists 
had concurred on every last detail of events, it would have seemed that they 
were writing about a different situation. Hence, fundamental disputes about 
human nature not only affect the motives for action, but also the manner in 
which the motives are explained. 
As there is no theory of human nature which has received 
universal scientific acknowledgement, our ideological stand-point is normally 
determined by a-rational factors. Ideological conviction is in many ways 
similar to a religious faith. This explains why it is difficult for 
ideologists to find common ground for discussion, however rational they may 
appear to be in other aspects of life. As in the case of religion, it is not 
unknown for dramatic conversions to take place. In the period under review, 
ideological commitments were unusually volatile. While ideological theories of 
ideology tend to explain such conversions in terms of a move from the light to 
the dark or vice-versa, there is a possibility that this methodology may 
provide more constructive answers. An optimistic view of human nature may be 
shaken by exposure to evil; a pessimist may change his views in response to an 
act of benevolence. The conversions which took place among Hazlitt's 
contemporaries were more complicated than this. But the central importance of 
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theories of human nature will be a useful guide when we turn to examine his 
response to these changes of principle. 
Another point that should be made here is that there is no degree 
of commitment which qualifies a person as an ideologist. It is often the case 
that an individual will have no opinion at all on matters of great concern to 
other members of his ideological "family". Although there are usually a few 
central issues which pre-dominate for each group, ideology does not exert such 
dictatorship in every case. To believe this is to make the liberal mistake of 
regarding all ideology as totalitarian; as Stalin said, unanimity is only 
conceivable in a graveyard and not even he could force agreement on all issues. 
Similarly, it would be wrong to reject those who hold self-contradictory views 
from our inquiries. There would be few subjects for ideological study if we 
were so selective. There are, of course, degrees of ideological commitment, 
and these should be taken into account. 
Finally, where some students have looked for a logical structure 
to ideological beliefs, the assumption here is that such a search can only 
result in imposing artificial clarity onto the ideas of ideologists. Marxism 
and Christianity may have demanded purity at one time, but there are other 
creeds which are more flexible and still remain ideologies. We may discover 
certain tendencies in the way members of an ideological group respond to 
particular issues, but since circumstances vary these attitudes are no more 
than provisional. Liberals may generally advocate free speech, but one could 
demand the censureship of racists and remain a liberal. In short, the 
political measures normally advocated by members of an ideological family are 
indications of their position, but are far from being defining 
characteristics. They become useful when the figure under review has no 
recorded statements on human nature, but in these cases we must use the 
evidence with particular caution. 
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At this point it is proper to notice the objections which 
might be levelled against this theory. In his recent study of The Briti&h 
Political Tradition, Professor W.H Greenleaf has powerfully argued that all 
5 
such attempts to locate the "essence" of ideologies are flawed. His view is 
that this involves excessive reductionism; in boiling down ideological 
statements to discover a common ingredient, the flavour will be lost. Now, 
historical reductionism is almost always to be avoided, on the grounds that 
it normally produces very one-sided history, and that even if the case for a 
common causal factor were proven, it would actually explain very little. 
But the methodology suggested here is not reductionism of the same kind as 
such statements as "history is determined by class-conflict". It is 
reductionism at one remove. Ideology is itself an abstraction, a tool which 
helps to explain political motivation. If we are to make use of this tool, it 
seems sensible to arrive at a consensus over the terminology involved, since, 
as we have seen, the continued use of different criteria leads only to 
confusion. The only possible method of reaching agreement would appear to be 
reductionism. Professor Greenleaf himself calls one volume of his study "The 
Ideological Heritage", a title which, had he followed his own prescription, 
would have no agreed meaning. In this volume he classifies thinkers into 
"collectivists", "individualists" and conservatives in a manner which suggests 
that there is indeed some element common to all. Although he does not use such 
wide general terms as the present study applies to a different period, it 
would be improper to argue that he has not indulged in reductionism. In short, 
the historian cannot do otherwise unless he is to abandon the idea of 
identifying traditions of thought entirely. 
Another related objection urges that we cannot identify members 
of a tradition ourselves. This should only be done by people who feel that 
they are continuing the tradition. This approach seems to be an 
unnecessary abdication of responsibility, since on the theory of ideology 
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proposed above, self-conscious ideologists would be the very last people to 
trust. They will "claim" particular thinkers for themselves, presenting their 
own,ideologically-coloured account of each thinker's work. Clearly it is 
preferable to leave this procedure to those who have no particular axe to 
grind. 
2) Terminology 
For the purposes of this thesis, the most important ideological 
groupings will be termed "conservative" and "liberal". There is a problem of 
anachronism here, since the words were not widely used by Hazlitt's 
contemporaries. While there were self-conscious liberals during his life-time, 
the word "conservative" seems to have first appeared in this context after 
6 
his death. However, the usage may be justified because although the words did 
not exist throughout the period, the positions which they describe did. It is 
absurd to suggest that the founder of conservatism was not a conservative, and 
that Fox was not a liberal, simply because they did not live long enough to 
adopt the label themselves. Furthermore, these words are generally used by 
historians of the period, and may be used to avoid confusion. 
A more serious difficulty is the fact that "conservatism" and 
"liberalism" have two meanings. The primary, or ideological meaning will be 
taken here to denote the agent's view of human nature; but there is a 
secondary meaning which indicates the stance towards present society and 
political institutions. A liberal in this sense is normally a humanitarian, 
while the conservative stands out against change. We shall return to this 
question a little later. For now, it suffices to say that this confusion, 
which bedevils much work on the subject, must be borne in mind at all times, 
but that it may be overcome. 
Conservatism is taken here to denote a belief in the moral 
corruption of man, liberalism a faith in the progressive, rational nature of 
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humanity. As such, the conservative places most emphasis upon order, while the 
liberal believes that man thrives best without excessive interference from 
others. Now these are generalisations, strictly applicable in very few cases. 
For the most part, the historian of political ideas is dealing with attitudes 
which lie between these ideal types. A decision must normally be made on the 
balance of evidence; a prevalent tone of pessimism indicates the conservative, 
and a habitual feeling that man is capable of improvement is the hallmark of 
liberalism. In some cases, the thinker will be close enough to the generalised 
model for the term to stand on its own. But more often a qualifying term will 
be necessary to provide a more accurate picture. 
In the period under review, the most common terms of 
qualification are "liberal" and ''conservative" in their secondary senses. 
We have seen that this promises confusion, but traditional usage demands that 
they are not discarded. Indeed, there is a way in which confusion can be 
avoided. The ideological term, denoting the view of human nature, should 
always come last in our short-hand description. Therefore, if a thinker has 
a strong belief in the progressive nature of man under free institutions and 
considers that present arrangements allow this satisfactorily, he would best 
be described as a conservative liberal. Correspondingly, if the agent 
thinks that man is fatally flawed, but that governmental control is more 
likely to produce harm that good, it would be appropriate to call him a 
liberal conservative. In both these examples, the first term indicates the 
attitudes which have arisen from the ideological position which is shown in 
the second. 
The other terms which are frequently used include "radical" and 
"reformer". These are not ideological positions, although they are sometimes 
used as if they are. They relate to the degree of change deemed necessary by 
the agent, not the desired outcome of these changes. When used in 
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conjunction with an ideological term, "radical" is taken here to mean the 
7 
desire to change government root-and-branch. "Reformer" implies that the 
remedy can be found by adjustments in the present arrangements. The terms, 
therefore, must be very carefully distinguished. Radicalism will be generally 
found in those who exhibit a relatively pure ideological commitment; it is 
unlikely that a thinker who is ambivalent about what is best for man would 
contemplate a complete overhaul of institutions. 
The word "reactionary", however, is more problematic. Mao's 
assertion that all reactionaries are paper tigers is hardly the least precise 
definition that has been offered. Does a reactionary wish to turn the clock 
back? If so, how far? Does he only react against recent changes? Or does he 
stand in the way of change which is obviously needed? Who, then, is to decide 
on the necessity of any change? Clearly most commentators have used the word 
to show their hostility to conservatives. This is a little unfair, since many 
reformers appealed to the past to justify their demands. In fact, this tactic 
has been used by so many writers with such varied purposes that it would be 
better to do without the term entirely. 
The terms "left" and "right" are also highly dubious when used 
in the history of ideology. They are standing temptations to anachronism. 
The political battlefield is not stationary over the centuries, but critics 
who employ these terms may easily commit the error of imagining that the men 
of the left in 1642 would fight alongside the revolutionists of 1789, to take 
8 
an obvious example. Also, if these terms are used in every period they lead 
one to expect a full spectrum of views at all times, and incite historians to 
seek out and distort the writings of marginal thinkers. This is not to imply 
that thinkers who were neglected in their day are not worthy of independent 
study, so long as the contemporary framework of debate is constantly kept in 
view. 
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Finally, it is quite valid to investigate more precise 
traditions of thought, such as the work of the "Commonwealthsmen" studied by 
Caroline Robbins, and those hierarchical thinkers portrayed by W.H Greenleaf 
9 
in his Order, Empiricism, and Politics. However, it might be argued that 
these traditions fall respectively within the liberal and conservative 
categories, and this should not be forgotten. The problem of abstraction which 
Professor Greenleaf notes in connection with the broader ideological labels 
afflicts this endeavour to a similar degree - perhaps even more seriously, 
because these more restricted models are more likely to make us neglect 
aspects of a writer's thought which lie outside the boundary walls. In the 
cases named above, major contributions have been made to the history of ideas, 
and clearly the method is profitable when used with skill. 
It may be objected that on the basis outlined above, 
impressionistic judgements will still play a role. This, indeed, is quite 
unavoidable. The boundary between reformism and radicalism, even pessimism 
and optimism, will be difficult to ascertain in practice. The advantage of 
this method lies in the fact that there is a clear distinction between 
ideological and dispositional factors, and that in the former case there is a 
clear body of evidence to which appeal can be made in disputes. Also, by 
its recognition that ideology affects all historians to some extent, it 
encourages the detection of students who write political manifestoes rather 
than history. The best work in the history of ideas is composed with 
awareness of personal bias, coupled with the desire to compensate for this as 
much as possible. 
In order to illustrate this methodology further, two examples of 
ideological figures from Hazlitt's period have been selected for brief 
examination. They have been chosen because they are normally associated with 
a definite position. We shall then turn to Hazlitt's own views on political 
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principles, to discover whether he demonstrates an understanding of what we 
have called ideology. 
A LIBERAL REFORMER: FRANCIS PLACE 
Francis Place is often nick-named "the radical tailor of 
10 
Charing Cross". The assumption behind this is that he was a radical liberal. 
It would be reasonable to say that those men normally described as radicals 
believed that institutional discrimination should be ended, in both religious 
and more strictly poltical spheres. This position was generally based upon a 
belief that free participation was best suited to man's nature. As we have 
seen, radicalism is a belief that the present governmental structure is 
totally unfitted for fulfilling the purpose of man's existence, which gives 
rise to the conviction that institutions should be wholly reconstructed. 
At times, Place gives strong indications of radical sympathies. 
At the time of the first Reform Act, he wrote that this was the beginning of 
an inevitable process, "which from time to time will increase the power of the 
people and lessen that of government, until it has either totally destroyed it 
11 
by a violent ebullition or quietly absorbed it." As a fervent disciple of 
Jeremy Bentham, he complained that government was conducted on an ad hoc basis 
quite opposed to the sound Utilitarian principles which should direct it. 
Bentham advocated Universal Suffrage on the grounds that in elections each 
man should count as one and no-one as more than one; the contrast between the 
application of this principle and the limited, customary franchises in 
English constituencies of the time is striking enough to consider this a 
demand for radical change. 
However, a little closer examination reveals that this position 
should be qualified. Place was certainly not convinced that human nature was 
benevolent when allowed free play. He chastised Cobbett for being "too 
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ignorant to see that the common people must ever be imbecile ... when not 
12 
encouraged and supported by others who have money and influence." In the same 
13 
mood he wrote to James Mill, "how very few are there who are not common men." 
14 
Mill himself "thought human life a poor thing at best",as his son testified. 
The evidence suggests that Bentham's followers were not the rigid liberals 
they are often portrayed as being. While they certainly thought that the 
people were to be trusted in electing the best governers, it is not clear 
that they were optimistic enough to believe that such men were equipped to 
take an active share in administration themselves. 
This has definite implications for Place's radicalism, and it 
is unsurprising that there are limits to the amount of change envisaged by 
him. Certainly he was no social leveller. He looked on the masses as the 
"vulgarity", clearly distinguishing between them and "the people", who were 
15 
those "by whom the rest must be governed". The natural governers of society 
were always to be men of property. Place himself was not only reasonably 
prosperous, but he had also risen in status due to his activities in 
Westminster politics. He leant towards the aristocratic Hobhouse and Burdett 
in preference to "demagogues" such as William Cobbett and Henry Hunt. Hunt, 
he informed Mill in 1816, "is a pretty sample of an ignorant, turbulent, 
16 
mischief-making fellow, a highly dangerous one in turbulent times." Place's 
caution lent credence to the belief that he was a spy in government 
employment. 
In short, it is preferable to classify Place as a reformer 
rather than a radical. But his liberalism clearly over-rides the occasional 
pessimistic outbursts. He placed great trust in the power of human 
rationality. He devoted a good deal of energy to the establishment of 
educational facilities for working men, and his initial solution to the 
Malthusian problem was "good teaching". While he did not entertain 
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glorious visions of the future in the manner of some contemporaries - he was 
rendered speechless by Robert Owen's Utopianism- he does show a strong 
conviction that progress in human affairs was likely. 
CONSERVATISM: ARTHUR WELLESLEY, DUKE OF WELLINGTON 
It is generally believed that the Duke of Wellington was more 
at home on the battlefield than in Parliament. He himself thought that 
political activity was largely an exercise in common sense. "There was much 
talk of "Whig principles, and Tory principles, and liberal principles, and 
Mr. Canning's principles;" but I confess that I have never seen a definition 
of any of them, and cannot make to myself a clear idea of what any of them 
17 
mean." This statement may be explained in various ways. His introduction 
of a distinction between Canning's principles and Tory principles is an 
obvious hit against that troublesome collegue; the claim of ignorance is 
partly a reflection of Wellington's disliking for partisan politics. But 
this does not mean that he lacked convictions himself. Indeed, the suggestion 
that party principles are irrelevant in relation to the national interest 
is a tell-tale sign of an ideologist at work. His definition of the national 
interest appears irrefutable to him, because he operates within a framework 
of ideas which prevent him from seeing any alternatives. 
This interpretation is borne out by the continuation of the 
passage quoted above. He announced his intention to maintain "the 
prerogatives of the Crown, the rights and privileges of the Church and its 
union with the State; and these principles are not inconsistent with a 
determination to do everything in my power to secure the liberty and promote 
the prosperity and happiness of the people". The order of priorities given 
here is typical of the thinkers of the time who based their views upon a 
conservative view of human nature. This affords a clue to Wellington's 
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ideological identity, but we need more evidence. 
Wellington did hold pessimistic ideas about human nature. His 
confession that his soldiers terrified him, and that they were the scum of the 
earth, are well-known. Furthermore, his correspondence is frequently 
enlivened by prophecies of doom. His favourite target for such opinions was 
John Wilson Croker, who was equally disenchanted with the trend of events. 
"It is some consolation to us who are so near the end of our career that we 
shall be spared seeing the Consummation of the ruin that is gathering around 
18 
us" is a typical pronouncement. Wellington believed that the passage of the 
Reform Bill in 1832 was effected by men who had forgotten that "all Gov't, 
even that of Self is restraint, and that it is not safe to entrust the Powers 
19 
of Restraint solely to the hands of those who ought to be restrained." The 
natural rulers of society were those he termed the "parti conservateur" -the 
Bishops and clergy, the aristocracy and the landed interest in general, plus 
great merchants and bankers. He was uneasy about the educational reforms 
proposed by liberals such as Brougham, believing that if the poor were to be 
educated at all it should be under the influence of religious principles. 
Wellington's misfortune was to shoulder the responsibility of 
governing the country when the trend was towards institutional changes he 
disliked. The threat of reform was one of the reasons which induced him to 
stay in politics, but this fact has been lost on historians who see him as 
a reactionary who opposed obvious improvements in the interest of his class. 
There is no need to claim that Wellington's views were equally persuasive as 
those of his liberal opponents. It is quite sufficient to show that these 
principles were grounded upon a genuine fear for the likely consequences of 
reform. It would have been quite consistent for Wellington to leave the 
management of these changes to others, but his attempts to carry them through 
himself in the face of opposition from within his own ranks demonstrates his 
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conviction that national tranquility was of more importance than mere party 
advantage. A desire to see the problem of France quietly settled seems to have 
been Wellington's motive for acquiescence in the Bourbon Restorations of 1814 
and 15. 
Wellington's career, indeed, shows that the caricature of 
conservatism beloved by Whig and Marxist historians is shallow. When called 
upon to defend the abolition of the Test and Corporation Acts in 1828, 
he argued that he was not in favour of adhering to measures which were 
necessary at one time, but were now redundant. This is a good illustration 
of the distinction between the two meanings of "conservatism". In the non-
ideological sense, a conservative resists change; in the primary sense, 
he pernlits, and even encourages reform if this will bring about a state of 
affairs which will on balance discourage the base elements of human nature. 
Wellington's conservatism was clearly of this primary type. Those who describe 
him as a reactionary seem to be motivated by a desire that students should 
regard conservatives as one-dimensional characters. 
We have seen that Wellington also held humanitarian views which 
indicate non-ideological liberalism. He wished to preserve the liberties of 
the people, and it appears that, unlike Place, he means the whole people. 
However, this element is not strong enough to merit the label "liberal 
conservative" for Wellington. It was so common-place for political thinkers 
of all descriptions to applaud the basic liberties of Englishmen that it 
sheds no light on their ideological identities. The conservative bias of 
Wellington's thought is so pronounced that the term may be allowed to stand 
alone in his case. 
4) Hazlitt and Ideology 
The word "ideology" was coined during Hazlitt's life-time, 
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although it carried a different connotation from that of today. Destutt de 
Tracy, who introduced it, wished to found a science of ideas which would 
free human thought from the accretions of prejudice. Hazlitt knew and disliked 
20 
de Tracy's work; ideology and its champion were both denounced by Napoleon. 
As a critic of political ideas, Hazlitt was partly concerned with ideology in 
its modern sense. However, he was also a keen participant in the debates of 
his time. In the remainder of this chapter, we shall examine his views on the 
subject in order to decide whether they merely convey evidence of his own 
ideological stance, or whether he was able to show a more objective and 
sympathetic understanding of other political beliefs. 
In an essay written in 1830 - the last year of his life -
Hazlitt examined "The Spirit of Controversy". Controversy, he asserts, is "a 
necessary evil or good (call it which you will) till all differences of 
opinion or interest are reconciled, and absolute certainty or perfect 
21 
indifference" reign in its stead. The spirit of controversy might be abhorred 
because it encourages dogmatism, and a willingness to think the worst of our 
antagonists. Despite our determination to see things in black and white, 
truth is many-sided. Indeed, we lash ourselves into a fury mainly because we 
suspect that there may be something in what the other side says. Hence, 
controversies expose some of the worst aspects of human nature, and help to 
ensure that the truth remains hidden from the combatants. 
However, Hazlitt does not foresee an immediate end to the 
bickering, and suggests some reasons why this should not be a cause for 
dismay. Simply because truth is not simple, the clash of opinions can lead 
less partial observers to a proper understanding. Here Hazlitt's argument is 
reminiscent of the support for free speech advanced by Milton, and, later, by 
J.S Mill. These thinkers believed that truth will always emerge from a fair 
contest, however wrong-headed some of the participants may be. There is, 
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however, an important difference in Hazlitt's position. Milton and Mill 
believed that this truth, once established, would be evident to those who 
were not blinded by their passions. It might still be subjected to attacks, 
but it would always prevail. Hazlitt is less sure of this. "The world has 
never yet done, and will never be able to do without some apple of discord -
some bone of contention - any more than courts of law can do without 
22 
pleadings, or hospitals without the sick". This scepticism arises from the 
belief that truth is many-sided, not simple as Milton and Mill implied. The 
suggestion is that since the whole truth about anything can never be known 
the political arena will always be the scene of clashes between the purveyors 
of partial truth. 
But are these sources of contention ideological, in our sense? 
Since Hazlitt believed that these arguments are sustained by the possibility 
of approaching a subject in different ways, it does appear that he was groping 
towards a similar concept. For instance, he acknowledges that while a novelty 
might be good in itself, antiquity "does not always turn out an old woman, 
23 
either." This is an interesting reflection on the debate between Burke and 
Paine, on which Hazlitt appears to be reserving judgement here. Also, Hazlitt 
did not disapprove of such disagreements, in the manner that some ideological 
theorists have done. It is difficult to develop a sympathetic understanding of 
contrasting principles when we wish for them to be eradicated. 
There is also strong evidence that Hazlitt comprehended the a-
rational basis of these theories. In an early discussion of the Earl of 
Chatham's parliamentary career, he notes that "The business of an orator is 
not to convince, but persuade; not to inform, but to arouse the mind;" ''Calm 
enquiry, sober truth, and speculative indifference, will never carry any 
24 
point." Explaining the failure of Horne Tooke's oratory, he writes that the 
speaker "must make common cause with his hearers. To lead, he must follow the 
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general bias." In other words, debates are largely pre-determined by the 
emotional preferences of the audience. The orator's task is to exploit this 
bias, and he will not do so if he concentrates on rational argument. In the 
essay "Belief, Whether Voluntary?", Hazlitt also demonstrates that he 
understood the similar origin of religious quarrels; "Is there then a Papist 
and a Protestant understanding - one prepared to receive the doctrine of 
transubstantiation, and the other to reject it? No such thing; but in either 
case the ground of reason is pre-occupied by passion, habit, example - the 
26 
scales are falsified." Hazlitt was quite prepared to admit that his own 
views were founded on prejudice. These insights into the motivation of 
political commitment cast an ironic light on Sir Leslie Stephen's jibe that 
27 
"What Hazlitt called his opinions were really his feelings." 
Hazlitt was also well aware of the way in which ideologists make 
use of facts to lend a rationalistic credibility to their position. The 
phrenologist, Dr. Spurzheim, is the particular target for this criticism, 
although the latter is associated with Robert Owen in the following passage: 
"From the moment that we heard Dr. Spurzheim declare that his 
system was not a theory but a collection of facts, we immediately withdrew our 
confidence both from him and his theory, and began to entertain doubts, not 
merely of the paradoxical and extreme inferences he drew from his assumed 
28 
facts, but of the truth of those facts themselves." 
Like Owen and other ideologists, Spurzheim chose "facts" which illustrated 
his theory, rejecting all others which might place it in jeopardy. In doing 
so, he distorted the facts. This is highly reminiscent of the pseudo-
descriptive use of facts we discussed earlier. 
Moving from the theory of ideology to Hazlitt's reaction to the 
thinkers and politicians of his time, we find that he treats them primarily 
in terms of their principles, and their effect in practice. Although we shall 
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return to this matter in detail later, it is worthy of notice here that he 
does not attack Whig and Tory principles; rather, he does not regard them as 
possessing any. For the Tory, "Truth and falsehood are ... something to buy and 
29 
sell; principles and conscience, something to eat and drink." "He is not for 
30 
empty speculations, but for full pockets." The Whig is "but the fag-end of a 
Tory." He is "what is called a Trimmer -that is, a coward to both sides of 
the question, who dare not be a knave nor an honest man, but is a sort of 
whiffling, shuffling, cunning, silly, contemptible, unmeaning negation of the 
31 
two." 
However, throughout this diatribe Hazlitt produces evidence 
that both Whig and Tory did in fact have principles, but that these were 
rejected by himself. This produces the peculiar self-contradiction in such 
remarks as "[The Tory] has no principles himself, nor does he profess to have 
32 
any, but will cut your throat for differing with any of his bigotted dogmas." 
On his own theory, "bigotted dogmas" qualify as principles no less than the 
most reasonable and flexible ideas. Also, even if he is right in identifying 
hypocrisy and venality as the watch-words of party, it would still be 
worthwhile explaining why this had happened before abusing it. 
However, although at times like this Hazlitt's own ideological 
commitment does throw his criticism off-balance, the overall conclusion should 
be that he is an unusually sympathetic observer. Not only his later work, 
which is reasonably obscure, but also the Spirit of the Age and his early 
"Character of Mr. Burke" demonstrate a more detached outlook. In the former 
work, it is interesting to find him congratulating Sir Walter Scott, who 
"does not enter into the distinction of hostile sects and parties, but treats 
of the strength or the infirmity of the human mind, of the virtues or vices 
of the human breast, as they are to be found blended in the whole race of 
33 
mankind." Here we see not only a suggestion of Hazlitt's own notion of 
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human nature, but also his approval of a writer who strives for objectivity -
at least in his fiction. 
Despite this critical ideal, the theory of ideology used here 
indicates that no-one can be entirely free from bias. Hazlitt certainly 
recognised this, and saw the tendency to dogmatism in theories which 
appeared to be objective; "We may be intolerant even in advocating the cause 
34 
of Toleration." This acute self-awareness is probably the key element in a 
proper treatment of political ideas. If Hazlitt did not follow his best 
instincts all of the time, it remains true that he was capable of writing 
sympathetically about political opponents, and that he was unusually aware 
of the sources of such disagreements. 
NOTES 
1. Of course, it is only recently, thanks largely to the efforts of historians 
such as H.T Dickinson and J.G.A Pocock, that ideas have been 
reinstated into the study of the eighteenth century. But the importance of 
some clarification in this field is shown by Professor Pocock's rather 
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(Cambridge, 1985, p.216 note); "a view of the world determined by the 
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recent discussion of conservative ideology at the time is based upon a 
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concerns from the purview of the history of ideas. The approach adopted 
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ideological stance, rather than determining factors. 
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3. For a recent account of this interpretation, see I. Adams, The Logic of 
Political Belief, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989. T. B Macauley (Works, 12 
Vols., London, 1898 ed., Vol.VII, p.365 et. seq.) denied that political 
science could be based upon theories of human nature, mainly on the ground 
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to draw up schemes of government on the basis of a theory of human nature, 
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ideas from a literary angle; but there are several confusions here which 
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PART TWO: ISSUES 
Hazlitt's work deals with so many aspects of politics and 
society that a process of selection is forced upon us. The issues treated here 
are not simply those which Hazlitt concentrated upon. Rather, they are 
controversial matters from which, it is hoped, the most striking conclusions 
about the character of his thought may be drawn. In this chapter we shall 
examine his ideas on the monarchy and patriotism. 
THE MONARCHY 
"I have nowhere in anything I may have written declared myself to be a 
Republican; nor should I think it worthwhile to be a martyr and a confessor 
to any form or mode of government. But what I have staked health and wealth, 
name and fame upon, and am ready to do so again and to the last gasp, is this, 
that there is a power in the people to change its government and its 
governors. That is, I am a Revolutionist, for otherwise, I must allow that 
mankind is but a herd of slaves, the property of thrones, that no tyranny or 
insult can lawfully goad to a resistance to a particular family ... " 
1 
Life of Napoleon Buonaparte, 1828. 
At the outset of this discussion it is important to distinguish 
between three different aspects of monarchy to which Hazlitt might respond. 
Firstly there was the personality of the individual ruler. The long reign of 
George III occupied most of Hazlitt's life, but the figure of George IV as 
Prince of Wales, Prince Regent and finally king also looms large. Secondly, 
there is the monarchy as an institution. Although the character and activities 
of each king must have affected Hazlitt's reflections, it is necessary to 
decide what he felt about the British monarchy in general. 
Finally, it is essential to distinguish what Hazlitt says about 
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the British monarchy from his views on its continental counterpart. Once 
again, this is no easy matter. It is not always clear whether his most abusive 
remarks are directed against monarchy abroad, or whether the institution 
as a whole was being condemned. But clearly there were differences between 
these institutions, and it will be of major importance to discover if Hazlitt 
regards the similarities as more striking. 
********* 
In 1823, Hazlitt contributed an essay "On the Spirit of 
2 
Monarchy" to The Liberal. It was a piece which he later recalled with mixed 
feelings, as he believed that it had provoked a great deal of hostility from 
the Tory press. It certainly is a bold essay, beginning with the impudent 
hope that Hazlitt will not be suspected of intending libel. 
With the memory of George IV's coronation fresh in his mind, 
Hazlitt attempts to explain the popularity of monarchy. Since it is impossible 
for us all to be kings, we console ourselves by enthroning someone who will 
not challenge our self-esteem. "We make Gods of wood and stone and brass, but 
we make Kings of common men, and are proud of our own handy work." Even a 
slave can sympathise with a king, "because the last is, what the first would 
3 
be." While it might be thought that kings should be the best men in their 
countries, the chances are strongly against this. Their people will not wish 
to have their own failings underlined in a comparison with men of surpassing 
virtue. 
Hereditary monarchy, indeed, has many advantages over an elective 
version. There can be few disputes over the hereditary succession, but if the 
position is filled on grounds of merit, there would be no end to the 
controversy. Similarly, under an elective monarchy our veneration for the 
institution would fluctuate according to our opinion of each ruler. Under 
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hereditary monarchy "it is the place and power we bow to, and not the man." 
Hazlitt's intention, however, is to explain the popularity of 
monarchy, not to justify it. It appears that his real intention is to attack 
hereditary monarchy in general, not to advocate it against elective rule. At 
one point he does interject "Pshaw! we had forgot - Our British monarchy is a 
mixed, and the only perfect form of government; and therefore what is here 
5 
said [in criticism] cannot properly apply to it". Later he describes a 
constitutional monarch as "a servant of the public, a representative of the 
people's wants and wishes, dispensing justice and mercy according to law. 
Such a monarch is the King of England! Such was his late, and such is his 
6 
present Majesty George the Fourth!" The sarcasm which lies behind these 
remarks is unmistakable. It is significant that he describes the coronation of 
George IV to illustrate his hostility to monarchy in general. Such a 
spectacle, he writes, "debauches the understandings of the people, and makes 
7 
them the slaves of sense and show." Exposed to this kind of veneration, 
surrounded by sycophants and taught to look down on his subjects, only 
accident can prevent an hereditary monarch from becoming a tyrant unless the 
people resist his encroachments. 
In Hazlitt's Political Essays (1819), there are two pieces 
which reveal that the later attack on monarchy was the result of no transient 
emotion. "What is the People?" and "On the Regal Character" contain very 
similar objections to monarchy in general. While hereditary kings can be no 
better than common mortals, their role can only be justified if they possess 
super-human powers. However, they only exercise their abilities on court 
etiquette. They are remarkable for remembering faces and dress, but this is 
because they are constantly watching for any signs of insubordination. They 
8 
look down upon their subjects "as we do insects that cross our path." In 
contrast to this, the "patriot King" is he who has enough imagination and 
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humanity to place himself in the situation of the people. Once again, he half-
heartedly excepts the Hanoverians from these criticisms. At least George III 
was not an evil man. But private virtues are of little value to the subjects 
of a king; Charles II was a witty and amiable person, and no less of a tyrant 
for it. In England Parliament interposes between the king and any ideas of 
despotic rule. But in "What is the People?" such devices are dismissed as 
9 
"insufficient checks and balances." If constitutional monarchs have an 
advantage, it lies in the increased personal safety of the ruler. Kings who 
ignore the people must live in constant fear of assasination from their 
attendants; the Prince Regent has nothing to fear from the speeches of his 
opponents, so long as the expression of public opinion is permitted. Yet this 
distinction seemed to be disappearing fast. The struggle against revolutionary 
France had encouraged the spread of Divine Right principles, even though the 
Hanoverians had benefitted from what Hazlitt regarded as their defeat in 1688. 
According to Hazlitt, in short, kings had done nothing for the 
people. Any freedoms which the latter enjoyed were the result of their own 
endeavours. The notion of transferring power from father to son is ridiculous; 
we do not have hereditary actors, so why do we use this principle in a more 
important sphere? Common sense decrees that government should be directed by 
merit, not birth. 
A final example may be drawn from the essay "Personal Politics", 
10 
which was written just before the author's death. Here, Hazlitt speaks about 
the Hanoverians in more detail. George III was instilled with false notions 
of prerogative as a youth, and his rigid adherence to his coronation oath made 
him blind to the cause of the people. He had dangerous leanings towards 
arbitrary rule, which induced him to support the despotic Bourbons. George IV 
lacked even the private morality of his father, but his reputation for 
gentlemanly conduct obscured his vices from the public. William IV had made a 
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promising start because of his good humour, but once more this affability 
would be no indication of how he would behave in a crisis. He urges that if 
in future a king should intervene to prop up the Bourbons, he should be 
expelled without delay. 
********* 
Towards the end of his life, Hazlitt stated that he was "by 
education and conviction inclined to republicanism and puritanism". There is 
little doubt that he had a theoretical preference for republican government, 
but this does not prove so much as it might appear. The passage continues with 
the mournful acknowledgement that in the republican United States, no-one has 
"a head like one of Titian's Venetian nobles, nurtured on all the pride of 
11 
aristocracy and all the blindness of popery." Hazlitt finds something 
fascinating in the institutions he had been brought up to abhor. A closer 
study of his ideas will help to explain this ambivalence towards monarchy. 
While Hazlitt is sarcastic about the distinction between 
constitutional monarchy and despotism, he is certainly suggesting that 
ideally the English version is an improvement. His moral case against George 
III's intervention in France really depends upon such a distinction. For if 
the hereditary principle corrupts all monarchs, there should have been no 
question that George would support Louis. At times, indeed, he implies that 
the war was inevitable, but more often he represents it as a deviation from 
the principles of the Hanoverian regime. Equally, Hazlitt contrasts the 
theories of the House of Stuart with those of their successors. This would be 
inappropriate if he genuinely believed all monarchs shared the same tendencies 
at bottom. We should conclude that although he would prefer meritocratic rule, 
his immediate concern was that the Hanoverians should conform to the 
12 
principles which brought them to the throne. 
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The advantages which Hazlitt identifies in hereditary rule 
were never refuted by him. It is true that a hereditary basis usually prevents 
arguments over the succession. A strict government of merit would be 
constantly changing even if it were possible that the very best man might be 
appointed. Hazlitt evidently found it easier to criticise hereditary monarchy 
than to suggest a more proper system. Furthermore, Napoleon had declared his 
throne hereditary, a fact which Hazlitt does not discuss at length in his 
biography. Most interesting of all is his comparison of the acting profession 
to that of kingship. Although we might agree that the cast of a play should 
not be decided upon purely hereditary grounds if we want to keep our patrons 
satisfied, it is not clear that there is an analogy here with monarchy. It 
is not necessary for the supporters of hereditary rule to claim that each king 
is necessarily the most gifted man available. Presumably most subjects would 
be satisfied if their monarch was able to read over his lines; under a 
working constitutional monarchy, of course, he would be assisted in this by 
prompters who represented the people. Hazlitt seems to be demanding a kind of 
theatrical flair from monarchs. This has fascinating implications, especially 
as it might help to explain his admiration for Napoleon. Whatever the validity 
of this point, Hazlitt ignores it in another essay, where he admits that his 
respect for the magistrate William Fielding was mainly inspired by the fact 
13 
that his father had been a great novelist. Although Hazlitt actually believed 
that the younger Fielding was competent in his work, it is clear that he 
wanted to believe this, in much the same way that a monarchist anxious to 
refute him might have sought great qualities in the Bourbons. 
This remarkable self-contradiction backs up Hazlitt's own belief 
that monarchy is suited to human nature. "It would be hard upon that great 
baby, the world," he writes, "to take any of its idols to pieces and shew that 
14 
they are nothing but painted wood." He relates an anecdote of the historian 
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William Roscoe, expressing a preference for George III over Bonaparte, 
"because, in the former case, there was nothing to overcome the imagination 
but birth and situation; whereas he could not so easily brook the double 
15 
superiority of the other, merited as well as adventitious." It is in the 
face of this kind of attitude that Hazlitt exclaims, "Oh, Reason! when will 
16 
thy long minority expire?" Evidently once reason has entered upon its kingdom, 
a republican form of government would be ideal for Hazlitt. But the very 
frailties which make the people set up human idols are those which make a 
different system unacceptable at present. Napoleon was born in the wrong age. 
Hazlitt, therefore, is by no means a worshipper of kings. But it 
would be incorrect to describe his attitude as that of a radical. It appears 
that his attitude towards the monarchy was determined primarily by his hatred 
of cant and hypocrisy. To his mind the flattery of kings could be nothing else 
when it was expressed by intelligent men such as the poet-laureate, Southey. 
He believed that if a man is constantly told he is divine, he will begin to 
act with the irresponsiblity of a god, however lacking in abilities. His 
remarks were therefore intended to remind the public that their king was a 
flawed human being no better than themselves. To protect existing liberties he 
advocated reform to shore up the "insufficient checks and balances'' in 
Britain, and in moral terms to restore the spirit of 1688. Indeed, his 
interpretation of this spirit is the liberal one, as opposed to the 
conservative version expounded by Burke in his Appeal from the Old to the 
New Whigs. The reign of George III had marked a regression from this spirit; 
the war against America, the moves to suppress "sedition" at home and the 
corresponding assistance to the Bourbons were worrying signs. If the 
Hanoverians were to adopt the maxims of the House of Stuart, they would share 
the same fate. Overall it would be better for everyone if they began to pay 
heed to the demands of the people, and, although Hazlitt doubts whether an 
hereditary monarch could be trusted to do so out of natural goodness, once he 
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saw that it was in his interests, and once better machinery for collecting the 
true will of the people was introduced, a constitutional monarch might be 
trusted as in the days of William III. 
PATRIOTISM 
"The definition of a true patriot is a good hater" 
17 
On Good Nature (1816) 
"[Liberty] is the indigenous growth of our temper and our clime; and woe to 
him who deprives us of the only amends for so many disadvantages and 
feelings!" 
18 
Aphorisms on Man (1830) 
If, as Hazlitt wrote in 1806, "To love one's country is to wish 
well to it; to prefer its interest to our own; to oppose every measure 
inconsistent with its welfare; and to be ready to sacrifice ease, health, and 
19 
life itself in its defence", then he was undoubtedly a patriot. Twenty-four 
years later he wrote, "I am not very patriotic in my notions, nor prejudiced 
20 
in favour of my own countrymen." Yet he had not changed his mind during the 
intervening years. The explanation of this seeming paradox is that the word 
"patriotism" has different meanings in the two sentences. The matter deserves 
extended treatment here, since it rveals much about the character of Hazlitt's 
ideas. 
The 1806 quotation comes from a pamphlet Hazlitt published 
privately, entitled Free Thoughts on Public Affairs; or Advice to a Patriot; 
in a Letter Addressed to a Member of the Old Opposition. The intention of 
this work was to urge the Foxite Whigs to continue their opposition to the 
war against Napoleon - a war which Fox, for one, was pledged to bring to an 
end if this were possible on honourable terms. Hazlitt's advice was unheeded. 
Fox found negotiation with the Emperor impossible, and this second 
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Revolutionary War was unquestionably more popular than the first in the 
public estimation. The pamphlet, therefore, is not widely remembered. But it 
is high quality work from one so inexperienced in the craft. It certainly 
reveals much of Hazlitt's attitude to his country. 
Early in the pamphlet, Hazlitt establishes his credentials for 
composing a patriotic appeal. He is a worshipper of the great names of 
English Literature, men like Shakespeare and Milton who were fired by "that 
21 
virtue, that integrity, that genius" which makes England unique among nations. 
As a result of their spiritual qualities, Englishmen are endowed with a 
"patrimony of independence" which they must defend. However,"it is no part of 
the love of one's country to be blind to her errors, or to wish her to persist 
22 
in them." The remainder of the work is devoted to pointing out the present 
mistakes in both the domestic and foreign policy of England. 
In writing this tract, Hazlitt believed that he was 
demonstrating one of the virtues of his country, the right to speak freely as 
a member of the public, on matters of state. However, there is also a false 
kind of patriot, who would prefer to see such a right extinguished. Such men 
are: 
"ever ready to usurp that name from others, as an honourable 
covering either for selfish designs or blind zeal ... It has been called 
patriotism to flatter those in power at the expense of the people; to sail 
with the stream; to make a popular prejudice the stalking-horse of ambition, 
to mislead first and then betray; to enrich yourself out of the public 
treasure ... to defend every act of a party, and to treat all those as enemies 
of their country who do not think the pride of a master and the work of a few 
of his creatures of more consequence than the safety and happiness of a free, 
brave, industrious, and honest people; to strike at the liberty of other 
countries, and through them at your own; to change the maxims of a state, to 
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degrade its spirit, to insult its feelings, and to tear from it its well-
earned and provident distinctions; to soothe the follies of the multitude, to 
lull them in their sleep, to goad them on in their madness, and, under the 
23 
terror of imaginary evils, to cheat them of their best privileges ... " 
This, in short, is the type of patriotism that Hazlitt disclaimed in 1830. By 
then, he had come to believe that this definition of the word had supplanted 
the meaning which he had adopted so proudly. 
The preceding quotation is well worthy of extensive 
transcription, not only because it is an excellent example of Hazlitt's 
breathless style, but also because it reveals much about his general 
principles. It demonstrates clearly the defensive posture which Hazlitt struck 
so often in his writings. The privileges of the people are under attack; the 
maxims of state have been altered; the enemies of freedom are even changing 
the meaning of patriotism. Once again we see Hazlitt's view of the libertarian 
spirit of the English constitution, which now stands in danger of being 
destroyed. Furthermore, Hazlitt is evidently alive to the situation which 
makes the liberal faith in Parliamentary reform so problematic; that the 
"people" were either prejudiced against liberty by choice, or capable of being 
goaded by designing men into such a position. However naive Hazlitt might 
have been in advocating peace, this is not the work of a visionary. 
Hazlitt's case against the war with Napoleon was based upon its 
needlessness, and the likelihood of either defeat or a prolonged, expensive 
stalemate. Although some distaste for war itself is suggested, the piece is not 
generally pacifistic. He doubts whether the stated cause of the renewal of 
war, the fate of Malta, was anything other than a pretext. There was a 
determination to settle scores with France anyway. It was not that the danger 
of invasion "produced the taking up arms, but the determination to take up 
24 
arms which produced the fear of invasion." The real motive for war was a 
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desire to expand trade. Under the Younger Pitt, the commercial spirit began to 
undermine the spirit of liberty in the nation, and although Pitt had departed, 
the war against Napoleonic France was no more than a continuation of the 
crusade against the Revolution. The commercial classes make a sorry 
substitute for the sons of Shakespeare and Milton."They would not give a 
hundred hogsheads of sugar or a half-years' income for all the posthumous fame 
25 
that was ever acquired in the world." While men actuated solely by greed may 
be strong in attack, they have little reason to defend themselves. They have 
no fixed stake in the country, unlike the old stock of England. They also lack 
the classical education enjoyed by the genuine aristocrats, and without this 
they cannot love fame. The implication is that now we are faced with the 
danger of invasion, we cannot hope for an easy victory, since the national 
spirit is corrupt. History relates that "The causes of the ruin of states 
have been almost always laid in the relaxation of their moral habits and 
26 
political prejudices." It is therefore time to put an end to a war which 
threatens to reveal the extent of decay, and under a Whig administration the 
healing might commence. 
The patriotism of Free Thoughts on Public Affairs is 
deliberately aimed at the patricians of the Whig party, imbued as it is with 
the spirit of republican Rome. As such, it would not do to take it as 
Hazlitt's last word on the subject. For instance, while the disparaging 
remarks about the lower orders and the "low and mechanical" commercial classes 
are reminiscent of Burke's Letters on a Regicide Peace, Hazlitt later took 
that pamphlet as evidence for a new claim - that the war against France was a 
crusade against an opinion. If the analysis in the pamphlet had included this 
ideological question, it would have reminded the Whigs of their internal 
quarrels, rather than their patriotic duties. It would seem that Hazlitt 
wrote the Free Thoughts under self-imposed constraints, and that it is 
necessary to examine his writings on patriotism from the later period when he 
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had abandoned hopes of Whig patronage, if we are to truly understand this 
aspect of his political thinking. 
It is typical of Hazlitt that his attitude to his countrymen 
should be a mixture of fondness and hearty dislike. In the 1829 essay entitled 
"English Characteristics'', he declares "The English are the only people to 
whom the term blackguard is peculiarly applicable - by which I understand a 
reference of everything to violence and a contempt for the feelings and 
27 
opinions of others." The English are only ever united by hatred- when at war 
with a foreigner they show great esprit de corps, but as soon as the conflict 
is over they will turn away from needy ex-servicemen with disdain. Patriotism 
for the Englishman resolves itself largely into a hatred for other countries; 
it is purely negative. Thus, most Englishmen will take the view that their 
nation can do no wrong in a crisis, and take its virtues for granted in quiet 
times. Obviously this is far removed from Hazlitt's idea (and, incidentally, 
Burke's), that in order to love our country she ought to be lovely. 
The Englishman does not lose his prejudices by going abroad. 
Indeed, this tends only to reinforce his prejudices. He hates foreigners 
instinctively, because "our self-love is annoyed by whatever creates a 
suspicion of our being in the wrong; and only recovers its level by setting 
28 
down all those who differ from us as thoroughly odious and contemptible." 
Hence, we return to brood over the treatment we have received, and grow more 
disconted with either insults or civilites. An Englishman abroad is no 
great advertisement for the country; he is silent because he has nothing to 
29 
say, and "he looks stupid, because he is so." He would rather be a slave 
himself than see others enjoying the same benefits in different lands. 
The English are at root a materialistic race, with no time for 
abstract speculations or refined principles. They "are certainly the most 
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uncomfortable of all people in themselves, and therefore it is that they 
30 
stand in need of every kind of comfort and accomodation." They do not demand 
luxuries, but cannot do without the satisfaction of bodily needs. This 
31 
unreflecting, physical nature makes them "the bravest nation on earth". They 
fight in order to show their mettle, not for an idea or out of cruelty. There 
is a danger in this attitude, as their thoughtlessness might lead them into 
unnecessary wars, from which they will not flinch until victorious. 
The materialistic English are obsessed with property, "that is, 
something that our neighbours dare not touch, and that we have not the heart 
32 
to enjoy." They are naturally gloomy people. But this does not mean that the 
phrase "Merry England" is a paradox. The national humour, indeed, has much to 
recommend it. "We are almost the only people left", Hazlitt believes, "who 
33 
understand and relish nonsense." When they play the fool, they do so in real 
earnest. They cannot be argued into enjoying themselves; their spirit of 
independence was demonstrated by their rejection of James I's Book of 
Sports. "If our tastes are not epic, not our pretentions lofty, they are 
34 
simple and our own." 
Hazlitt, therefore, sees much good mixed with the unfortunate 
characteristics of Englishmen. Indeed, his definition of patriotism decreed 
that his portrait should include both the warts and the dimples. However, 
there are times when this "ideal" of patriotism deserts him, and he sets his 
notion of Englishness against an unfavourable view of foreigners. The essay 
"Merry England" is a defence of English humour against the French, "who are 
one eternal smile of self-complacency, tortured into affectation, or spun into 
languid indifference," and the Italians, who are "voluptuous and immersed in 
35 
sensual indolence." The essay was composed abroad, on a visit which clearly 
did not enhance Hazlitt's attitude to foreigners. His Notes of this journey 
are dotted with generalised comments on the French especially. He obviously 
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held a grudge against them for deserting Napoleon instead of defending him 
with the same valour they showed when conquering others. Whatever the 
provocation, he does at times show the blanket hostility to foreigners which 
he loudly condemns in others. In fact, it is highly characteristic in him to 
define his attachment to a cause through rejecting an alternative; for 
36 
example, "The love of liberty consists in the hatred of tyrants." It is also 
an indication of his love for abstract generalisations. In France, he 
complained that he had adopted fifty different theories about the national 
character, which he had abandoned each time on finding a contradictory 
37 
tendency. He did not consider that such general explanations for the conduct 
of Frenchmen were unlikely to be universally true. 
Hazlitt's patriotism was not the kind which thrives during 
periods of international conflict. Believing that the blessings which made 
his country worth fighting for should be preserved intact, he read the worst 
motives into the conduct of those who regarded peace-time liberties as an 
unafordable luxury. This hostility was inevitable, since patriotism, for 
Hazlitt, is "little more than another name for the love of liberty, of 
independence, of peace, and social happiness", exemplified in language, 
38 
literature, and customs. As the home of liberty and peace, the nation should 
keep itself aloof from conflicts unless called upon to defend the liberty of 
others. This is an idea of patriotism which would be accepted by most of 
Hazlitt's predecessors in the liberal tradition, notably those whom Caroline 
Robbins identified as "Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthsmen". 
The opponents of Hazlitt's view believed that a victory for 
the French would undermine all the cherished liberties of Englishmen. It was 
therefore essential to intervene in a continental war which, for these men, 
was undoubtedly a war of liberation. Perhaps it is less creditable that these 
advocates were not oblivious to the material advantages of their country. 
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But it is not the task of the historian to act as an umpire in what is 
clearly an ideological squabble. Each side might interpret the events from 
1789- indeed, from 1688 -to the present in its own way, and each 
interpretation, fully equipped with "factual evidence" twisted to fit the 
requirements of debate, would be equally convincing in its own way. It is 
unsurprising that Hazlitt's attack on false patriotism sounds like the 
pleadings of a jealous suitor to a mistress who appears to be straying. 
In fact, Hazlitt found his distinction between varieties of 
patriotism difficult to sustain. There was much pressure on him to change his 
views. A patriot is dismayed when he finds himself in disagreement with the 
majority of his countrymen, and as he points out in Free Thoughts, the 
temptation after the rupture over Malta for opponents of the first war to 
re-enter the fold was formidible. Hazlitt resisted, and the resulting 
feeling of alienation continued after Napoleon's defeat. He relates in 1826 
that "To be a Reformer, the friend of a Reformer, or the friend's friend of a 
39 
Reformer, is as much as a man's peace, reputation, or even life is worth." 
He felt that love for one's country should not exclude respect for others in 
the world, but when his natural need for acceptance at home is combined with 
his disillusionment with the French, it is hardly surprising that he could 
not always sustain his high ideals. 
Finally, it is instructive to note how far this feeling of 
isolation reflected a perceived discrepancy between his own character and 
those of his fellows. The Englishman, Hazlitt says, does not love ideas; yet 
he himself could not do without them. Englishmen are highly materialistic, yet 
Hazlitt had both a theoretical and practical indifference towards money and 
the goods it might purchase. Early in his career he was convinced that the 
love of liberty was a uniting factor, but his confidence lessened over time. 
Certainly, when he wrote about Englishmen he sounded like a detached observer, 
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suggesting that his own generalisations did not apply to himself. Indeed, it 
is fascinating to notice how closely the basic qualities of his Englishmen 
tallies with his portrait of the Tories. They, too, are grossly materialistic, 
they are not impeded by too much thinking, and they are bound together by the 
hatred of others. The only Reformers who seem English on Hazlitt's criteria 
are Cobbett and Burdett; the Whigs seem a crop of exotic plants. We shall 
return to this subject in more detail later. Here we can note that in 
comparison to his stated opinions about the English, his patriotic ideals 
seem to be unrealistic. Indeed, the burning love for his country which 
induced him to advise the Whigs at his own considerable cost in 1806 must have 
been another source of sad reflection to him in later days. 
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SECTS AND FART~ES 
1) PARTIES 
"I am no politician, and still less can I be said to be a party-
1 
man", Hazlitt announced in the Preface to his Political Essays (1819). He 
claimed independence from Whigs, Tories and Reformers alike, protesting that 
"The question with me is, whether I and all mankind are born slaves or free." 
In this section we shall examine Hazlitt's critique of political parties in 
his time. Was he really as independent as he wanted his readers to think? Is 
his criticism genuinely detached, or was it inspired by a bias of his own? 
It is proper that we distinguish between his view of each party as a whole, 
and his response to individual politicians, since we have already noticed his 
love of generalisations. 
TORIES 
In the Examiner of October 6th, 1816, Hazlitt published a long 
list of Tory characteristics. The Tory is wedded to pensions and 
sinecures, long pedigrees, the Bourbons, man-traps, and corporal punishment 
for soldiers; he despises philanthropists, reformers, "low-born fellows", 
3 
dissenters, and Napoleon Bonaparte. This theme is renewed in the preface to 
his Political Essays which appeared three years later. "A Tory", he writes, 
"is one who is governed by sense and habit alone. He considers not what is 
4 
possible, but what is real; he gives might the preference over right." As we 
have seen earlier, he accuses the Tory of lacking principles, calling his 
beliefs "bigotted dogmas". The Tory is sensual, corrupt and sycophantic. He 
2 
takes the easy way out and follows the crowd. "He is styed in his prejudices -
5 
he wallows in the mire of his senses." 
The earlier reference to Napoleon reminds us that these 
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outbursts were written soon after the latter had fallen. By 1825, the initial 
trauma of this event had worn off. An essay composed that autumn, "On the 
6 
Jealousy and Spleen of Party", briefly returns to the theme. The Tories are 
not selective when they hire writers to support their cause; provided they 
attain "a certain standard of dullness, impudence, and want of principle, 
7 
nothing more is expected." They will employ the meanest scribbler, provided 
that he extolls the king and lampoons the reformers. "This shews a confidence 
8 
in themselves, and is the way to assure others." 
The last piece we shall glance at here is "Illustrations of 
9 
Toryism: From the Writings of Sir Walter Scott" (Jan, 1828). Once again, 
Hazlitt's rage might be partly explained by the connection with Napoleon- his 
illustrations are derived from Scott's Life of Napoleon Bonparte. But the 
themes are familiar. "The definition of Toryism is, that it is that feeling or 
turn of mind which refers everything to custom or habit, and mistakes the 
10 
sense of power for the sense of right and wrong." The Tory can only reply to 
reasonable arguments with a barrage of abuse and nick-names. He is a blind 
worshipper of titles and family trees. Scott allows that Bonaparte showed "a 
mind worthy of the rank to which he had ascended"; Hazlitt reads this as a 
characteristic Tory insult. Bonaparte's greatness did not depend upon the 
titles he adopted. But a Tory would not see this, since everything tends 
towards "the aggrandisement of the individual'' in his creed, irrespective of 
11 
the individual's abilities. The essence of Toryism is that millions should 
be disregarded in favour of one. It arises from a failure of imagination; 
a multitude is less impressive to the eye than one man in regal splendour. 
Hazlitt's attitude to the Tories sounds quite straight-forward. 
But one or two points should be noted. As in the case of monarchy, Toryism 
appears peculiarly suited to human nature. Hazlitt's account implies that one 
must have special qualities in order to stand out against them. Obviously, 
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this reflects some glory upon him. But in placing himself above the comn1on n1an 
in this manner, he makes those who succumb to Toryism understandable. It may 
be that the apologists for the party express themselves in ''whining, hollow, 
designing cant, which echoes without feeling", but on Hazlitt's own evidence 
12 
it might be argued that they preach hypocrisy to a willing audience. Human 
nature being what it is, the Tories are able to co-operate better than their 
opponents; "How strong are the ties that bind men together for their own 
advantage, compared with those that bind them to the good of the country or 
13 
their kind!" Toryism, therefore, is the result of a human flaw that should 
always be guarded against, but may never be wholly suppressed. However savage 
his attacks might be, there seems to be a kind of horrified respect 
underlying his treatment of the Tories; perhaps this is an illustration of his 
14 
own maxim that "abuse is an indirect species of homage.'' Ironically, if read 
from this angle Hazlitt's criticism is too flattering. The Tories were hardly 
free from faction throughout this period; the Canning/Castlereagh duel of 
15 
1809 is only the most spectacular evidence of this. 
It also seems that Hazlitt's strictures are primarily aimed at 
the party's apologists. William Gifford, of the Quarterly Review, was a 
particular target for Hazlitt's invective, along with his colleague John 
Wilson Croker, and John Stoddart of the New Times (Hazlitt's brother-in 
-law). It is easy to see why Hazlitt attacked the party hacks first, apart 
from the obvious rivalry between journalists. Believing that Tory principles 
were no more than a crust of special pleading over the pie of corruption, he 
was certain to view those who expounded the party doctrines as hypocrites. In 
his eyes, Croker was a brazen adventurer, Stoddart an apostate, Gifford a 
libel-peddlar of low birth and negligible talent. It is possible that these 
enemies contrived to reduce the sales of Hazlitt's books by ridiculing his 
gramn1ar, his learning and even his complexion. But it is generally agreed that 
16 
his Letter to William Gifford of 1819 secured him effective revenge. 
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Spirited though his attacks are, it is more relevant 
for our purpose to study his work on individual Tory politicians - the men who 
patronised the Giffords and the Stoddarts. Soon after the death of the Younger 
Pitt, Hazlitt wrote a "Character" of the war leader which he included in his 
Free Thoughts on Public Affairs and subsequently re-printed twice. Pitt, he 
felt, had risen to power and earned the respect of many "by a negation ... of 
the common vices of human nature, and by the complete negation of every other 
talent" that might interfere with his one worthy attribute, his dexterity 
17 
with words. Pitt had "no insight into human nature, no sympathy with the 
18 
passions of men, or apprehension of their real designs." Lacking warmth 
himself, he concerned himself exclusively with the logical arrangement of an 
argument. His speeches, therefore, are remarkably correct for an 
extemporaneous speaker; but this is the only excellence he possessed. Even 
then, he said nothing memorable. This is not surprising given Hazlitt's theory 
of oratory, which rejected the use of cold logic in debate. Chatham, Pitt's 
father, had known better and achieved more. 
Why, then, had Pitt succeeded in public life? Simply because 
"it was his business not to overcome others, but to avoid being overcome." 
19 
He had a "lucky combination of strength and weakness" to attain this end. 
Pitt could be f~ted as "The pilot who weathered the storm" because nothing 
ever disturbed the equanimity of such a temperament. Indeed, Pitt "always 
20 
considered peace as an object perfectly indifferent in itself." As such, he 
was able to take the country into an unjust war against France without 
thinking of the consequences. 
In the Free Thoughts on Public Affairs, Hazlitt proceeds to 
discuss the impact of Pitt on the history of his times. His intentions had 
been two-fold; to lessen "the free spirit of the country as much as he could", 
21 
and to encourage commerce. Hazlitt believed that that "there ought to be as 
- 95 -
little connection as possible between the measures of government and the 
22 
maxims of the exchange.'' Pitt's policy in this regard was therefore a 
dangerous error. On the question of liberty, however, Hazlit.t's sentiments are 
more complex. He writes, 
" ... perhaps we may suppose that the restrictions which he 
introduced in the liberty of the subject, and the spirit of passive obedience 
and non-resistance which was every where industriously diffused, the contempt 
and obloquy which were poured on the very name of liberty, might be required 
by the circumstances of the time, and necessary to prevent the contagion of a 
23 
dangerous example, and the mischiefs of civil anarchy and confusion." 
Whatever the expedience of such measures, the Tories exploited the 
situation for their own advantage. They taught that "the forms of all 
government were alike indifferent, provided they secured the same servile 
obedience and death-like apathy in the state; they attempted to induce "A tame 
acquiesence in every encroachment of power or exertion of undue influence, a 
disposition to assert our own rights or those of others no further than fear 
24 
or interest permit." While he repeats that this might be acceptable as a 
temporary measure, the Tories must not be allowed to make it into orthodoxy. 
Since the greatness of a state is built upon civic virtue, such principles 
could mark the beginning of England's ruin. 
While Pitt had unique peculiarities, Lord Eldon might be said to 
represent Hazlitt's stereotypical Tory. In The Spirit of the Age, he is 
25 
presented as a "good-natured man'' (a character-type disliked by Hazlitt) 
He is genial enough when he contemplates the misery of others, but when his 
own interests are concerned, he is eloquent and determined. The Chancellor is 
immovable in his principles; he "has been found uniformly and without a 
single exception on the side of prerogative and power, and against every 
proposal for the advancenment of freedom." "He has gone the whole length of 
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26 
the most unpopular designs of Ministers". All he knows is where preferment 
lies. "As to abstract metaphysical calculations, the ox that stands staring 
27 
at the corner of the street troubles his head as much about them as he does." 
Like the ox, Eldon is not evil by nature, but when goaded into action he must 
be avoided. 
WHIGS 
In 1817, Hazlitt thought that the Whig party was a contemptible 
body. His reaction to the continued antagonism between Whig and Tory was well 
summed up in the rhyme: 
"Strange that such difference should be 
28 
Twixt Tweedledum and Tweedledee." 
The Whigs, he believed, acted as valuable servants to the government rather 
than effective opponents. They acted as a cushion between the rulers and the 
ruled. Their object of filling the shoes of the Tories deterred them from 
all-out opposition; if they had attacked the office-holders, the offices might 
have suffered too. This was not in their long-term interests. Their own 
beliefs, originally unimpeachable, had yielded under the disappointments of 
years in opposition. Instead of placing all their hopes on the prospect 
of replacing Ministers, they prayed for a chance of forming a coalition with 
29 
those they claimed to despise. "This is very pitiful work." 
Unlike the Tories, the Whigs were very selective in their choice 
of supporters. "The reputation of Whiggism, like that of women, is a delicate 
thing," so the present party cannot allow itself to mix with questionable 
30 
company. Hence, when Lord Byron became involved with the Liberal magazine, 
in co-operation with Leigh Hunt and Shelley, the Whigs were horrified. When 
Hazlitt contributed his "On the Spirit of Monarchy" to the publication, they 
told Byron to withdraw. In the face of such evidence Hazlitt concluded in 1825 
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31 
that the Whigs had become "half-faced friends of liberty." His opinion of 
32 
1817, that a Whig "is but the fag-end of a Tory", had not altered. 
These views are especially interesting in view of the fact that 
the Free Thoughts on Public Affairs had been written in support of the 
party. Also, Hazlitt had sent a prospectus for a history of English philosophy 
33 
to the Whig M.P William Windham. He evidently hoped for patronage from this 
quarter, but was disappointed. It might be said that the Free Thoughts 
were written as a warning that the Whigs should maintain their principled 
stance on the war; but in 1807 Hazlitt composed a favourable assessment of 
Charles James Fox, even though the latter had broken off negotiations with 
Napoleon. Even if Hazlitt's enthusiasm for the Whigs at that time is 
exaggerated in this account, the impression remains that his wrath was 
inspired by their behaviour in opposition after 1807; the "Ministry of All the 
Talents", of which Fox had been a member, was evidently not the immediate 
cause of his disillusionment, despite the inclusion of the heavily-subsidised 
34 
Grenville faction in the coalition. 
While the essay on Fox dwells chiefly upon his success as a 
debator, Hazlitt does not disguise his admiration for the late leader's 
character and opinions. Fox possessed "one of the most excellent natures that 
35 
ever fell to the lot of any of God's creatures." He could not present a 
starker contrast to Eldon,; "He had an innate love of truth, of justice, of 
36 
probity, of whatever was generous and liberal." Fox was not an impressive 
thinker like Burke, nor even a brilliant speaker. But he had a good heart, and 
this more than compensated for his failings. He was "the true friend of his 
37 
country, as far as it is possible for a statesman to be so." Hazlitt's opinion 
of statesmen in general was bad enough, but the qualification does not really 
detract from this accolade. 
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The Whig party of the 1820's lacked a dominating figure like 
Fox, but Henry Brougham may be selected as an example of Hazlitt's later 
criticism of individual Whigs. The Spirit of the Age contains a short 
38 
essay which is surprisingly cordial. Brougham is an example of Scottish 
eloquence, which in Hazlitt's view was a contradiction in terms. He has 
insufficient imagination with which to move an audience, notwithstanding his 
tendency to speak "in a loud and unmitigated tone of voice, sometimes almost 
39 
approaching to a scream." After this, it is rather odd for Hazlitt to say that 
Brougham's prose is almost as good as his oratory! He is too improvident for 
40 
a leader, and "too petulant for a partisan". Overall, however, Brougham "is, 
no doubt, a very accomplished, active-minded, and admirable person"- a 
lukewarm compliment, but nonetheless somewhat more than we might expect from 
41 
a bitter opponent of the party as a whole. 
******** 
As a useful source of historical information on parties, Hazlitt 
leaves much to be desired. His balance deserts him, and there is too much 
evidence of spleen. He hated the Tories because they presided over the years 
of war against Revolutionary France, and seemed intent on crushing liberty at 
home. But perhaps a more important factor was Hazlitt's detestation of cant 
and hypocrisy. Since he did not share the principles of the Tories, he could 
only assume that they were not sincere - rather, that they were not principles 
at all. Hence he feels no need to refute Tory arguments. He merely uses the 
tactics of the Quarterly Review against them. 
This inability or reluctance to understand the Tory position 
detracts from the value of his criticism. But even as an ideological assault, 
his work has its problems. He was too fascinated by individual characteristics 
to neglect a more detailed discussion of Tory leaders. While his portraits of 
Canning and Eldon fit neatly with his generalised view, more complicated 
- 99 -
personalities such as Pitt and Wilberforce do not. Eldon epitomises the 
hated "good-natured man", but what of that cold fish, Pitt? Wilberforce is 
obviously a man of principle - why, then, does he collaborate with the Tory 
to destroy English liberties, while working for the freedom of the negro? 
Sir Walter Scott's novels reveal a profound knowledge of and respect for 
humanity; how, then, do we explain his siding with the court in politics? 
These individual case-studies both call attention to the generalisations, and 
undermine them. Hazlitt's affinity for a sweeping epigram conflicts with his 
love for particulars once again. 
The grudging respect which can be detected in Hazlitt's work 
on the Tories is missing when he addresses the Whigs. A distinction must be 
made between his youthful and mature writing here. As a relatively 
inexperienced author in 1806-7, he attempted to catch the eye of the party 
leaders. But his later disillusionment is not a sign that he had shifted his 
principles one way or the other. During the second decade of the century he 
saw the champion of liberty dethroned and legitimacy restored over Europe. The 
Whigs were utterly ineffectual when they denounced these events, and for the 
most part they were reluctant to do so much. For Hazlitt this was sufficient 
to prove that they had abandoned their old principles, while his own had been 
maintained. 
Overall Hazlitt's quarrel with Whiggism, which is a compound 
of ideological and tactical factors, is even more unsatisfactory than his 
treatment of the Tories. The difference between his generalisations and his 
more detailed criticism is equally damaging. A note written in 1819, in which 
he severely qualified his admiration of Fox, is either a case of a leader 
being retrospectively punished for the sins of his followers, or a candid 
confession from Hazlitt that he had seriously misjudged a character whose 
whole public life was open to his scrutiny. Either solution is a blow to 
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Hazlitt's critical acumen. He has no appreciation of the genuine Whig 
dilemma over reform. They were faced by the opposition of the king and most of 
their influential countrymen, but, more seriously, the majority were afflicted 
with serious doubts which, as we shall see, Hazlitt shared himself. He makes 
full use of his critical licence in order to rebuke the Whigs for their 
timidity, but without concrete proposals of his own the critic himself is open 
to the censure of others. Hazlitt is almost entirely destructive in his work 
on political parties, and as a result provides little more than a handful of 
useful quotations for the historian. 
REFORM AND THE REFORMERS 
Throughout Hazlitt's adult life, parliamentary reform was a 
42 
live political issue. Its supporters in parliament itself may have been few 
for much of the time, but there was always someone advocating the extension of 
the franchise as a solution to public ills. Reform and the reformers are 
often discussed by Hazlitt, and it is most important for an understanding of 
his thought that we confront his scattered and often ambiguous remarks. 
We have already noticed Hazlitt expressing support for 
Universal Suffrage in the essay "A New Theory of Civil and Criminal 
Legislation." There he had asserted that the newly-enfranchised would follow 
the lead of their social superiors, in line with their behaviour in matters of 
literary taste. The essay "What is the People?" is another, more extended 
treatment of the same issue, and it is from this "great manifesto" that we 
43 
shall take Hazlitt's mature views on reform. 
The opening paragraph features a sentence of over four hundred 
words, in which Hazlitt lashes the "detestable fiction" of Divine Right, 
or "legitimacy". He also appeals to his readership, presuming them to be 
numbered among the "people" themselves. They would not wish their opinions to 
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be disregarded, as they would be under despotic government; therefore they 
44 
"would not have the people nothing!" At this point it would be natural to ask 
what Hazlitt precisely means by "the people". We learn that they are "fvl.illions 
of men, like you, with hearts beating in their bosoms, with thoughts stirring 
45 
in their minds, with the blood circulating in their veins ... '' But Hazlitt 
seems to regard this definition as imprecise, promising to return to the 
problem by showing what the people is not. However, it turns out not to be 
legitimacy, which does not clarify matters much. In fact, Hazlitt never 
really manages to define what he means by the people at all, despite the title 
of the essay. This is a vital omission, in view of the importance attached by 
reformers to the qualifications for voting. It would be fair to say that he is 
identifying the people as at least the vast majority of the population. These 
men have the right to a say in government by virtue of their humanity. But 
Hazlitt's evasion of details induces a suspicion that he is less certain of 
his ground that the rhetoric would imply. 
The essay proceeds with a discussion of the need for reform. 
This has arisen, Hazlitt believes, because there are insufficient 
constitutional "checks and balances'' to protect the people against the power 
46 
of the monarch. Men of rank possess too much influence, and this should be 
curbed by providing the people with more rights. Privileges and rights are 
contradictory; if a man has privileges, it means that others are deprived of 
rights. If rulers hold their position as a privilege and not through the 
choice of the people, they will inevitably regard their subjects with 
contempt. 
Hazlitt acknowledges that the people may act with "a certain 
degree of folly, or rashness, or indecision, or even violence in attaining an 
object'', but this "is surely less to be dreaded than a malignant, deliberate, 
47 
mercenary intention in others to deprive [them) of it." When they rise up 
- 102 -
against the government, they are provoked beyond endurance. They are, if 
anything, too generous in assessing the abilities and motives of their 
rulers. Hazlitt agrees with Burke that rebellion arises from ''a necessity 
that is not chosen, but chooses - a necessity paramount to deliberation", but 
48 
regards this as a truism. If the people did not resist when their patience 
was finally worn through, the "drunken, besotted, mad pride, selfishness, and 
caprice" of arbitrary government would never be checked. One must remember 
49 
that "of all dynasties, anarchy is the shortest-lived." When the people are 
foolish, their folly is second-hand; "It is better to trust to ignorance than 
50 
to malice." Entrusting power to the people, therefore, is clearly the lesser 
of two evils. 
This advocacy of the people is rather ambivalent. The tone of 
these remarks is negative; Hazlitt demonstrates his fears rather than any 
hope. There is a necessity for him to introduce a more positive note if his 
audience is to be satisfied. He attempts this by discussing great historical 
figures who have "belonged" to the people. Indeed, we discover that "all the 
intellect that ever was was theirs ... all the greatest poets, sages, heroes, 
51 
are ours originally, and by right." The supporters of the status quo demand 
evidence that the people can govern themselves, but they should be more 
concerned to show that hereditary rulers are necessarily best. 
Hazlitt also introduces the familiar safety-clause - the people 
will follow the lead given to them by "the impartial reason and enlightened 
intellect of the community." Thus informed, they will always choose the 
52 
"general good as its end." For the most part, a man may be trusted to choose 
what is best for himself; in more complicated matters truth will prevail in a 
fair fight. If the public will is allowed free play, a "perfect Commonwealth" 
will arise, as the direct antithesis of despotism. 
"What is the People?", therefore, is a powerful, angry piece 
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which would appear to place Hazlitt close to a writer such as Thomas Paine, 
who rejected aristocratic government in favour of a system based on natural 
rights. However, this conclusion would be premature. Firstly, the fact that 
the essay stands out so clearly amongst Hazlitt's writings should give us 
pause. Parliamentary reform was so widely canvassed among the liberals of the 
time that it is significant how rarely Hazlitt discusses it. Also, for all 
the extreme rhetoric against hereditary rule in general, he does make the 
distinction between constitutional and arbitrary monarchy which we noted 
earlier. This does seem to distance him from the more extreme reformers like 
Paine. 
Furthermore, Hazlitt is not so convinced of the virtues of a 
wider franchise that he is prepared to envisage a revolution in order to 
bring them about. "Timely reforms are the best preventatives of violent 
Revolutions" he writes, once more echoing Burke ("A state without the means of 
52 
some change is without the means of its conservation"). Clearly, there are 
times when a resort to arms will become necessary, but the implication is 
that they will always be defensive. The present regime is not working, but it 
is not beyond all hope of reform. Measures are needed to allow the people a 
greater voice in government, but it is impossible to rank Hazlitt with whole-
hearted advocates of universal manhood suffrage such as Paine, Bentham and 
John Cartwright. When discussing the wisdom of the people, he appeals to the 
"Great Kings, great law-givers, great founders and reformers of religion" 
53 
who have sprung from them. If we are to take this argument seriously, the 
people in Hazlitt's sense does not need to exceed the 400,000 identified by 
Burke as the political nation. Certainly, since the people will defer to the 
opinions of the most enlightened members of the community, there is no 
necessity for the franchise to be granted on the basis of a common humanity. 
Natural rights appear in the essay only as an auxiliary to what is basically 
a utilitarian argument. 
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The scattered comments in Hazlitt's other works tend to 
support this impression of reformism rather than radicalism. "The common 
people in civilised countries are a kind of domesticated savages", he wrote 
54 
in a Round Table essay. Although it was not unusual for reformers to take 
a dim view of the lower orders, Hazlitt's remarks are indicative of an 
aristocratic disdain. In an essay "On the Conversation of Authors" (1823), he 
suggests that people "in an inferior station in life" are poor companions. 
"You may talk to them on matters of business, and what they have to do for 
you ... but out of that narrow sphere, to any general topic, you cannot lead 
55 
them." In the posthumously-published Aphorisms on Man, he protests that the 
56 
rich should not look upon the poor as all "naturally thieves and beggars." But 
it is equally wrong for the poor to associate wealth with hardness of heart. 
If a beggar were to receive a thousand pounds, he would probably refuse 
assistance to his quondam fellows. He speaks of the ill-nature of rural 
peasants, and links the decline of states with the growth of cities. If the 
National Gallery should be opened to all, he assumes that while the rabble 
will not be interested, the respectable poor will dress in their best 
57 
clothes in order to avoid being pointed at. In none of these examples does 
Hazlitt reveal genuine antipathy towards the lower orders, yet his coolness is 
marked enough to suggest that he had little desire to see them entrusted with 
real power. His attitude is probably expressed most clearly in the Table 
58 
Talk essay, "On Vulgarity and Affectation". Here, he speaks of the 
59 
existence of "a well-dressed and an ill-dressed mob, both which I hate". He 
would always sympathise with the people, whose faults were those of ignorance 
and therefore pardonable. But this was clearly not an enthusiastic preference. 
Elsewhere in his later work, Hazlitt is even more explicit 
about his misgivings. One of his Aphorisms on Man expresses the view that 
"If reform were to gain the day, reform would become as vulgar as cant of any 
other kind." Indeed, "It is essential to the triumph of reform that it should 
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never succeed." Once particular grievances have been remedied, liberty will be 
taken for granted, corruption will re-appear, and the whole struggle will 
begin again - a course of events he also prophesies for America. These views 
appear to be deliberately paradoxical, but they reinforce the overall 
impression that Hazlitt was most concerned for a moral reformation of society. 
The key to this attitude is that institutional reform is not enough. Hazlitt 
once wrote that "The service we have proposed to do is this; to neutralize the 
61 
servile intellect of the country.'' Parliamentary reform may indeed be a means 
to this end, but the end itself - to uphold liberty against all its foes -
is of far more importance. The political nation, however it is comprised, 
must be constantly on the watch against abuses, and, since power will 
corrupt human beings under any system of government, this task will probably 
be perpetual. Once again, the motivation of these views seems to owe more to 
the classical republicans and their eighteenth-century disciples than to the 
contemporary reform movement. 
Hazlitt, then, was a negative thinker by conviction. This does 
not mean that his thoughts are of any less interest or importance than the 
more visionary activists of his time. Indeed, since it tends to uphold his 
assertion that he was no party-man, it lends particular interest to his 
account of the political grouping with whom his links were closest: the 
reformers. 
********* 
"Reformers are naturally speculative people; and speculative people are 
effeminate and inactive. They brood over ideas till realities become almost 
indifferent to them. They talk when they should act, and are distracted with 
nice doubts and distinctions, while the enemy is thundering at the gates, and 
the bomb-shells are bursting at their feet ... They are cowards, too, at bottom, 
- 106 -
and dare not strike a decisive blow, lest it should be retaliated ... They are 
not like their opponents, whose all is at stake, and who are urged on by 
instinctive fury and habitual cunning to defend it; the common good is too 
remote a speculation to call forth any violent passions or personal 
62 
sacrifices ... " 
Hazlitt wrote those lines at a time when he was particularly disgusted with 
the friends of reform. The trial of Queen Caroline had seen a host of radicals 
clamouring to kiss her hand. This spectacle, he felt, "gave a deathblow to the 
hopes of all reflecting persons with respect to the springs and issues of 
63 
public spirit and opinion." It was not simply that her case was at best 
doubtful. What really galled him were the motives of her supporters. 
Ostensibly it was an excuse to attack the crown; but part of the Queen's 
attraction was her regality. In view of the unpromising context of these 
remarks, it is worth investigating the matter in greater detail. 
In the preface to the Political Essays, Hazlitt opens the 
theme of the natural disunity of reformers. "Speculative opinion leads men 
64 
different ways, each according to his particular fancy." Speculation breeds 
disagreement over the most petty details. Since the ideas we reach are 
personal to ourselves, we resent a counter-argument as an affront. The 
outcome of this is that while "Tory sticks to Tory; Whig sticks to Whig; the 
65 
Reformer sticks neither to himself nor to any body else." Men of speculation 
are naturally vain, and cannot bear the thought of merit in others. If someone 
of their party appears to be particularly gifted, they will find their 
capacity for united action in driving him from their ranks. The reformer 
dreams of Utopia, and will reject anything short of the greatest possible 
good. But who is to determine when this situation has been reached? One man's 
greatest good is a miserable compromise to another. Reformers, therefore, 
cannot be wholly satisfied with any gain. 
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Although Hazlitt composed this preface soon after Waterloo, when 
he had a large stock of bitterness to pour upon those who had not saved 
Napoleon, he does not seem to alter his tone elsewhere. The very fact that he 
does not see the reformers as a homogenous group, however, should lead us to 
examine his reactions to individual activists. 
We have already glanced at Hazlitt's hostility to one group of 
reformers, the Utilitarians or Philosophic Radicals. This group is compared by 
Hazlitt to a bigotted religious sect. They also debase the value of art, and 
reduce complex moral issues to a "dry calculation of consequences." But he 
also disagreed with their political position. They leave nothing "between the 
Ultra-Toryism of the courtly scribes and their own Ultra-Radicalism - between 
66 
the extremes of practical wrong and impracticable right." 'l'hey stand foremost 
in denouncing political abuses, but say nothing about corruption in the East 
India company which employs their leaders. Hazlitt, therefore, not only 
differs from the Utilitarians in his assessment of the necessary scope of 
reform, but also questions their sincerity. Certainly his dispute with this 
group was more profound than a petty squabble over the small print of reform. 
Another group of reformers discussed by Hazlitt are those who 
advocated reform from within the Whig party. Those who remained close to Fox 
after the Whig schism of the 1790's, such as Grey and Sheridan, formed the 
Society of the Friends of the People, and introduced reform legislation into 
the Commons on several occasions. Their interest had fallen off during the 
Napoleonic period, but a handful supported the continued efforts of Sir 
Francis Burdett. We have seen that Hazlitt denounced the Whigs for their 
"half-faced" support of freedom; he had a great admiration for Sheridan 
(a rather eccentric choice for an example of "political firmness"), and he was 
cordial towards Brougham. But he did not believe that the Whigs were likely 
67 
to press for reform, and the Act of 1832 would have surprised him. 
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A final group of reformers might be distinguished, although they 
were more disparate than the Foxites or the Utilitarians. These men based 
their desire for change upon natural rights arguments, a belief in the 
"ancient constitution", or a mixture of these plus other factors. They might 
be described as less rigidly doctrinaire than the Utilitarians, yet lacking 
the practical considerations of the Whigs. 
Sir Francis Burdett was never closely allied to the Whigs, 
although he was a fervent admirer of Charles James Fox. As the M.P for 
Westminster he was a prominent figure, and he became something of a hero when 
he was arrested for upholding the right to report the proceedings of the House 
68 
of Commons. Hazlitt devoted a section of the Spirit of the Age to Burdett. 
Even this short piece 1nakes clear his approval of the wealthy baronet. He is 
"one of the few remaining examples of the old English understanding and old 
English character." "There is no honest cause which he does not avow; no 
69 
oppressed individual that he is not forward to succour." He is a very pleasing 
speaker, but no rabble-rouser. Indeed, he is careful to rebuke the people when 
they are in a fury. His only fault is a leaning towards a belief in the old 
constitution of England, which he has presumably caught from that "man of one 
idea", John Cartwright. 
This affection for Burdett is highly revealing. It is true that 
he supported parliamentary reforrn, even when he found himself in a minority of 
one for doing so. He also favoured Catholic Emancipation, liberal movements 
abroad, and (less fervently than Hazlitt) Napoleon. But he was convinced that 
there should be a qualification for the vote (although he occasionally 
supported universal manhood suffrage for tactical reasons), he went hunting 
with the Prince Regent, and overall his aristocratic bearing and inflexible 
personality did little to help the reformers towards unity. In later years 
Burdett became a Tory, a move which some commentators have found quite 
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predictable on the basis of his early beliefs. Hazlitt obviously did not 
anticipate it, and he can hardly be accused of closet Tory sympathies on this 
basis. But Burdett made it clear that he supported the true prerogative of 
the crown; in other words, he was never a radical since he believed that in 
spirit, if not the letter, the constitution was sound. This is close to the 
position we have associated with Hazlitt. Burdett also identified himself with 
the "patriotic" opposition to Walpole; like Hazlitt, his thought was rooted in 
the eighteenth-century, and he was clearly influenced by the ideas of the 
"Commonwealthsmen". 
William Cobbett was another reformer whom Hazlitt found worthy 
of extensive treatment. They only met on one ocassion, and Hazlitt was most 
impi:essecl despite the fact that Cobbett cursed him. He clearly did not suffer 
fools, and spoke his mind. Unfortunately this did not help one predict what he 
might say next, for his mind was constantly changing. In his Table Talk 
essay on Cobbett, Hazlitt describes him as "a very honest man with a total 
70 
want of principle." He was not easily driven from a position by others; 
rather, his own self-will made him succumb to "the first whim which he takes 
71 
in his head." As an independent thinker, he felt no regret when he renounced 
his old principles. "He is like a young and lusty bridegroom that divorces a 
72 
favourite speculation every morning, and marries a new one every night." He 
was the most effective supporter of reform just as he had been its most 
powerful assailant. 
While excessive flexibility of opinion was normally enough to 
damn a writer in Hazlitt's eyes, he regarded Cobbett with great affection. 
This mood prevails despite the unfortunate effects of Cobbett's temperament. 
He loved a fight so much that he transformed friend and foe alike into 
lifeless corpses. If he had concentrated his blows on the Ministry, he would 
73 
have achieved much; "no unpopular Minister could live before him." But he did 
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not care for his own reputation, nor of those who support him. He simply 
struck out whenever he pleased. 
Cobbett was a natural oppositionist. Once his aims had become 
established or widely popular, he would immediately turn against them. "If he 
could bring about a Reform in Parliament, the odds are that he would instantly 
74 
fall foul of and try to mar his own handy-work.'' Not only did he reject his 
ideas when others began to accept them, but he reacted angrily when a notion 
convinced himself. In England he opposed the monarchy; in American exile he 
had soon grown weary of republicanism. 
Hazlitt's admiration for Cobbett may partly be set down to the 
score of style. Cobbett was refreshingly anecdotal; his egotism was not 
feigned, and did not deflect the attention of the reader. He was a vigorous 
polemicist, and a lover of nature. Hazlitt's approval of Cobbett's egotism is 
significant, since it was this aspect of his character which encouraged his 
cussedness. Remove Cobbett's awkwardness, and both his flexibility and 
effectiveness might have disappeared. Hazlitt, in short, admired Cobbett for 
his individuality, the very factor which rendered him an impossible ally. 
A close study of Hazlitt's account reveals some interesting 
parallels between the two men. We have seen him insist that reform would 
simply become another subject for cant if it were to become established. By 
turning against any successful opinion, Cobbett seemed to be inspired by a 
similar concern. Cobbett was not selective enough when he picked a quarrel; 
Hazlitt, who rebuked himself for his excessive candour towards Burke, was 
aware how counter-productive this indiscriminate approach could be, but never 
entirely rid himself of it. We have quoted Leslie Stephen's accusation that 
Hazlitt's opinions were unduly influenced by his feelings, and this is a 
point the latter makes against Cobbett. Both men were masters of political 
invective, and wielded a club more often than the rapier. Above all, perhaps, 
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Hazlitt is a delightful egoist in the same mould as Cobbett, who "does not 
put himself before [his subject], and say- 'admire me first' -but places us 
75 
in the same situation with himself, and makes us see all that he does." 
There are, of course, differences. However inconsistent Hazlitt 
may have been, he never denounced radicals with the fury of the original 
Cobbett, nor did he eulogise monarchs at any time. But Hazlitt exaggerates 
Cobbett's flexibility; there was no essential shift of ground after his 
initial conversion to reform. Their major difference is one of temperament and 
education. Cobbett was self-taught, and perhaps this accounts for his 
incautious utterances. Cobbett threw himself into political campaigns while 
Hazlitt stood aloof, apart from casting one "unavailing vote" for the Radical 
John Cam Hobhouse. 
Hazlitt's affinity with Cobbett is perhaps best explained by 
their shared love for the underdog - their inveterate oppositionism. They are 
both far stronger in attack than defence. Cobbett's failure to stick to a 
position may have been frustrating, but at least it meant that he would always 
oppose despotism. His example was a contribution to the spiritual renovation 
which Hazlitt believed essential for his country. Like Burdett, he was an old-
fashioned Englishman for whom liberty was more than a cant word. These factors 
over-rode any disagreement over particular issues, and gained Hazlitt's 
approval. 
********* 
Hazlitt called himself a "reformer" in a conversation with 
James Northcote, and proceeded to complain that this seemed to give tradesmen 
the excuse to treat him in an off-hand manner. In some ways this passage 
illustrates his position very neatly. He sympathised with the people, but did 
not love them. Hence he was with the reformers, but not quite of them. While 
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it is wrong to disqualify all those with an ambivalent attitude to the people 
from the class of reformers, in Hazlitt's case it was sufficient to prevent 
whole-hearted conunitment. For all his claims about first principles, he was 
not the type to force the facts as he saw them into a pre-conceived mould. By 
upbringing a republican, by conviction a worshipper of liberty, he found 
himself supporting the cause of parliamentary reform as a tactical move in 
an overall strategy of destroying despotism. He saw it as a promising means to 
an end, and not an end in itself. 
If there is a fault in Hazlitt's work on active politicians, it 
is the excessive use of abstract generalisations. In most cases his detailed 
criticism is more revealing, both in order to understand his thought and his 
period. The discussion of reformers is perhaps the most valuable, with a tone 
of exasperated fondness which is less destructive than the unqualified 
hostility towards the abstract Whig and Tory. While relating the problems that 
they faced, he also explained how the difficulties had arisen. With the 
exception of the Utilitarians, they were agreed on only one tenet: the right 
to disagree. He denounced the Utilitarians for apparently denying that right, 
and in exercising it on others he demonstrated the unlikelihood of cohesion 
around such a principle. When he identified the spirit of contradiction which 
motivated the reformers, it may be a case of the pot calling the kettle black. 
But in such situations we do tend to learn a good deal about both the pot and 
the kettle. As Hazlitt said himself, we tend to see in others only so much as 
we see in ourselves. 
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HAZLITT AND THE POLITICS OF DISSENT 
"Hazlitt was a clissenter to his back-bone" 1 
Leslie Stephen, Hours in a Library 
It has always been known that the relationship between the 
Church and the political establishment in the eighteenth and early nineteenth-
centuries was intimate. It was a common belief that a single fate would attend 
the altar and the throne, and it is unsurprising that the defenders of 
monarchy against the theorists of the French Revolution were also concerned 
to support the Anglican Church. While no-one has denied this fact, in a 
secular century it has been common for the centrality of religious thought in 
politics to be overlooked or deprecated. A recent attempt to produce a more 
balanced picture has resulted in some interesting work, and it is hoped that 
2 
religion will receive proper attention in the future. 
While scholars have underlined the mutual support of the Church 
and the Crown, the relationship between religious and political non-conformity 
has also received attention. Once more, it has always been accepted that 
religious dissent provided many prominent advocates of political reform. 
It is accepted that the rejection of the Feather's Tavern petition in 1772, 
for example, drove many "advanced" clergymen out of the Church and encouraged 
the adoption of liberal views. But while the impact of dissent has usually 
been regarded as a middle-class phenomenon which was gradually over-shadowed 
by the development of class-consciousness among the industrial proletariat, 
a recent historian has claimed that "all radical thinking had a religious 
3 
origin." (emphasis mine) William Hazlitt was brought up a non-conformist, 
educated at the famous dissenting academy at Hackney, and it was intended that 
he should follow his father, who was a prominent Unitarian Minister. It will 
therefore be useful to study his religious ideas, in order to trace any 
- 117 -
relationship between this aspect of his thought and his politics. This, in 
turn, may shed some further light on the more general question of dissent 
and radicalism in England. 
We cannot be sure why Hazlitt defied parental pressure, and 
rejected a career in his father's profession. His son tells us simply that 
he "manifested an extreme distaste'' for the idea; it is interesting to note 
that Hazlitt later told James Northcote that he would have liked to have sent 
4 
that son to Charterhouse, rather than a dissenting academy. Politics seem to 
have replaced religion as his primary concern during his time at Hackney, 
where he was taught by such eminent figures as Joseph Priestley and Andrew 
Kippis. Late in life, Hazlitt admitted that he lacked "much natural piety", 
and clearly he felt that any scruples should bar his entry into the church. 
We have seen that his "Project for a New Theory of Civil and Criminal 
Legislation'' was originally inspired by a discussion about the Test and 
6 
5 
Corporation Acts. But however much attention was paid to this religious issue 
in the first draft of the essay, it is not a prominent feature of the 
published version. As a corollary of the right to hold opinions freely, he 
states that "There should be no secular interference in sacred things; no 
religious persecuting tests or disqualifications." He rather cynically adds 
that "the different sects should be left to inveigle and hate each other as 
7 
much as they please." By the time that this essay was re-drafted he 
was clearly highly disillusioned with the forms of religious worship. 
Toleration, for him, seems to be a product of indifference. 
We should not conclude on this evidence that he was an atheist. 
In conversation with James Northcote he expressed the view that "sceptics and 
philosophic unbelievers [such as Byron and Paine] appear to have just as 
8 
little liberality or enlargement of view as the most bigotted fanatic." In 
proselytising, free-thinkers would be as dogmatic as anyone, and deny the 
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right of others to reach their own judgements. These remarks are a hit at 
bigotry in general, and so far no indication of belie£ on his own part. The 
implication is that men of all creeds and none have a tendency to close their 
minds to opposed viewpoints. This trait seems to emerge whenever the dogma is 
backed by any form of organisation. For instance, while Hazlitt reveals a 
liberal's hatred for the inquisition, he is quite able to sympathise with 
the motivation of Guy Fawkes. The latter showed that he was capable of laying 
9 
down his life for his principles, and this is a very worthy characteristic. 
Hazlitt's religious ideas remain obscure largely because his 
approach is that of the sociologist rather than the theologian. He is 
primarily concerned to trace the effects of belief on a man's character and 
actions than to discuss his own beliefs. However, since he assented to the 
notion that man is naturally a religious animal, it would be reasonable to 
suggest that Hazlitt retained an ill-defined faith in a god. Otherwise, 
indeed, it is unlikely that his work on religion would have been as 
interesting as it is. 
The remainder of this section, therefore, will concentrate 
upon Hazlitt's response to religious institutions and the relationship 
between these views and his political opinions. It would be appropriate to 
begin with the Anglican Church, which he discusses at length in the essay, 
10 
"On the Clerical Character." 
The spirit in which this piece is written is clear from the 
outset. Hazlitt allows that the clerical character might have a good deal of 
merit; however, he will only be concerned with its faults. Firstly, he takes 
exception to the clerical dress. This is a claim on our good opinion which 
has nothing to do with the qualities of the man. As such, it is a standing 
invitation to hypocritical behaviour, and a temptation for clergymen to relax 
whatever principles they might possess. "Those who make their dress a 
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principal part of themselves, will, in general, become of no more value than 
11 
their dress.'' If they really were men of distinction, they would wish to 
appear in their uniform as rarely as possible. As it is, they cannot be seen 
without it. This suggests that without it they would not be respected at all. 
The clerical obsession with dress is merely a symptom of their 
stickling for external forms and ceremonies in other things. This 
predeliction Hazlitt finds easily comprehensible; "It was, of course, much 
easier to conform to these, or to manifest a reverence for them, than to 
12 
practise the virtues or understand the doctrines of true religion." By these 
13 
means, "The form of religion has superseded the substance." In conforming to 
established forms the cleric loses all independence of thought and action. In 
return he receives an assured income and automatic respect, so he might well 
consider it a tolerable bargain. 
Whatever the pretensions symbolised by the cloth, the 
clergyman is a sensual being. Not being allowed to sin on the grand scale 
merely forces him to find outlets for his appetites elsewhere. It is normal 
for him to be a glutton, and dinner is the most important event of his day. 
Although he cannot cause scandal in his parish, he takes a prurient interest 
in sins of the flesh. He is a moral spy, and must be well acquainted with the 
frailties of his flock. Being a clergyman is "like living next door to a 
brothel, a situation which produces a great degree of irritation against vice, 
but is not equally favourable to the growth and cultivation of sentiments of 
14 
virtue." 
Hazlitt cannot believe that a man may honestly subscribe to all 
thirty-nine articles. Either the successful candidate lacks the intelligence or 
the diligence to master the subject, or he is a downright knave. He knows that 
the reward for conformity might be a bishopric or a place at court, whereas 
if he allows his scruples a hearing he is facing penury. The Anglican has a 
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"critical bonus for finding out that all the books he cannot understand are 
15 
written against the Christian religion." Tests, therefore, not only encourage 
the recruitment of hypocrites, but teach more honest men the convenience of a 
flexible conscience. Hazlitt cites the example of William Paley, who reversed 
his thesis "That the eternity of Hell torments is contradictory to the 
goodness of God" on the advice of a bishop. It is hardly surprising that 
Paley's work on moral philosophy, which was so popular at the time, "is a 
somewhat ingenious and amusing apology for existing abuses of every 
16 
description, by which any thing is to be got." Paley's real text is "That men 
should not quarrel with their bread and butter" - no wonder he found 
advancement in the Church. Clergymen of this stamp earned Hazl.itt's lasting 
17 
scorn; "the greatest hypocrites in the world are religious hypocrites." 
Hazlitt next moves on to the alliance between Church and State. 
Once the cleric has insulted God by surrendering his conscience in religious 
matters, it is easy for him to become a political prostitute. Throughout 
history, therefore, "Priestcraft and despotism have gone hand in hand - ha;re 
18 
stood and fallen together." The greatest mischief which arises from the 
alliance is its "tacit and covert" nature. The church pretends to be neutral 
in politics, but this is a pretence designed to make the advice of clergymen 
more effective. Priests annoint kings, and kings give them lands in return; 
the clergy can hardly be impartial politicians. "They are servants of God by 
19 
profession, sycophants of power from necessity." The priest is happy to make 
a king into his god, because he does not fear him as he would a genuine deity. 
However, it is not an equal partnership. The church is subordinate to the 
crown. But it is not concerned about this since the crown is a liberal pay-
master. 
While the Church of England suffers at Hazlitt's hands, 
Methodism arguably comes off even worse. The Methodists are altogether "a 
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20 
most pitiful sect". "It is a bastard kind of popery", a revival of 
enthusiasm which ''at once absolves the understanding from the rules of 
21 
reasoning and the conscience from the restraints of morality." Its members 
are incapable of living without sin, and hope that a show of faith will 
save them from eternal punishment. The Methodist creed consists of "faith 
22 
without works, and words without meaning." Hazlitt's hostility to the sect 
seems to be based upon his conviction that it was both a symptom and a 
probable cause of moral decay in England. He believed that it was particularly 
suitable to the "rabble", along with those who suffered from "an uncomfortable 
23 
mind in an uncomfortable body." It was a common-place amongst Whigs and 
reformers to attack Methodism- one of Leigh Hunt's earliest publications 
was a swingeing attack, and the Edinburgh Review was hostile. Hazlitt's 
attitude, however, is peculiarly venemous even by the standards of this 
24 
debate and his own polemical style. While he does not comment on the 
Anglican evangelical revival in general terms, his hostility may be gathered 
25 
from his treatment of William Wilberforce. The latter is not exactly a 
hypocrite, but he is another who makes sure that his faith and his interests 
do not conflict. His "humanity will go all lengths that it can with safety and 
discretion; but it is not to be supposed that it should lose him his seat for 
Yorkshire, the smile of Majesty, or the countenance of the loyal and 
prosperous. He is anxious to do all the good he can without hurting himself or 
26 
his fair fame." Like Cobbett, Hazlitt thought that Wilberforce was at best 
inconsistent in working for the benefit of "savages" while ignoring abuses at 
home; also, he attributes the successful campaign against the slave trade to 
27 
Thomas Clarkson rather than Wilberforce. Although there is a suggestion that 
Hazlitt disliked the "enthusiasm" of the evangelical movement, his main 
concern lies with its political and social implications. 
A companion-piece to the essay "On the Clerical Character" is 
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"On Court Influence", in which Hazlitt pays tribute to the dissenting clergy. 
It is appropriate that renegade Tories such as Robert Southey should attack 
28 
the dissenters, he writes, because the latter are "but half Englishmen". This 
means that ''they are not professed slaves - that they are disaffected to the 
Constitution in Church and State, because they are not prepared to go all 
the lengths of despotism and intolerance under a Protestant hierarchy and 
29 
Constitutional King." Dissenting churches are "nurseries of public spirit, 
30 
and independence, and sincerity of opinion in all other respects.'' Dissenters 
are not fair-weather friends of freedom like their opponents. Instead of 
receiving rich rewards for their versatility, they have stuck to their 
principles regardless of the consequences. They ''are, or have been, the 
steadiest supporters of ... liberties and laws: they are checks and barriers 
against the insidious or avowed encroachments of arbitrary power, as effectual 
and indispensable as any others in the Constitution: they are depositaries of 
a principle as sacred and somewhat rarer than a devotion to court-influence -
31 
we mean the love of truth." 
Hazlitt believed that "It is hard for any one to be an honest 
32 
politician who is not born and bred a Dissenter." Just as there is an alliance 
between Church and State, so civil and religious liberty are cherished 
together in the dissenting tradition. Protestantism gave birth to liberty, 
and non-conformists must now carry the torch in the face of a new bigotry. 
They have not relinquished the spirit of free enquiry which inspired Luther. 
Because their stated convictions are not hypocritical, "Dissenters are the 
33 
safest partizans, and the steadiest friends." 
Much of this supports the view that religious and civil dissent 
grew from the same seed in Hazlitt's case. But we must tread carefully here. 
Towards the end of "On Court Influence," it becomes clear that nostalgia 
greatly colours his account. He is speaking primarily of his father; of a 
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type of character which "has worn itself out." He is also dealing with 
court influence, a subject which always made him exaggerate the virtues of 
any other phenomenon. 
Looking elsewhere in his writings, we do in fact discover a very 
different attitude towards dissent. For example, although William Godwin in 
some respects reminded him of a dissenting minister, these characteristics 
were not endearing; "There was a dictatorial, captious, quibbling pettiness of 
34 
manner." Dissenters fall under the same anathema as sects of all kinds in 
Hazlitt's eyes. Reformers in general remind Hazlitt of the "rational" 
dissenters, who consider that ''because they alone profess the title, they 
35 
alone possess the thing. All rational dissenters are with them wise and good." 
The stubborn adherence to principle which Hazlitt acclaims in ''On Court 
Influence" becomes unnecessary rigidity in other contexts. Rather than being 
the "safest partizans, and the steadiest friends", the dissenters can be 
irritating allies, utterly opposed to the most trifling compromises. Also, 
while their pre-occupation with another world makes them less corruptible 
than their Anglican counterparts, it is unlikely to encourage a realistic 
approach to secular questions. Burke had pointed out that this estrangement 
from the world made the "meddling" of Dissenters dangerous; Hazlitt's belief 
that their interventions were generally futile is less hostile but perhaps 
equally damning. 
In his later work, Hazlitt takes his criticisms further. He 
predicts that with the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts the dissenters 
will stop attending chapel. This is typical of human cussedness, which ensures 
36 
that "A thing is supposed to be worth nothing that costs nothing." He can now 
reflect that although the Church of England mistreated the dissenters, the 
latter returned the compliment when their chance came under Cromwell. If they 
could replace the thirty-nine articles with a creed of their own - which, 
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given their tendency to quarrel, is unlikely - they would probably enforce it 
with equal illiberality. "Like a muzzled mastiff", the tendency to persecute 
37 
is present in all of us, whatever our convictions. 
The clerical and dissenting characters, therefore, are 
contrasting examples of the foibles of human nature. The one is but an 
ordinary mortal with ordinary failings, except for his hypocritical pretence 
that he is free from them. The dissenter is not an hypocrite, but this only 
gives him a licence to exercise his squabbling disposition, which the 
Anglican must keep in check. Hazlitt's sympathies are clearly with the 
dissenter; it cannot be said to be a choice between evils. But it would be 
most accurate to say that Hazlitt's belief in private judgement is taken to an 
extreme here. A man's religion is for him a personal matter, which should be 
subject to the interference neither of the state nor of the other individuals 
in a sect. 
Since this thorough-going individualism is the key-note of his 
essay on "Civil and Criminal Legislation", it might appear that in Hazlitt's 
case religious beliefs did play a central role in shaping his politics. But, 
as we have seen, that work does not closely reflect the complexity of his 
thought in general. Most probably the background of dissent was the factor 
which made Hazlitt's political thought so ambivalent and self-contradictory. 
Taught from a tender age to accept nothing at face value, to reject 
authority automatically and to hate hypocrisy above all else, Hazlitt was ill-
equipped to build a rigid system in a world which refused to resolve itself 
into black and white alternatives. This means that while he often strikes a 
note of pessimism which the rational dissenters would have abhorred, he also 
lashes abuses in the approved manner. He expects the reader to share his 
indignation at the frailties of humanity, despite the fact that his mature 
writings, at least, indicate that such imperfections are ineradicable. 
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His work on religion exemplifies this well, and a few more 
examples can be brought forward to illustrate this tendency. Writing about 
the preacher Edward Irving, he denies that religion is the only possible 
bastion of morality. The preacher may be an hypocrite just as easily as a 
secular moralist. Religion has been with us a long time, he writes, and there 
38 
is little sign that it is about to eradicate vice from the world. His attack 
on Coleridge's Lay Sermon has a similar basis. But elsewhere he suggests 
that religion is not only compatible with man's nature, but that some form 
of worship is necessary to him. Religion is "another name for fear"; man is 
39 
"naturally a worshipper of idols." These are splenetic remarks, but elsewhere 
he reveals a genuine understanding of the cravings for something to believe 
in. He argues that those who have attempted to reconcile science with 
religion are misguided, since ''there is no faith so firm as that which has 
40 
never been called into question". We have seen his admiration for the 
character of Guy Fawkes, which goes further then his habitual respect for 
the underdog. Hazlitt, therefore, must be regarded as superior to critics 
such as Paine, whose Age of Reason is premised upon scorn for those who 
slide from the most rational forms of religious belief. This is because he 
is not only a sociological student of religion, but also, and perhaps 
primarily, a moralist. 
In the case of Hazlitt, therefore, there is support for the view 
that political and religious beliefs were closely connected at this time. But 
his work also reveals that generalisations like this are apt to be too neat. 
While it is likely that Hazlitt's demand for religious liberty pre-dated his 
love of civil liberty, it is clear that the latter principle rapidly became 
dominant in his mind, while religion dwindled to something of an after-
thought. If this is still held up as evidence that "all radical thought had 
a religious origin" the statement is becoming something like a mere truism. 
One can point to symptoms of religious heterodoxy in most important 
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contemporary politicians, whether they "conformed" to the accepted norms in 
41 
Church and State or not. If the historian then wishes to confine his 
attention to certain forms of dissent, the statement will be made true by 
definition or his search will fail. It is a fact that pious men who could not 
accept the thirty-nine articles were faced with a choice between an 
hypocritical acceptance or a life of dissent. They would presumably be men of 
learning and conviction, who would hope to be permitted the same civil 
rights as others. When parliament showed itself unready to allow this, it 
would be logical for them to hope for its reform. In this respect, the 
relationship between religious and civil dissent is almost true by definition, 
and as such is neither a profound discovery nor capable of explaining much. 
But Hazlitt's career reveals that a dissenting background was 
by no means a sufficient cause of radicalism, even if it was a necessary one. 
Even if we accept that his staunch liberalism was a legacy of his youth, we 
have to explain why he began his career with a philosophical tract aimed 
against "radical" metaphysicians (owing much to the Anglican Bishop Butler!, 
followed closely by a eulogy of Burke which he learned to regret years later, 
at a time when the influence of old dissent had waned sufficiently for him to 
speak of his quondam fellows in a critical spirit. It is, of course, possible 
to construct a model of "radicalism" which Hazlitt might fit, but this, in 
his words, is "pitiful work". The likely solution is that despite the neat 
logic of such historical explanation, human beings are able to shape their 
own way to an extent which makes a generalisation without an exception a 
rarity outside the realms of tautology. 
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PART 3 FRIENDS AND FOES 
"I hate a lie, a piece of unjustice touches me to the quick, though nothing 
but the report of it reach me ... I have made many enemies and few friends; for 
the public know nothing of well-wishers, and keep a wary eye on those that 
would reform them." 
1 
On Depth and Superficiality (Early 1826) 
It would not be possible to assess Hazlitt's politics without 
a survey of his work on the outstanding individuals of the day. He was 
acquainted with several leading figures, but it is characteristic of him to 
mix personalities with his politics, even if he had not actually met his 
subject. Whatever the drawbacks of this approach, it produced a masterpiece 
in his Spirit of the Age when coupled with his favourite essay format. 
In this section the primary intention is to evaluate Hazlitt's 
criticism of several controversial characters. It is assumed that a truly 
great critic should be perceptive and as even-handed as possible; one may 
possess one of these qualities in great measure, and the result will normally 
still be ephemeral work. We should bear this in mind as we discuss Hazlitt's 
views on contemporary figures. It may be possible to decide whether he 
satisfies both the necessary qualities, and we may also derive a greater 
understanding of the principles upon which his criticism was based. 
FRIENDS 
Hazlitt described himself once as "The Fool of Love", and it is 
normally assumed that he was equally inept in friendships. This and the 
following chapter are concerned with his personal relationships to some 
extent. But the fact that rather more attention is to be devoted to his 
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foes than to his friends is no indication that he was an unaimable creature. 
The "Friends" and "Foes" in our sense are those who are usually taken to have 
leaned to his side in politics, and those whom he took upon himself to combat. 
Whether the matter is as clear-cut as the title suggests will emerge in the 
course of discussion. 
WILLIAM GODWIN 
Hazlitt knew Godwin very well, but was unimpressed by his 
appearance and conversation. Although his expression denoted "placid temper 
and recondite thought", he was not tall or graceful. He had, indeed, "less of 
the appearance of a man of genius, than any one who has given such decided 
2 
and ample proofs." These proofs, however, were the result of application 
rather than of native brilliance. This rather dour impression is reflected in 
Hazlitt's assessment of his verbal powers; "He has neither acuteness of 
3 
remark, nor a flow of language." Hazlitt told James Northcote that he had not 
recorded Godwin's conversation since it has nothing to interest the public. 
In ordinary conversation, in fact, Godwin "either goes to sleep himself, or 
4 
sets others to sleep." It seems as though there was something of a personality 
clash between the two men. In particular, Hazlitt was irritated by Godwin's 
habit of snubbing his friends and courting his enemies. Perhaps some of this 
might be attributed to Hazlitt's conviction that Godwin had plagiarised his 
own work on Malthus without acknowledgement; it does appear, in fact, that 
Godwin did not assist Hazlitt in his career as much as he might have done. 
The essay on Godwin in The Spirit of the Age is dominated by 
a discussion of The Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, the author's most 
renowned non-fictional work. Hazlitt's account of its original reception is 
well-known: 
"No work in our time gave such a blow to the philosophic mind of 
the country as the Enquiry Concerning Political Justice. Thomas Paine was 
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considered for the time as a Tom Fool to him; Paley an old woman; Edmund 
Burke a flashy sophist. Truth, moral truth, it was supposed, had here taken 
5 
up her abode; and these were the oracles of thought." 
However, Hazlitt says elsewhere that ''I always found something wanting in Mr. 
Godwin's Enquiry Concerning Political Justice". He had "hoped, from its 
title and its vast reputation, to get entire satisfaction from it", but had 
6 
been disappointed. Godwin's "sultry and unwholesome fame" did not last, and 
now he "has sunk below the horizon, and enjoys the serene twilight of a 
7 
doubtful immortality." 
Despite his own quibbles, Hazlitt was concerned to defend 
Godwin from the distortions of his opponents. It was not true that the latter 
wished to destroy old prejudices without having alternatives to offer. Rather, 
his work is unquestionably positive; it gives mankind an ideal standard to 
inspire them which is fully consistent with scripture. However, he is quite 
clear that the ideal is unrealistic - Godwin "raised the standard of morality 
above the reach of humanity". He made exceptional heroism into a rule of 
everyday conduct; he over-rated the power of abstract reason; "he absolves 
man from the gross and narrow ties of sense, custom, authority, private and 
8 
local attachment." By creating over-ambitious models of behaviour Godwin was 
plotting his own downfall - "there is nothing that annoys our self-love so 
much as being complimented on imaginary achievements, to which we are wholly 
9 
unequal." This made his decline from public favour inevitable, although of 
course the French Revolution speeded up the process. The standards of utility 
and benevolence, which Godwin promoted to encourage virtuous behaviour, might 
be used instead to justify the grossest selfishness, while his appeal to the 
right of private judgement could be merely a way of defending unreasonable 
prejudices. The theory was therefore over-ambitious and potentially 
dangerous. 
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While Godwin had erred in placing too much emphasis upon 
reason, Hazlitt was anxious that this should not be used as justification for 
a contrary error. Although reason is unlikely to reach Godwin's standard, it 
is still "that which raises the individual above his mere animal instincts, 
appetites, and passions." Quoting his own Illustrations of Vetus, Hazlitt 
called reason "the queen of the moral world, the soul of the universe, the 
10 
lamp of human life." Since it is to reason that we owe our advancement from 
barbarism, we must attempt to cultivate it as far as our faculties will 
allow. Godwin had performed a useful service in advancing the extreme case for 
reason and benevolence. By this means we can attain a more realistic view of 
human potential, and virtue may be placed on a secure footing. 
This rather back-handed cornpliment reveals that Hazlitt' s 
criticism of Godwin is based on a different view of human nature. Godwin 
himself was not an advocate of revolutionary change. He believed that the 
path to a rational world would be long, but that eventually the truth would 
prevail. Hazlitt, therefore, was not rebuking Godwin for being over-confident 
about the immediate prospects for a perfect state. He was expressing doubts 
about the long-term future. Hazlitt and Godwin were agreed that one must work 
with the available materials, but disagreed about their quality. 
As we have seen, such contrasting views of human nature are 
the sources of ideological conflict. Hazlitt and the Godwin of the Political 
Justice could never have agreed over the precise meaning of such words as 
"reason", "progress", and "freedom", let alone the proper goals of human life. 
Godwin had, however, grown "wiser with opportunity and reflection; he changes 
11 
his opinions, and changes them for the better." He had always been a 
conservative (in the secondary sense), and at one time supported the 
Rockingham Whigs. The later part of his life saw a retreat to more moderate 
views, and he dropped some of his more controversial ideas on such topics as 
- 134 -
marriage. 
Although the division between the two men is made apparent in 
the Spirit of the Age, Hazlitt's tone in this essay is undoubtedly cordial 
when it is compared with the manner in which he treated other contemporaries 
who changed their views. Overall it is a quiet criticism, not a polemical 
attack. It is this mood which makes the essay a notable achievement. At the 
time, and for many years later, most writers found it difficult to approach 
Godwin without either losing their tempers or composing a eulogy. Obviously 
Hazlitt had a bias of his own, but it is not of a kind which induces a loss 
of balance. Godwin had erred on the side of optimism, and for this he can be 
forgiven. 
It may be proper to examine other differences between the two 
writers here, which further illuminate their ideological incompatibility and 
represent Hazlitt's views on major topics which we cannot examine at full 
length. The question of punishment, for example, was dealt with in some detail 
by both. Godwin urged the necessity for far-reaching reform of the penal 
system, arguing that the present situation was designed to encourage vice 
rather than to eradicate it. Grounding his case on utility and his theory of 
necessity, Godwin rejected the notion of retribution and reformation through 
coercion. The aim of punishment should not only be to protect society, but to 
restore offenders to a useful role in society. In an ideal state there would 
be no need for punishment in our sense of the world; neighbours and friends 
would undertake the process of reformation through reasonable persuasion. 
Hazlitt agreed that there were many problems with the penal 
12 
system. Like Godwin, he considered that the use of excessive punishment was 
counter-productive, as it merely deterred a jury from convicting. However, the 
case for reform is based on very different principles here, indicating a 
pronounced disagreement over the nature of man. Instead of appealing to 
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utility, Hazlitt suggested that punishrnent should reflect the collective moral 
sense of the community. Society should not only be secured against the 
offender, but should also feel that he has been justly punished. The just fate 
of the law-breaker would deter potential criminals from following the same 
course. He believed that the large number of capital offences threatened to 
defeat the object of a penal system. Transportation would be a much more 
suitable punishment in most cases. An attempt should also be made at reforming 
culprits "under prison-discipline". But Hazlitt argued that the laws of 
rationality do not apply to criminals; "It is the nature of passion to be 
blind to mere consequences; nay, more, it is the nature of passion, when its 
purpose is once fixed, to justify itself, and to resist and harden itself 
13 
against consequences." Hence, Hazlitt assumed that there will always be a 
need for coercion, and had grave doubts about the efficacy of any atten1pt at 
reformation through reasoned argument. Similarly, although he admitted that 
environmental factors have an effect on the incidence of crime, he dismissed 
the Godwinian idea that people are not responsible for their actions. While 
Godwin's necessitarianism led him to claim that the murderer is no more 
responsible than the knife he wields, Hazlitt laid it down as a firm principle 
that "No punishment ... will in the end be found to be wise or humane, or just 
or effectual, that is not the natural reaction of a man's own conduct on his 
own head, or the making him feel, in his own person, the consequences of the 
14 
injury he has meditated against others.'' There is more than a hint here of 
the retributive theory of justice which Godwin abhorred; the difference 
between them arises because of their contrasting faiths in the power of reason 
over human behaviour. 
Another revealing illustration of the gulf between Godwin and Hazlitt 
is the question of progress in art. Hazlitt had no doubt that the notion of 
progress applied to the sciences, since their procedure permitted one 
invention to inspire another. In the 1790's, however, Godwin was confident 
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that great improvements in the arts might be expected on similar grounds. 
His case depended upon his belief that "Genuius is wisdom; the possessing a 
great store of ideas, together with a faculty for calling them up; and a 
15 
peculiar discernment in their selection or rejection." But there is no reason 
why this discernment should remain "peculiar", since "every child ... is 
susceptible of the communication of wisdom, and consequently, if the above 
16 
definition be just, of genius." As human nature improves, so will the 
various portrayals of society advance towards perfection. 
For Hazlitt, however, there was no such vision of united 
advancement by the artist and his materials. His first point in the fragment 
"Why the Arts are not Progressive?" was to deny any analogy between the 
methods of art and science. Art depends upon "genius, taste and feeling"; 
l7 
is not "mechanical, reducible to rule, or capable of demonstration". The 
great models from the past, such as Homer, Titian or Shakespeare, studied 
nature as they found it. The masterpieces of the past may inspire others, but 
they will interpose themselves between the artist and nature, thus producing 
work which is partly imitation. Hazlitt believed that the arts leaped to 
their greatest perfection at the outset, and "have in general declined ever 
18 
after". There is no question of gradual improvement based upon wisdom. Indeed 
Hazlitt thought that the contemporary improvement in manners had arisen out of 
the exhibition of folly on the stage; hence, comedy had in a great measure 
laughed its own materials out of existence and was now faced with extinction. 
Although he did not directly refer to the Godwinian notion of progress in his 
essay, it is very likely that he would have regarded the growth of reason as 
tending towards the same outcome. Godwin himself had produced his masterpiece, 
Caleb Williams, as a result of his observations of "Things as they are"; had 
his protagonists Falkland and Williams behaved as fully rational beings it is 
difficult to envisage how this gripping adventure, or indeed any other plot 
of great dramatic interest, might have been produced. 
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Hazlitt's views on Godwin are revealing for a study of his 
thought as a whole. Political Justice, which was the text exclusively 
refered to in his criticism, is an example of almost pure liberalism. The 
hatred of dependancy, the corresponding denigration of government, and the 
faith in reason, benevolence and truth are all central to the liberal view of 
human nature and how it can fulfil its destiny. Hazlitt clearly leaned towards 
liberalism himself, but in his case there are definite qualifications. The 
differences between the two men are so marked that it must be doubted whether 
Hazlitt ever endorsed the more extreme positions in the early editions of 
Godwin's treatise, and he simply ignored the subsequent softenings of the 
doctrine. The critics who have called him a Godwinian have assumed that he was 
a radical because he opposed the governments of his day, and provided him 
with a list of doctrinal preferences which they assume all radicals agreed 
upon. Neither of these assumptions bear serious inspection. Godwin's refusal 
to endorse agitation for parliamentary reform alienated him from many 
genuine radicals, such as John Thelwall. Although we have seen that it would 
be inappropriate to describe Hazlitt's writings as radical, there may have 
been a time before his career opened when such a labelling could be endorsed. 
But we have his own statement that the Political Justice disappointed him 
to support the impression left by the coolly dismissive tone of the Spirit 
of the Age essay to support the impression that Hazlitt was at the most an 
admirer, rather than a disciple, of Godwin's. Most probably even this 
favourable view diminished once he had met the uninspiring philosopher. It 
must be concluded that Godwin exerted a marginal positive influence upon 
Hazlitt's political ideas, and that the phrases quoted so often from the 




According to Hazlitt, Robert Owen was ''a man of one idea", a 
19 
class of person discussed in a Table Talk essay. A man of one idea is so 
completely eaten up by it that his conversation can never dwell for a moment 
on another topic. In Owen's case, if he is told that your state of health is 
poor, he will explain how all such problems would be remedied under his 
scheme for the improvement of mankind. The rest of the discussion will be 
devoted to an elaboration of this plan. If you should politely mention anyone 
who has supported or deprecated his idea, "he looks at you with a smile of 
pity at the futility of all opposition and the idleness of all encouragement", 
20 
takes his hat and marches away in triumph. 
A man of one idea is generally a harmless fanatic; but he is 
a very irritating companion. He resembles a lunatic, but does not enjoy the 
lucid intervals of the latter. "If you see a visionary of this class going 
along the street, you can tell as well what he is thinking of and will say 
21 
next as the man that fancies himself a teapot or the Czar of Muscovy." This 
portrait is humorous rather than hostile, but one can readily understand why, 
years later, Owen felt compelled to respond to this imputation of "sober 
madness''. However, his objection only reinforces Hazlitt's argument, since it 
22 
is merely a defence of his idea. 
"On People with one Idea" was composed in 1822, when Owen had 
lost many of his powerful advocates. Hazlitt therefore felt able to bracket 
him with old Major Cartwright as a well-meaning failure. However, in 1816 
when he reviewed Owen's New View of Society for the Examiner, his emotions 
were very different. Owen had attracted the support of well-placed admirers, a 
list which eventually included Southey, Viscount Sidmouth (the former Prime 
Minister and current Home Secretary), and the Duke of Kent. He did not manage 
to obtain the whole-hearted countenance of William Wilberforce and the Prince 
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Regent, although flattering dedications indicated his desire to interest 
23 
them. At this point, therefore, Hazlitt took the "New View" very seriously. 
The first intention of Hazlitt's review was to criticise the use 
of the word "New" in Owen's title. He doubted whether New Lanark differed in 
any way from "Old Utopia". "It is as old as the "Political Justice" of Mr. 
Godwin, as the "Oceana" of Harrington, as the "Utopia" of Sir Thomas More, as 
24 
the "Republic" of Plato." It represented an over-optimistic vision of the 
future, "by which fools and honest men have been sometimes deceived, but which 
25 
has never yet taken in the knaves and knowing ones." Why, then, bother to 
revive these doctrines, which may not have been refuted, but have been found 
unrealistic in practice? 
Hazlitt's reaction to Owen's pamphlet was a mixture of 
incredulity, derision, and suspicion. He was amazed at the confidence with 
which Owen advocated his "paradoxes", in the presence of the men whose 
privileges were undermined by the doctrine. To illustrate his belief in 
environmental determinism, Owen had argued that the characters of judge and 
convict would be reversed had the circumstances of their birth been exchanged. 
Hazlitt must have rubbed his eyes when he read this argument. "Here's a 
levelling rogue for you!" he wrote,''The world turned inside out, with a 
26 
vengeance!" And yet Owen had not been arrested. Instead, he was patronized 
by the great. Hazlitt could only assume that Owen's views were not taken 
seriously, or that because New Lanark was small and distant, they felt that it 
was safe to patronise him. Meanwhile, Owen agreed with their opposition to 
parliamentary reform and Napoleon, which was comforting. Hazlitt himself could 
quietly dismiss the New View, but might have changed his mind if he had seen 
Owen "brought up for judgment before Lord Ellenborough, or standing in the 
27 
pillory." 
But Hazlitt had more weighty arguments against Owen's work. His 
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refutation ''is contained in this sentence:-'If to do were as easy as to teach 
others what were good to be done, chapels had been churches, and poor men's 
28 
cottages princes' palaces.'" Although Owen claimed that he alone understood 
human nature, he was far too sanguine about the hopes of improvement. Hazlitt 
wrote, "The improvement of men we do not think an impossibility, but we do 
think it almost the next thing to an impossibility, and not, as Mr. Owen does, 
a certainty." It seemed that "things will most probably go on as they have 
29 
done." He found the idea of a low-born Prince Regent "at the head of a gang 
of bravoes and assassins" very entertaining, but his light-hearted banter 
implies strongly that he rejected such thorough-going environmental 
determinism on the grounds of over-simplification. Owen treated his 
assumptions as facts, in a manner which reminded Hazlitt of the phrenologist 
Spurzheim; both men used "facts" in a manner which only succeeded in making 
the reader deeply suspicious. In short, "This puff will not take with us: we 
30 
are old birds, not to be caught with chaff." 
This critique, unfair as it is to both Owen and his admirers, is 
nevertheless highly revealing. Hazlitt was genuinely confused about the whole 
matter; he could not bring himself to recognise humanitarian motives in Owen's 
patrons. He correctly predicted that these influential backers would fall 
away. However, this was not so much because of a sudden realisation on their 
part that they were committed to a scheme which would actually do something 
for the poor; they were alienated by Owen's aggressive views on religious 
instruction. Similarly, Hazlitt ignored Owen's real achievement at New 
Lanark. It was by no means so insignificant as Hazlitt claimed, however n1uch 
Owen exaggerated its importance. This practical success attracted men like 
Southey, who had been disappointed by the results of Godwinianism but had 
never lost their philanthropy. As such, it revealed a considerable amount of 
good-will which a more balanced critic might have applauded. Hazlitt's 
critique is reminiscent of his review of Coleridge's Lay Sermon, which we 
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shall briefly discuss in the following chapter. In this approach a few leading 
principles are subjected to ridicule, and the reader is left to suppose that 
the remainder of the argument is equally specious. In neither review is there 
a serious attempt to examine the motivation behind the work. 
Possibly the clearest indication of Hazlitt's distance from the 
beliefs of Owen may be found in their respective thoughts on education. Owen 
was convinced that a proper system of education was essential to the 
production of his perfect society; indeed, his entire theory appears to 
31 
depend upon this. Although he did believe that children were born with 
certain innate propensities, they might be formed into any human character 
through the proper methods. He thought it was scandalous that Britain lacked 
a government-supported education system, and gave financial help to the 
contemporary educational reformers, Joseph Lancaster and Andrew Bell, even 
though he found fault with the plans of both (especially the latter, who 
advocated the inculcation of Anglican principles) . 
Hazlitt not only thought the plans of Bell and Lancaster 
inadequate; he did not look upon the idea of any kind of national education 
with enthusiasm. His early teachers, notably Joseph Priestley, were generally 
opposed to teaching which would uphold one form of belief over another - in 
spite of the sectarian nature of their own academies. Hazlitt shared this 
suspicion, but there is a more important reason for his antipathy to the 
32 
national schemes. His ideal was a classical education. While those who were 
not advantaged in this way could cope with the mundane problems of life quite 
adequately, only those who had been exposed to the thoughts, or read about 
the noble deeds of great men could genuinely recognise and admire excellence 
in others. Whether one might properly describe Hazlitt as an educational 
elitist or not is an open question. But it is certainly not implied that this 
kind of training should be available to everyone. In essays on ''The Ignorance 
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of the Learned" and "The Disadvantages of Intellectual Superiority", Hazlitt 
argued that drinking at the Pierian spring did not bring unmixed benefits; it 
is likely that he felt such a course was unsuitable for many more than the few 
who embarked upon it in his own day. As we have seen, Hazlitt had grave doubts 
about the supremacy of reason in human affairs; like Godwin, Owen was also 
guilt of over-estimating the potential for improvement through environmental 
factors. Holding these views, Hazlitt could not be as optimistic about the 
likely benefits of rationally-planned education as Owen was. 
This divergence of view over a central issue in the debate over 
human nature is indicative of a marked ideological disagreement between the 
two men. Owen's belief that once his ideas had been fairly stated they would 
be accepted by all rational men could not have impressed him much either. 
His subsequent development might bring him within the Socialist tradition, 
but the New View is best regarded as the work of an extreme liberal, closer 
to William Godwin than to Karl Marx. Like Godwin, he was not an enthusiastic 
supporter of the ca.mpaign for parliamentary reform; if he had been less 
extreme in his optimism, he might have acted differently. He did believe in a 
hierarchical society; he thought that happier, better-nourished workers would 
ensure larger profits for the masters, and that both groups would experience 
an upward-levelling of living standards. Whether this should lead us to 
describe him as a conservative (in non-ideological terms) is debatable and 
beyond our present purpose. The important point to make here that it was not 
Owen's cautious attitude to social change that Hazlitt objected to, but his 
optimistic view of man. 
SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH 
Although Hazlitt had relatively little to say about Sir James 
Mackintosh, the parallels between the two men are extremely interesting and 
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therefore he is a worthy figure with whom to close this section. As a young 
and promising lawyer, Mackintosh wrote a defence of the French Revolution, 
Vindicae Gallicae, which won renown as perhaps the most effective reply to 
Burke's Reflections. However, the course of events in France induced him to 
moderate his views. Announcing that he now detested and abhorred the 
principles of the French, he made a public "recantation" in a series of 
Lectures on the Law of Nature and of Nations, delivered in 1799. He settled 
down to a career in law and politics, also writing on philosophy and history 
for the Edinburgh Review. Before his death he was able to assist the passage 
of the 1832 Reform Act, showing that he had returned to something like his 
early advocacy of liberal causes. 
It has been suggested recently that Mackintosh's disagreement 
with Burke was not so profound as the rhetorical stance of the Vindicae 
33 
Gallicae would imply. Although there is not space here to argue this point 
fully, it would appear to be highly suspect. Mackintosh and Burke both 
appealed to events in France to sustain their contrasting cases, and 
occasionally Mackintosh was able to convict Burke of factual error. But what 
was really at issue was not the facts, but their interpretation. While Burke 
was anxious to place the blame for events on the Third Estate and their 
philosophical mentors, Mackintosh was equally keen to demonstrate that the 
country was pushed into revolution by corrupt government. Similarly, when 
Mackintosh contested Burke's interpretation of the 1688 Revolution in England-
probably the underlying object of the whole discussion - he made the valid 
point that the Revolution was made to appear more conservative than it was by 
the "Old Whigs''. But Burke might have simply replied that the reason why the 
Old Whigs had done this was because they intended it to be a once-for-all 
event. In short, both Burke and Mackintosh found what they sought in the pages 
of history and the accounts arriving from France. There could be no winner in 
this debate; all that is established by the texts is that Burke was a 
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conservative and Mackintosh a liberal. 
In the Vindicae Gallicae, Mackintosh justified Revolution on 
principles very similar to those of Machiavelli. States must return to their 
first principles periodically, as corruption will otherwise become too firmly 
established. Mild reforms are unavailing in such circumstances, since 
"pruning" of this kind will only stimulate further development of abuses. But 
when he came to review Burke's Letters on a Regicide Peace, he had changed 
his mind. He now wrote that ''the only question that can be at issue between 
Mr. Burke and ourselves, is whether a war was a just, effectual and safe mode 
of averting the danger with which the French Revolution might threaten the 
34 
established governments of Europe." Mackintosh's ideological conversion is 
further illustrated by his asking the rhetorical question, "Who are you that 
presume to frame laws for men without taking human passions into account - to 
regulate the actions of n1ankind without regarding the source and principle of 
35 
those actions?" In the Vindicae Gallicae, Mackintosh had been "presumptious" 
enough to submit all contemporary institutions to the test of reason, and 
found most of them sadly wanting. After reading Burke under the influence of 
the events in France, he realised that old institutions might be allowed to 
survive if they fulfilled other human needs. His liberal view of human nature, 
therefore, had changed to one very close to Burke's conservatism. 
Hazlitt was very hostile to those who joined the "winning" side, 
and did not let the circumstances of Mackintosh's conversion escape his 
scrutiny. Burke had invited Mackintosh for a visit after reading the cordial 
review of the Regicide Peace, and during his stay Mackintosh had become "a 
convert not merely to the grace of Mr. Burke's style, but to the liberality of 
36 
his views, and the solidity of his opinions.'' Hazlitt probably attended the 
lecture course of 1799, and reported William Godwin's shock at the desertion 
of an old friend. Hazlitt himself was not impressed; the lectures were "very 
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tolerable, dull, commonplace declamations -a little bordering on fustian." 
Since Hazlitt does note that on his return from a legal position 
in India Mackintosh returned to his former liberalism, the familiar 
explanation of apostasy cannot be the only reason for the critical tone of this 
38 
essay, from The Spirit of the Age. Hazlitt regarded Sir James as a poor 
parliamentary speaker, a man who originally expected his auditors to be 
convinced by philosophy, rather than their emotions. His theory that 
Scotsmen are too dry in their oratory was applied to Mackintosh as it was 
to Henry Brougham. Mackintosh also had no original opinions; he reminded 
Hazlitt of a dispensing chemist, able to pluck the right chemicals from his 
drawers, but unable to manufacture them himself. He had a prodigious memory, 
but this is not the same as genius. 
A more interesting reason for Hazlitt's disapproval was another 
tactical weakness beside Mackintosh's poor oratory. He was unaware of the 
distinction between friend and foe. In the House of Commons, "He gave a handle 
39 
to his enemies; threw stumbling-blocks in the way of his friends." When 
attacking Lord Castlereagh, he found so many objections to his own position 
that he was easily overthrown; yet when he had attacked Godwin, he had been 
irresistable. In other words, Mackintosh's love of truth made him more anxious 
to present both sides of a question fairly than to lead his audience to the 
preferred conclusion. Now, this characteristic will be noted again, in 
connection with Hazlitt's own 1806 essay on Burke. Here, Hazlitt subsequently 
thought, he had given "a handle to his enemies" through his excessive candour. 
It is unlikely that the coincidence would have struck Hazlitt in 1825, by 
which time he had learned not to repeat such ''mistakes." But it is interesting 
that the epigraph of The Spirit of the Age is "To know another well were to 
40 
know one's self." 
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This common characteristic is only one of many striking 
parallels between Hazlitt and Mackintosh. We have noted that Mackintosh was 
almost the only contemporary thinker of note to recognise Hazlitt's 
philosophical ability. They both regarded Utilitarianism as inadequate 
because it under-valued the moral sentiments. Mackintosh was attacked by James 
Mill for this, and John Stuart regarded Hazlitt as unreliable on the same 
grounds. There are great similarities in their political creeds. The following 
41 
quotations may give some idea of how their views coincided: 
Mackintosh:"[The Press] is the true control over the Ministers and 
Parliaments, who might else, with impunity, trample on the impotent 
formalities that form the pretended bulwark of our freedom" 
Hazlitt: "It is the press that has done every thing for the people, and even 
for Governments." 
Mackintosh (2) : "V.le desire to avert revolution by reforrn - subversion by 
correction." 
Hazlitt{2): "Timely reforms, therefore, are the best preventatives of 
revolutions." 
Mackintosh(3): "It is not because we have been free, but because we have a 
right to be free, that we ought to demand freedom." 
Hazlitt(3): ''[The people have] a desire of happiness, and a right to freedom, 
and a will to be free." 
Mackintosh{4): "The multitude have attained sufficient knowledge to value the 
superiority of enlightened men; and they retain a sufficient consciousness of 
ignorance to preclude rebellion against their dictates." 
Hazlitt(4): "Literature is at present pretty nearly on the footing of 
universal suffrage, yet the public defer sufficiently to the critics." 
Mackintosh(5): "Men may be so brutalised as to be proud of their chains." 
Hazlitt(5): "The slave, who has no other hope or consolation, clings to the 
apparition of royal magnificence, which insults his misery and his despair ... 
and hugs his chains the closer, because he has nothing else left." 
Mackintosh {6): "The evils of anarchy must be short-lived, while those of 
despotism are fatally permanent." 
Hazlitt(6): "Of all dynasties, anarchy is the shortest lived." 
When this evidence is considered, it is revealing that Mackintosh, like his 
friends Madame de Stael and Benjamin Constant, would be best described as a 
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conservative liberal. Mackintosh was also close, politically and socially, 
to Francis Jeffrey of the Edinburgh Review - a man whom Hazlitt called "The 
Prince of Critics", and applauded as someone who only deserted a central path 
43 
in politics to fight for liberty when it was endangered. 
In view of all this, it is rather difficult to explain the 
unquestionably cool tone of Hazlitt's remarks on Mackintosh. Of course, they 
moved in different circles, and a meeting may have brought about a friendship. 
But this is nearly as unlikely as the idea that Hazlitt could have befriended 
Lord Byron. The main problem, of course, was that Mackintosh had renounced his 
faith in the French Revolution, in a manner which amounted to a propaganda 
coup for the government. His subsequent return to the liberal fold could never 
efface the memory of the Lincoln's Inn lectures. Also, he was a 
parliamentarian without possessing the necessary ability to sway an audience; 
this probably tarnished Hazlitt's view of his undoubted qualities in other 
fields. 
This chapter on Hazlitt's "Friends" reveals that he was a very 
difficult man to please. Apart from the obvious fact that Hazlitt was a 
critic, who would be reluctant to overlook faults in a political platform or 
in a dramatic production, his ideological stance helped to ensure this. His 
ambivalent view of human nature allowed him great versatility in his attacks. 
Faced with an optimistic writer, the pessimistic strand in his thought was 
activated, and when his subject showed hostility to mankind, the hope for 
happier days which never wholly left him would rise up to deliver a rebuke. 
It would seem innappropriate, therefore, to speak of Hazlitt's intellectual 
friends and foes; it can be said, more plausibly for him than for most other 
critics, that he showed no favouritism in selecting his targets. If Napoleon 
Bonaparte, the subject of the following chapter, is an exception to this, then 
the reason for this inconsistency simply becomes more fascinating. 
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It is well known that Hazlitt regarded himself as a good 
hater. At a time when political and literary camps where unusually polarised, 
it is not surprising that his polemical qualities were regularly called upon. 
Some of the most memorable invectives were hurled at his brother-in-law John 
Stoddart, William Gifford of the Quarterly Review, and Edward Sterling, 
father of the poet and author of the "Letters of Vetus" in the Times. But 
his targets were not only journalists. Poets, philosophers, politicians, 
preachers and phrenologists all felt the weight of his displeasure. If, as we 
have suggested, Hazlitt was at his best when exercising his critical powers 
upon the work of others, it may be hoped that some important evidence may 




It has been truly said that "Burke was the great soul whose 
echo returned constantly to Hazlitt's thoughts, and summoned his prose to its 
1 
keener intensities." At least a glancing reference to the great Whig may be 
detected in many of Hazlitt's essays. A wholly satisfactory review of his 
complex reactions to Burke would require a lengthly dissertation; it is 
necessary, therefore, to restrict the present discussion to what are 
apparently the salient points. 
Hazlitt's first piece on Burke was composed for his Eloquence 
of the British Senate (1807), and later reprinted in the Political Essays. 
It was, he later asserted, "written in a fit of extravagant candour, at a 
time when I thought I could do justice, or more than justice, to an enemy, 
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without betraying a cause." In 1807 he had felt that it must be "a test of 
the sense and candour of any one belonging to the opposite party, whether he 
allowed Burke to be a great man." While the radicals mocked Burke as ''a wild 
enthusiast, or a hollow sophist", Hazlitt was almost alone in believing him 
to have been "an admirable reasoner, a close observer of human nature", 
besides being one whose prose combined "the two extremes of refinement and 
3 
strength". 
It will be noted, however, that Hazlitt regarded himself as 
belonging to an "opposite party" from Burke. Indeed, Hazlitt recorded his 
agreement with those who urged that ''the consequences of [Burke's] writings 
as instruments of political power have been tremendous, fatal, such as no 
4 
exertion of wit or knowledge or genius can ever counteract or atone for." 
Burke's message had lent succour to the enemies of freedom at home and abroad; 
the ammunition he had provided against Revolutionary principles was capable 
of damaging the more moderate opponents of despotism. For Hazlitt, the 
unrelenting assailant of Divine Right theories, this was unforgiveable. 
This position seems difficult to square with the earlier 
cordiality. But Hazlitt is speaking here of the effects of Burke's writings 
in the hands of others. When he examines Burke's philosophy in isolation from 
these effects, his attitude softens markedly. The "order of things" advocated 
by Burke may be only one possible arrangement of society, but his 
presentation is fair; "the advantages he points out as connected with the 
5 
mixed form of government are really and necessarily inherent in it." The old 
institutions of society have a genuine "tendency to enlarge and raise the 
mind, to keep alive the memory of past greatness ... because it is natural to 
think highly of that which inspires us with high thoughts." These remarks, 
indeed, are consistent with the favourable account of the old aristocracy 
which Hazlitt had published in his Free Thoughts on Public Affairs the 
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previous year; here he had concluded that since noblemen had a lasting stake 
in the country, a pride in their ancestry and a liberal education, they might 
be entrusted with more power than their mere numerical strength might 
6 
justify. In short, Hazlitt admitted that Burke was an advocate for a "mixed" 
system of government which had much to be said for it (although he is careful 
to point out that different systems might be equally attractive in other 
ways); his primary intention was not to write an apology for Louis XVI's 
"despotism". It is difficult to make a clear distinction between the true 
message of a work and the effect it has upon the conduct of its readers, but 
the only sensible explanation of Hazlitt's ambivalence in this essay seems to 
be that he tacitly drew such a distinction in the case of the Reflections. 
Further support for this conclusion may be drawn from Hazlitt's 
acknowledgement later in the essay that Burke truly understood "the nature of 
man, and his capacity of being affected by certain things from habit, from 
7 
imagination, and sentiment, as well as from reason.'' Burke thought more highly 
of man than to regard him as a mere calculating machine; he realised that 
parents loved their own children before all others, irrespective of their 
merits; he also denied that "that mode of government is necessarily the best 
8 
which is the cheapest." While Burke's opponents deprecated the power of 
prejudice and urged instead that men should follow abstract reason, Hazlitt 
urged the value of the prejudice in many cases. We have seen that ideological 
positions may be best understood as originating in conceptions of human 
nature; here we find that Hazlitt not only found merit in Burke's political 
creed, but could also agree with him on the fundamental issues of human 
emotions, knowledge, and conduct. There is a marked contrast between his 
treatment of this "foe" and his response to such supposed political allies 
as Godwin; in the first case, an outward hostility is tempered by the 
existence of underlying areas of agreement, whereas we have seen that his 
apparent fellow-feeling with Godwin was undermined by disagreements over 
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vital principles. 
Ten years later, Hazlitt composed a second article on Burke for 
the Political Essays. A changed tone is unmistakable from the outset of this 
piece. Although Hazlitt does not deny the unusual quality of Burke's prose, 
the essay mostly consists of a compendium of short-comings. Burke renounced 
his principles for a pension, his vanity outweighed his reason, he distorted 
facts to fit his theory. He was not a great philosopher, yet his ventures into 
practical politics were foredoomed by his metaphysical bent. In the previous 
essay, Hazlitt had allowed that Burke presented a valid case for a tenable 
cause. Here he is depicted as a man of "false refinement", who simply 
constructed an apology for prevailing abuses. To borrow a phrase from another 
essay, "he strev . .,cd the flowers of his style over the rotten carcase of 
9 
corruption." 
It would seem that Hazlitt had completely changed his mind about 
Burke in the intervening ten years. Yet this verdict is much too simplistic. 
Although there is no mistaking Hazlitt's bitterness, some hesitation is also 
apparent. Firstly, we should recall that in a footnote appended to the 
earlier essay at this time, he noted that his attitude was the result of 
"extravagant candour". This is an unusual choice of words, if not an 
unfortunate one. If he was too candid in 1807, what was he in 1817? The clear 
suggestion is that while he was able to discuss Burke's writings on their 
real merits in the first essay, when he composed the second he felt it 
necessary to obscure his true position. It appears that he changed his tone 
because "the poison of high example has by far the widest range of 
destruction", and that "however much it may be defended upon other grounds, 
the political career of that eminent individual has no title to the 
10 
praise of consistency." Burke had stood forward as the champion of liberty 
during the American War, but in writing his Reflections he had light-
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heartedly changed sides - possibly, Hazlitt asserts, because he was jealous 
of Rousseau's success on the other side. While this innovative insult might 
suggest that Hazlitt was warming to a task which he had commenced with the 
words, "It is not. without. reluctance that we speak of the vices and 
11 
infirmities of such a mind as Burke's'', his discomfort soon re-emerges. 
It was a common-place among Burke's detractors to accuse him of inconsistency, 
but it was more unusual to admit immediately afterwards that his career could 
"be defended upon other grounds". The remainder of the piece, which had 
originally appeared as the coda to an Edinburgh Review article on Coleridge, 
reads like the work of a man trying to convince himself of the validity of his 
own argument. Certainly it cannot compare to the earlier essay in terms of 
prose-style, although this may be partly attributed to its brevity. 
Hazlitt could be far more abusive where Burke was concerned, but 
even at his most hostile there are indications that he regretted his stance. 
The original version of his Round Table paper "On Beauty" contained a 
footnote which announced that ''[Burke) was at once a liar, a coward, and a 
12 
slave". It is revealing that, although Burke was long dead and there was no 
question of libel action, Hazlitt chose to omit this when the essay was taken 
from the Examiner newspaper for reprinting. It would appear that, on 
reflection, Hazlitt concluded that he would rather not allow such remarks to 
feature in his more lasting work. 
Despite such hesitancy, clearly by 1817 Hazlitt's opposition to 
Burke's legacy had deepened. In 1807 he had been buoyed by his belief in 
Napoleon as a bulwark against despotism; this consolation had disappeared ten 
years later. Burke's reputation as the greatest spokesman of the counter-
revolution had grown, and as the memory of his stand over America faded, it 
became easier to exaggerate the discrepancy between this and his later 
position. Hazlitt's sensitivity on this issue had probably increased; the 
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estrangement between himself and the Lake Poets, for example, had become 
permanent by 1817. Although it would be wrong to describe the author of the 
second "Character of Mr. Burke" as a man with a persecution complex, he 
certainly leaves the impression that he can no longer afford his earlier 
"candour", as he has been betrayed and deserted. 
Ironically, it appears that the main source of Hazlitt's 
later attitude is a mistake common to both Burke and himself. The former had 
exaggerated the influence of Rousseau and other French writers on the French 
Revolution. Hazlitt followed him by attributing the "legitimate reaction" to 
Burke. The pen could be rnightier than the sword, but in alliance they were 
almost unstoppable. It was therefore the duty of all those who rejected 
despotism to fight with every tool at their disposal, even if this meant 
distorting the truth a little. Therefore, although we have seen that Hazlitt 
was originally capable of discussing Burke as a supporter of the existing 
system of English government, he was unable to sustain this opinion for long. 
He eventually came to believe that Burke not only wished to see the ancien 
regime restored in France, but he also had given tacit encouragement to 
the friends of despotism at home. This type of criticism finds little 
sympathy among modern authorities on Burke, but it should be remembered that 
Burke ignored warnings that he would be seen as an apologist for arbitrary 
government. If a recent biographer is correct in claiming that Burke's 
preferred solution of creating a Constitutional monarchy in France could not 
have succeeded without a revolution, then the misunderstanding between Burke 
13 
and his opponents becomes even more ironic in hindsight. The fact that 
Burke's Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents had been premised 
upon an equally unlikely threat of despotism from the young George III should 
also permit a more sympathetic understanding of Hazlitt's error. 
One must conclude, however, that just as a balanced account of 
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the French Revolution should not be sought in Burke's pages, Hazlitt is 
not the man to consult if we seek an impartial account of Burke's career and 
writings. It is a pity that such a verdict is inescapable, because there are 
some fine insights to be gleaned from his criticism, and it might be said that 
Hazlitt understood Burke's mind as well as any of his contemporaries. 
Temperamentally they had much in common; they were highly emotional men, yet 
both sacrificed friendship for the sake of their principles. Emotionally, 
their allegiances were divided over the French Revolution. This, however, 
should not be allowed to disguise the broad areas of ideological agreement 
which Hazlitt betrays when the polemical approach is dropped. When it is 
remembered that the lasting friendship between Fox and Burke was changed to 
bitter emnity by the events in France, it becomes possible to understand that 
marginal differences of principle can have the same effect as a yawning gulf 
at times of political crisis. 
II 
THE LAKE POETS 
"That conversion will always be suspected that apparently concurs with 
interest. He that never finds his error till it hinders his progress towards 
wealth and honour, will not be thought to love truth only for herself.'' 
14 
Samuel Johnson, Lives of the Poets: John Dryden. 
Despite their loud protests, there is no doubt that the Lake 
Poets - William Wordsworth, Robert Southey and Samuel Taylor Coleridge -
underwent ideological conversion during the wars against France. They greeted 
the fall of the Bastille as a vital advance along the road to man's millenium, 
yet when Napoleon fell they were increasingly haunted by the likely results of 
radical thought. As teenage liberals, they were enchanted by the visions of 
freedom conjured by Godwin; as adult conservatives, they learned to appreciate 
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the cautions of Burke. Although what others saw as change was regarded by 
themselves as natural development, they actually provide a common, and wholly 
credible, motive for ideological disenchantment. When they were young, they 
gave themselves ''credit for qualities which [they] did not possess'', and 
15 
measured others by this standard. Later, they became aware of their own 
weaknesses, and those of their fellows. Hence, their burning desire for a 
rnore free and equal ordering of society was tempered into a conviction that 
distinctions of wealth and rank ensured social harmony, and that radical 
reform would involve unnecessary risks. 
Although there is insufficient space here for a full examination 
of the subject, the course of each man's metamorphosis should be sketched 
before discussing Hazlitt's criticisms. Wordsworth, as is well known, was 'n 
France during some of the early months of the Revolution. He made a Royalist 
girl pregnant, but inclined in other matters to the Girondin faction. He 
admired Paine and Rousseau - influences which are evident in his youthful 
pamphlet (never published), A Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff- and a 
subsequent reading of Godwin's Political Justice captivated him. At this 
time he told a friend that "I am of that odious class of men called 
16 
democrats, and of that class I shall forever continue." The pamphlet certainly 
places him among the more radical thinkers of the day; he advocated universal 
manhood suffrage, short parliaments, rotation in office, and no unmerited 
titles. His hatred for the aristocracy, fuelled by constant legal battles with 
the first Lord Lowther, is particularly extreme. 
Obviously George III's declaration of war against the French 
was a serious blow to Wordsworth. It began the process which ended with 
Wordsworth as Distributor of Stamps for Westmorland. Although his 
sympathies lay originally with the French, his opinions were even more shaken 
when 
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" ... become oppressors in their turn 
Frenchmen had changed a war of self-defence 
For one of conquest, lost sight of all 
17 
Which they had struggled for ... " 
After a tour of Germany with Coleridge and his sister Dorothy {1798), and the 
French invasion of Switzerland {1802), he decided that his loyalty lay with 
England. This rejection of the French did not automatically entail an 
alienation from the cause which they had abused. But in Wordsworth's case the 
two were closely linked. He disliked the feeling that he was adrift from his 
compatriots. He developed strong nationalistic principles, which inspired his 
sonnets on Independence and Liberty (1802), and his most famous political 
work, The Convention of Cintra (1808), which saw the best chance of 
defeating Napoleon in a patriotic movement in the Peninsular. The sonnets 
still contain references to Milton and Sidney, but it is debatable whether 
they would have approved of the cause for which their aim was invoked. 
Equally, the Cintra pamphlet might be called the work of a rebel, but a 
rebel with a conservative cause. He worried that its publication would raise 
the old accusation of Jacobinism against him, but he was now criticising the 
government from a position of safety. In 1816 he published odes on Waterloo 
in the belief that victory over France was more important than conquering 
misery at home - a telling reversal of earlier priorities. 
The Letters to the Freeholders of Westmorland {1817) perhaps 
best indicate Wordsworth's later position. They were designed to persuade the 
county electorate not to vote for the Whig, Henry Brougham, who was standing 
against Lord Lowther's nominees. The ideological conversion he had 
undergone is demonstrated in his eulogies of Burke, a man whom he had 
previously denounced. The second Lord Lowther, who had paid his father's debt 
to the Wordsworth family, is complimented as "a tried enemy to dangerous 
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innovators - a condemner of fantastic theories - one who understands mankind 
and knows the heights and levels of human nature ... who despises ... the shows, 
and pretences, and all the false arts by which the plaudits of the multitude 
are won, and the people flattered to the common ruin of themselves and their 
18 
deceivers." Wordsworth was convinced that parliamentary reform would be the 
harbinger of anarchy. The "ignorant" populace were "not fit to govern 
themselves - not yet, certainly", and since he did not think it right that a 
child should learn more than his father had done, the day when they were fit 
19 
to govern themselves could only be a long time off. 
Some critics have defended Wordsworth's consistency, urging that 
"The story of Wordsworth's political development is one of growth but not one 
20 
of decline or apostasy", and that he maintained his "hurnanitarian sympathy". 
This account (by F.M Todd) is not satisfactory. It appears to be based on a 
confusion of the two types of liberalism discussed earlier. One may have 
"humanitarian sympathies" even after an ideological conversion from 
liberalism to conservatism, and the statement sheds no light on the question 
of consistency. But when Todd claims that Wordsworth's political faith 
"looked hopefully forward and was based essentially on a belief in inevitable 
progress towards an ideal state of human liberty and dignity", he seems to be 
21 
indulging in wishful thinking. This would indeed signify ideological 
consistency, but flies in the face of the pessimistic view of hurnan nature 
evinced by Wordsworth in his later writings. 
********* 
Robert Southey was brought up on lines laid down in Rousseau's 
Emile, and after this did not take well to the discipline of Westminster 
22 
School. Expelled for denouncing the practice of flogging, Southey read Godwin 
and became a radical liberal. The Pantisocratic scheme which he devised with 
Coleridge and another friend was not rigorously Godwinian in spirit or letter, 
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since Southey wanted to take a servant and married Edith Fricker with 
unnecessary enthusiasm for one who followed the creed of Political Justice. 
Nevertheless, Southey was clearly fired with enthusiasm for liberal causes as 
a young man, and had great hopes for the future of humanity. 
At this time Southey was writing radical poetry about the 
Peasant's Revolt and Joan of Arc. After the death of Robespierre he and 
Coleridge collaborated on a play about the Jacobin leader, whom Southey had 
described as a benefactor of mankind. By 1797, however, trips abroad and 
the French war induced him to renounce his visions of "man-mending". He 
settled down to support a growing family (together with that of Coleridge) , 
and became a contributor to the Quarterly Review which had been set up to 
oppose the moderately-liberal Edinburgh. He adopted a view of history which 
reflected his conservative outlook; "Great and sudden changes are evil in 
themselves and in their consequences," he wrote. "The Constitution is our 
23 
Ark of the Covenant. Woe to the sacriligious hand that would profane it." 
Like Wordsworth, Southey became convinced that only an immediate 
suspension of the freedom of the press could save the country from a bellum 
servile during the post-war distresses. But, as Crane Brinton has suggested, 
Southey never entirely lost his desire to see man's lot improved. His hatred 
for Malthusian doctrine was hardly unique in the conservative ranks, except 
perhaps for its intensity. He believed that taxation should be levied to 
support the poor by public works whenever necessary. He was an enthusiast for 
the ideas of Robert Owen, even though he realised that the latter was an 
enemy to established religions. His notions on taxation and industrial 
developments provoked the ridicule of Macaulay, but Southey emerges from their 
24 
ideological battle with great credit. Macaulay's confidence that moral 
conclusions may be drawn from statistics is not as convincing as Southey's 
anger as a witness of suffering. 
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Southey's main dilemma was that he became a paternalist at a 
time when the Tory party was falling under the influence of laissez-faire. 
After reading evidence of the factory system's abuses he told a friend that he 
was surprised "that more of these cotton and worsted and flax kings have not 
yet hanged themselves ... that none of their factories have been destroyed; that 
25 
the very pavement of the streets has not risen and stoned them." This moral 
outrage was echoed by some amongst the Tory party, but for the most part the 
political econon1ists were looked upon as oracles because of their theoretical 
"expertise". Never entirely at home among the Tories, he was the object of 
bitter invective from the Whigs and reformers. In 1817 William Smith stood up 
in parliament with a copy of Southey's Wat Tyler in one hand, and an 
issue of the Quarterly Review in which the former radical had denounced 
the freedom of the press in the other, and ironically urged that Southey 
should be arrested for sedition. Southey could not resist defending himself, 
and probably made matters worse by doing so; Coleridge argued that a man 
should not be condemned for having thought too well of his fellows at one 
time, but this did Southey little good either. Although Coleridge's statement 
confirms that Southey had undergone an ideological conversion, the latter 
thought that there had been no more change in his opinions than "the ordinary 
26 
process of beer and wine- of fermenting." 
********* 
Coleridge's own complex personality and opinions can scarcely be 
fully dealt with here. Having absconded from Cambridge and enrolled in the 
dragoons under the name of Silas Titus Comberback, Coleridge found a more 
congenial outlet for his spirits in Jacobinism. His "Moral and Political 
Lectures", delivered in Bristol during 1795, certainly sounded radical in 
denouncing the status quo. Yet even here, he was pleading for the lower 
27 
orders, not to them, a method which he held fast to throughout his life. 
- 163 -
Whereas Wordsworth and Southey experienced religious doubts after being 
exposed to the doctrines of Paine and Godwin, Coleridge told his Bristol 
28 
audience, "Go, preach the Gospel to the poor.'' It was necessary, he declared, 
to teach them their duties in order to make them deserving of their rights. 
He warned against the possible consequences of revolution; since ''the Temple 
of Despotism is built of human skulls", we should beware "lest when we erect 
the edifice of freedom we but vary the stile (sic) of architecture, not 
29 
change the materials." The lecturer was concerned with the well-being of the 
poor as much as with their need for a voice in political matters. The poor 
could not be free members of society because the system prevented them from 
developing human affections. The worker returns from his hard day's toil to be 
greeted by a family who are competitors for his bread, not the soothers of his 
30 
weary soul. Therefore Coleridge did hold some views which are nor1nally 
associated with conservatism at this early stage of his development. However, 
he blamed the excesses of the Revolution on the allied powers, and hoped that 
the war would soon be brought to an end. 
Within a year of this lecture, Coleridge could write that he 
had "snapped his squeaking baby-trumpet of sedition", even though he had 
recently composed the poem "Fire, Famine and Slaughter" which asserted that 
Pitt would burn in Hell. His religious sentiments must have played a part in 
this conversion. In The Plot Discovered of the previous year, he had 
denounced the view that the English constitution was the best possible as 
blasphemous; "An omnipotent devil in a good humour would give a much better 
31 
extreme of possible good." But it had become clear that the cause of religion 
was no safer with the French. The invasion of Switzerland seems to have been 
the immediate factor which reconciled him to supporting the English. At the 
same time, he was coming to reject the materialistic philosophy of Hartley, 
and to trace all the woes of his day to the influence of Hobbes and Locke, 
who in their turn had infected Helvetius and the French. 
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Coleridge's political canon is perhaps marred by the fact that 
he was working for the newspapers during the Peace of Amiens. At this time his 
hatred for Napoleon confirmed the change in his outlook. In October, 1802, 
he wrote an interesting piece entitled "Once a Jacobin, always a Jacobin". The 
latter word, he explains, is attached to a person ''whose affections have been 
warmly and deeply interested in the cause of general freedom, who has hoped 
all good and honourable things, both of and for mankind." "Even when he 
32 
despairs of the cause, he will yet wish that it had been successful." The 
Jacobin believes that government can only be good if it flows directly from 
the governed. This creed was "dazzling at first sight to the young" - and, 
to those who "judging of man in general, from their own uncorrupted hearts, 
33 
judge erroneously and expect unwisely." The opponents of Jacobinism have acted 
throughout the crisis as if the doctrine could only be countered by force. 
They condemn all who ever held such optimistic views of mankind as 
incorrigible. Instead, the ex-Jacobins should be accepted as loyal citizans 
who have been led astray by idealism, not through evil. 
Coleridge maintained a critical stance to the end of his life. 
But caution crept in to some of his later works, at a time when he opposed 
Catholic Emancipation and the Reform Bill, on the grounds that the time for 
such measures had not yet arrived. But, like Southey, he never lost his old 
enthusiasm entirely. In 1815, he found himself haranguing an audience of 
butchers on the subject of the Corn Laws, and his attacks on the Malthusians 
and political economists are bitter. Like Southey, he would not be closely 
associated with a political party, although he did send Lord Liverpool his 
advice on one famous occasion. The Christian Socialist F.D Maurice wrote of 
Coleridge's work; "The mere conservative is indignant, because it will not 
assume exisiting rules and opinions as an ultimate basis, but aims at 
34 
discovering their meaning and their foundation." Another distinguished 
critic has argued that Coleridge's Idealism "was the source of a radicalism, 
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more radical than that of the Philosophe of that ilk, a criticism more 
35 
profound and more constructive than that of any of his contemporaries." 
Whatever the justice of this claim, it would still be inappropriate to deny 
the conservative orientation of Coleridge's thought. At the time that he lost 
his faith in the rational progress of man, he became more cautious about the 
necessity for reforms. This is not a necessary outcome of a conservative view 
of human nature, but it is a position more common amongst conservatives than 
a refusal to countenance any change at all, which after all carries grave 
risks to the social tranquility which such thinkers value most. Coleridge was 
indeed a conservative, and his notions of "progression" and "permanence" and 
the "National Church" demonstrate a concern for the proper workings of a 
constitution which places him in the front rank of the tradition. As John 
Stuart Mill later said, he clearly was a seminal thinker of the century. 
********* 
We must now turn to an investigation of Hazlitt's reactions to 
these three men. He was acquainted with all of them, and this personal contact 
inevitably coloured his criticism. In 1798 he heard Coleridge preach, and was 
enchanted by both the matter of his sermon, and the manner of its delivery. 
Coleridge was at this time intending to join the Unitarian Ministry, a course 
which Hazlitt had already rejected. It was while staying with the Hazlitts 
that Coleridge received the offer of patronage from the Wedgewoods which 
deflected him from his original plan. The mood evoked in the essay "My First 
Acquaintance with Poets" is one of affection tinged with regret. By the time 
he wrote the essay, Hazlitt had decided that the preacher had possessed great 
powers, but that these had been wasted through drug addiction, lack of will 
and apostasy. Wordsworth emerges from the piece as a distant figure, without 
a trace of his friend's warmth and brilliance. Southey does not appear in the 
36 
essay at all, which symbolises their slighter acquaintance. 
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Hazlitt was a very early admirer of Wordsworth's poetry. He 
believed the Lyrical Ballads to be the product of a "levelling muse"; the 
same inspiration which had guided the poet to Revolutionary France. It is not 
possible to discuss the matter fully here, but it might be ventured that this 
37 
is neither an accurate, nor perhaps a serious reflection. By the time this 
comment appeared in The Spirit of the Age, Wordsworth had long forsaken his 
liberal past, and any mention of levelling tendencies would certainly have 
embarassed him. Certainly the context makes it likely that Hazlitt was 
digging up Wordsworth's past to draw attention to the changes in his opinions. 
The Lyrical Ballads did represent a continuation of the new trend in writing 
poetry in the language of comnon men, and dealing with hurr~le subjects. But 
the existing order of society is scarcely threatened with "levelling" in the 
poems. "Hart-Leap Well", for example shows that nature takes revenge for 
abuses by the wealthy; the assumption is that the destruction of Sir Walter's 
handiwork is just, but that the people themselves need not intervene against 
such men. Obviously, had Sir Walter not been so cruel no harm would have come 
to his land. The poor narrator of the poem can do little more than guess at 
the cause of nature's vengeance. It is left to the poet to draw the moral from 
the tale. The precept, 
"Never to bind our pleasure or our pride 
38 
With sorrow of the meanest thing that feels," 
is quite compatible with the paternalism Wordsworth adopted in later life. The 
poor must not be treated harshly, indeed they should be regarded as having 
emotions and physical needs. But men like Sir Walter should merely ensure that 
they know their duties as well as the rights of their position. In many 
respects, the poet's stand-point is reminiscent of Gray (a poet Wordsworth 
despised) in his "Elegy". It is the task of the educated man to speak for 
the "mute inglorious Miltons" of a low station. In other poems, such as 
"Simon Lee", Wordsworth's message is at least similar to that of many 
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contemporary apologists for the status quo. This line of argument suggested 
that the poor should be envied, as they were not enticed by the false charms 
of luxury. 
Elsewhere, indeed, Hazlitt does suggest that he is not in 
earnest when he speaks of Wordsworth's levelling muse. He describes the 
lyrical poetry as the "cant of humanity", and his political poems as the 
39 
"cant of loyalty to level Buonaparte with Kings and hereditary imbecility." 
He was also insistent upon what he regarded as Wordsworth's major weakness as 
a poet and as a man; his consuming egotism. This is not egotism of Cobbett's 
variety, which does not monopolise the reader's attention. "[Wordsworth] is 
glad that Buonaparte is sent to St. Helena", Hazlitt writes, "and that the 
Louvre is dispersed for the same reason - to get rid of the idea of anything 
greater, or thought greater than himself. The Bourbons ... give no disturbance 
40 
to his vanity; and therefore he gives them none.'' This egotism, which other 
less hostile observers also reported, casts further serious doubts upon 
Wordsworth's "humanitarianism". 
Hazlitt has little to say about Wordsworth's direct involvement 
in politics, except when he jeers at the employment of the latter as stamp 
distributor for the government. The accusation of apostasy is not so common 
in Wordsworth's case as it is for the other two Lake Poets. This suggests that 
Hazlitt had less respect for Wordsworth than for Coleridge, and that since 
Southey was poet laureate - and very outspoken - he was a more promising 
target for criticism. The Spirit of the Age essay on Wordsworth 
concentrates upon the poetry, which Hazlitt never ceased to admire. 
Hazlitt's treatment of Southey is significantly different. He 
did not have a high regard for the laureate's poetical talents, and this 
allowed him a free rein for an assault on his politics. "We have nothing to 
do with Mr. Southey 'the man', or even with Mr. Southey 'the apostate', but we 
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have soemthing to do with Mr. Southey the spy and informer", he writes in his 
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review of Southey's Letter to William Smith. In this publication, Southey 
had rebuked the man who had dragged the Wat Tyler into the public domain 
once again. Hazlitt's main concern at the time was with the freedom of the 
press, and he was outraged by Southey's position. He could not restrain 
himself from striking at Coleridge, who had defended his fellow Lakist. 
Coleridge had said that Southey could be excused his youthful ideals; Hazlitt 
retorts, 
" ... being a child, he felt as a child, and thought slavery, 
superstition, war, famine, bloodshed, taxes, bribery and corruption, rotten 
boroughs, places and pensions shocking things; but now that he is become a 
man, he has put away childish things and thinks there is nothing so delightful 
as slavery, superstition, war, famine, bloodshed, taxes, bribery and 
42 
corruption, rotten boroughs, places and pensions; and particularly his own.'' 
He accepted the explanation that Southey was appalled by the Napoleonic 
expansion, but now that this threat has passed away, why does he not revert to 
his old liberalism? The answer, for Hazlitt, was simple. "His engagement to 
his first love, the Republic, was upon liking; his marriage to legitimacy is 
for better, for worse, and nothing but death shall part them." His new motto 
43 
is, "Be to her faults a little blind/ Be to her virtues very kind." Southey 
had accused his opponents of having watched the sun rising in the east, and 
fixing their gaze there while it moved westwards. Hazlitt parries the thrust 
ably; the sun, he says, will rise in the east again, "Yet Mr. Southey is still 
44 
looking in the West - for his pension." Here Hazlitt strikes a weak point in 
Southey's defence; he loved the Iberian peninsular, and his hatred of the 
Napoleonic regime was consistent with this feeling. But when the Bourbons were 
restored they brought back the inquisition with them, and for all Southey's 
bigotry against Catholicism, he was ominously silent on the subject. 
Hazlitt regarded Southey as a living contradiction of Coleridge's 
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message in "Once a Jacobin, Always a Jacobin." The revolutionary in Southey 
was not dead by any means. For example, Southey had compared Napoleon with 
Hatto, the Bishop who was eaten alive by rats. Hazlitt retorts that "The 
45 
levelling rogue cares neither for Bishops nor emperors!" "Poets are naturally 
Jacobins", he declares, "they are with us while they are worth keeping" at 
46 
any rate. Southey's old temperament even showed through in the odes he has 
written as poet laureate. He seemed to be preaching morality at kings and 
princesses, as if he were the village parson addressing his humble flock. We 
have noticed above that Southey certainly retained much of his hatred of 
oppression; but Hazlitt's attack does not square with some of his other 
writings. In an article on Coriolanus he expressed the view that poets are 
naturally attracted to power, and that even the best need the praise of the 
47 
mighty to spur them on. Also, his definition of a Jacobin changes to suit his 
polemical needs. When the epithet is applied to himself, he can write that 
"The true Jacobin hates the enemies of liberty as they hate liberty, with all 
48 
his strength and all his might.'' But in Southey's case a Jacobin is "one who 
would have his single opinion govern the world, and overturn everything in 
49 
it." Hazlitt's real case is that his political course has stuck to a central 
path, while Southey has been always in extremes. But this is buried in the 
flood of invective. In assaulting Southey's ideas on taxation, and applauding 
Macaulay's ridicule, he merely reveals how much his feelings can betray his 
50 
normal critical sense. When he recites the standard opposition creed that 
taxes would only enrich pensioners and money-men, he makes no attempt to deal 
with Southey's view that taxation might be put towards constructive ends such 
51 
as public works - a view he endorses himself elsewhere. "Constructive" is not 
the appropriate word to describe Hazlitt's criticism of the man who "missed 
52 
his way in Utopia [and] found it at Old Sarum." Once more there is a closer 
approach to balance in The Spirit of the Age, where he concedes that 
Southey "cannot bear to give up the thought of happiness, his confidence in 
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his fellow-man, when all else despair." But such an insight is rare. Overall 
it is not easy to argue with Marilyn Butler's characterisation of Hazlitt's 
54 
attitude a::; "nasty". 
Hazlitt's assessment of Coleridge's later work is also marred 
by bitterness, although this is softened a little by his sorrow at the talent 
"the damaged archangel" had supposedly wasted. He reviewed Coleridge's Lay 
Sermon before it was published, on the basis of his past opinions. Although 
he was able to show that Coleridge's attempt to demonstrate the relevance of 
biblical teaching to contemporary politics was open to serious objections, he 
failed to appreciate that in lecturing the higher classes Coleridge was hoping 
to effect a peaceful reformation of acknowledged abuses. When Hazlitt heard 
that Coleridge had described Caliban as the prototype of a modern Jacobin, he 
could not disguise his triumph: "for Caliban is strictly the legitimate 
sovereign of his isle", and has been supplanted by the superior qualities of 
55 
Prospera. Once again, literary criticism is dragged on to the political 
battlefield. But in his calmer moments, Hazlitt has clearer insights. In words 
which curiously echo those of Maurice, quoted earlier, he writes, 
"Would the Whigs patronise him? - he is too straightened in 
antiquated notions and traditional prejudices. Would the Tories take him in? 
56 
-he is too liberal, enlightened and transcendental for them." 
Indeed, Coleridge is a man whose ideas have left him "no place of refuge" in 
57 
the present political situation. In some respects this anticipates the work of 
Mill on Coleridge, although Hazlitt's purpose is not so friendly. He can also 
concede that The Friend contains some "noble passages and fine trains of 
58 
thought", though it is too abstruse for common readers. At least Coleridge's 
"discursive reason would not let him turn himself into a Poet Laureate or 
59 
stamp distributor." Charles Lamb is not the only critic who has detected "a 
kind of respect [which] shines thro' the disrespect" of Hazlitt's review of 
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the Lay Sermon. Indeed, sadness is the key emotion in Hazlitt's criticism of 
Coleridge. After the passage on Caliban, he protests, "Why does tv!r. Coleridge 
61 
provoke us to write as great nonsense as he talks?" The Spirit of the Age 
essay on Coleridge best exemplifies this theme - "Alas! 'Frailty, thy name is 
Genius!' What is become of all this mighty heap of hope, of thought, of 
learning, and humanity? It has ended in swallowing doses of oblivion and in 
62 
writing paragraphs in the Courier- such, and so little, is the mind of man!" 
Hazlitt summed up his debate with the Lakists as follows: 
"And we saw three poets in a dream walking up and down the face 
of the earth, and holding in their hands a human heart, which as they raised 
their eyes to heaven, they kissed and worshipped ... And not long after, we saw 
the same three poets, the one with a receipt stamp in his hand, the other 
with a laurel on his head, and the third with a symbol which we could make 
nothing of, for it was neither literal nor allegorical, following in the 
train of the Pope and the Inquisition and the Bourbons ... with the emblem of 
63 
the human heart thrown beneath their feet, which they trampled and spat upon!" 
********* 
Hazlitt's commentators often explain that the difference between 
the Lake Poets and himself was due to his belonging to a later generation. 
While the poets witnessed the fall of the Bastille and reign of terror, 
Hazlitt was only a schoolboy then. Before dealing with this possibility, it is 
important to notice the biographical coincidences between them. All four men 
were groomed for a religious life at some point, and their several decisions 
not to take orders on conscientious grounds were acts of youthful rebellion 
which it took them some time to live down. Their social backgrounds were very 
similar - Hazlitt may not have attended a university, but Hackney Academy 
provided perhaps an even better education. All, of course, were great literary 
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men who were fascinated by politics, and all four were concerned to prove 
their consistency. The Lakists attributed their maturing views to a belief 
that they had hoped too much for their fellows. It is interesting to find that 
their bitter critic, William Hazlitt, occasionally echoed this sentiment. At 
the end of the great essay "On the Pleasure of Hating", he declared that he 
had been disappointed in both his private and his public ideals, "calculating 
64 
others from myself, and calculating wrong." 
The notion that the answer lies in biographical details is 
probably correct, but must be carefully explained. Hazlitt did not live 
through the early stages of the Revolution as an adult. But we have seen that 
the views of the poets changed in the late 1790's, when Hazlitt was as old as 
they had been at the height of their radicalism. It was not the terror that 
finally alienated them - more likely, it was Napoleon. The one pre-eminent man 
to guide the Revolution, pleaded for by Wordsworth in his early writings, had 
arrived, and the older men rejected him. Hazlitt did not, and an explanation 
for this must be attempted here. 
The state of mind which believes that it is wrong to read our own 
good intentions into the motives of others is more compatible with the 
authoritarian than the democratic spirit. It is an aristocratic disposition 
which appears to contradict the belief of the true democrat that the opinions 
of others are of equal value (or close enough to make no important 
difference) . The fact that Hazlitt betrays such a spirit is of great 
significance; that he shared it with the Lake Poets suggests that contrary to 
the familiar interpretation, areas of ideological agreement remained between 
them even after their quarrels. It seems that this difference between their 
positions was, ironically, the result of the extreme liberalism of the poets 
in their youth. Their support for the French had not stopped a long way short 
of treason, and from this position their conversion was almost bound to be 
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violent. Hazlitt was never actively seditious, was never induced to write 
recanting verses like "France: an ode", and was therefore able to maintain a 
critical stance to the end. For example, the Lake Poets seem to have regarded 
Napoleon as a monster of their own creation; Hazlitt could view him without 
the distorting spectacles of anxiety. 
But Hazlitt was almost alone in his detached position. The 
poets, whom he admired as men and as writers, accepted government pensions or 
wrote articles for the press on the "Corsican upstart''. They needed to live, 
and they needed to make their conversions public in order to assuage their 
guilt. But Hazlitt could not understand the complexities of their situation, 
and wrote it all down to an exercise in snivelling apostasy. Their continued 
commitment to the cause of jl.J.'3t government went unacknowledged except for the 
odd reluctant after-thought. Perhaps the history of political abuse has been 
enriched by this failure of sympathetic understanding on Hazlitt's part, but 
it has disguised broad areas of agreement which exist despite the fact that 
their squabble was an ideological one at root. 
III 
MAL THUS 
Hazlitt's part in the debate over population, which was fuelled 
by the publication of Thomas Robert Malthus's Essay on the Principle of 
Population (1798 and subsequent editions), has already been made the subject 
65 
of an excellent full-length study by W.P Albrecht. However, Malthus was such 
a persistent irritant to Hazlitt that a full picture of Hazlitt's thought 
demands a few remarks here. The main purpose of this section is to examine 
the ideological implications of Hazlitt's vehement and consistent opposition 
to the Malthusian doctrine. 
Malthus's Essay was the outcome of conversations with his 
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father over the future progress of mankind. Malthus senior, who had known 
Rousseau, was an optimist who failed to convince his son in spite of an 
education directed by liberals. Robert could not accept the more sanguine 
visions of Godwin and Condorcet, who had gone so far as to suggest that 
perfect rationality would eradicate illness and mortality, thus removing the 
need for more children. Instead of this, the young clergyman saw the sex 
instinct as natural to man, and believed that in a state of society free from 
wars and famines which would otherwise keep the population down, the number of 
people would increase in a geometrical proportion (1:2:4:8:16:32 etc.). The 
means of subsistence could never keep pace with this; at the very best it 
might increase in an arithmetical series (1:2:3:4:5:6, etc.). The result of 
this growing discrepancy would be that the wonderful state envisaged by 
Godwin would soon disintegrate. War and famine would re-emerge, and population 
would therefore fall back to a more 'natural' level. 
This blow was serious enough to Godwin and his followers. But 
more moderate optimists, already reeling from the untoward results of the 
French Revolution, were equally perturbed by the implications of the essay. 
It is difficult to see how the conditions of the poor could be markedly 
improved if the theory holds. Population, Malthus says, is checked by the 
intervention of ''misery and vice" whenever it presses upon the means of 
subsistence. But at the time that he wrote, the poor were suffering 
particular hardships, and the Poor Rates levied in their support were rising. 
Reformers hoped that conditions might be improved by institutional or 
agricultural improvements, beside the rise in living standards that might be 
expected from the industrial developments at the time. But it is clear that 
even modest movements in this direction could afford at best a temporary 
succour. Released from the prison-house of misery and vice, the lower orders 
would begin to breed, their children would survive longer, and before long 
the old troubles would re-emerge. There would be no question of increased 
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leisure for the poor, who would thus never manage to raise their rational 
faculties. Thus, readers of the Essay would gather that the poor have always 
been with us, and ever will remain on the margins of existence. 
In some quarters, this doctrine was greeted with howls of 
protest. William Cobbett informed him, 
"I have, during my life, detested many men; but never any one so 
much as you ... no assemblage of words can give an appropriate designation of 
you; and therefore, as being the single word which best suits the character 
of such a rnan,I call you Parson, which amongst other meanings, includes that 
66 
of Borough-monger Tool." 
Karl Marx was later to repeat this "conspiracist" view: 
"The people were ... confronted not with a man of science but 
with a bought advocate, a pleader on behalf of their enemies, a shameless 
67 
sycophant of the ruling classes." 
However, conservatives of the time were equally angry. Southey wrote in 1812, 
"The rich are to be called upon for no sacrifices; nothing more 
is required of them that they should harden their hearts. They have found a 
68 
place at the table of nature, and why should they be disturbed at the feast?" 
Coleridge was also concerned with the moral effects of the theory; 
"You say to a man, 'You have no claim upon me; you have your 
allotted part to perform in the world, so have I ... you carne into the world 
when it could not sustain you.' What would be this man's answer? He would 
say 'You disclaim all connection with me; I have no claims upon you? I can 
then have no duties towards you, and this pistol shall put me in possession 
69 
of your wealth.'" 
It might be useful to characterise the response of Cobbett and 
Marx as a "radical" one, while that of Southey and Coleridge is 
"conservative" (in the ideological sense) . This may be justified by the fact 
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that Cobbett (whatever his ideological position) agrees with Marx in seeing 
Malthus as an apologist for the status quo, the implication being that 
something is drastically wrong with present arrangements. Coleridge and 
Southey, by contrast, see him as endangering the status quo. At present, the 
poor are looked after and (in theory, at least) hold a respectable place in 
an organic society. If Malthus's creed should take root, however, they will 
be left to themselves and, human nature being as it is, revolution will be the 
consequence. Malthus regards charity to the undeserving as a mistake; 
Coleridge and Southey, by contrast, did not believe that the poor should be 
punished in this manner, both on religious and pragmatic grounds. In briefly 
discussing Hazlitt's response to the Essay, we shall be particularly 
concerned to discover to which general class of critic he belonged. 
******** 
Hazlitt's Reply to Malthus was published in 1807, under the 
auspices of William Cobbett. This would seem to indicate the nature of the 
piece, but far more evidence is required. First of all, it may be pointed out 
that Hazlitt's primary concern was not to defend Godwin, but to justify the 
Poor Laws. He writes, "Perhaps if the truth were known, I am as little 
sanguine in my expectations of any great improvement to be made in the 
condition of human life either by the visions of philosophy, or by downright, 
70 
practical, parliamentary projects, as Mr. Malthus himself can be." Hazlitt 
therefore regards Malthus as both pessimist and innovator; "It is astonishing, 
what a propensity Mr. Malthus has to try experiments, if there is any mischief 
71 
to be done by them." Indeed, the publication of Hazlitt's piece in the 
Political Register coincided with San1uel Whitbread's attempt to amend the Poor 
Laws, partly under the influence of Malthus. In 1817, when a committee of 
parliament was appointed to look into the question, Hazlitt instantly 
published a summary of his earlier work. Hence, as usual, Hazlitt was 
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compelled to adopt a negative stance in the debate. 
One of Hazlitt's most insistent points is that the Essay was 
unoriginal. Robert Wallace had dealt with the problem of population in a very 
similar way earlier in the eighteenth century. In fact, all the originality in 
Malthus's work was false. The ratios were an ingenious technique for duping 
the public; they gave an impression of scientific sanctity to what was really 
an exercise in propaganda. There is an infinite source of food in one grain of 
wheat, which will duplicate itself many times provided it has the space to do 
so. There will come a time when the whole earth is cultivated, and then we can 
speak of the limits of subsistence. 
While the supply of food is only checked by the limitations of 
space, the population is checked by ''moral restraint" in addition to the 
admitted impact of vice and misery. People are not simply breeding machines. 
Many live contented with celibacy. Malthus obviously had a strange view of 
human nature; Hazlitt makes great sport with the notion of the parson as a 
sensualist. Malthus had allowed Godwin his ideal state of rationality, and 
then showed how this would be undermined by the most irrational behaviour 
possible. He had subsequently admitted that moral restraint may have 
some effect, but Hazlitt believed that his desire to paint the world black 
prevented him from allowing the full force of this new check to population. 
Although he does not dream of a perfect state, he is clear that modest 
increases in rationality may stave off the perpetual misery envisaged by 
Malthus. 
Malthus's treatment of the poor also arouses Hazlitt's 
indignation. The writer of the Essay will only preach his gospel to the 
poor; the rich may maintain their horses and their game laws, but the lower 
orders must give up their few humble pleasures and live under his direction. 
While this implies that rich and poor are somehow a different species, "The 
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only difference in the vices of the rich and the poor is, that the rich can 
72 
afford theirs better.'' If a high standard of living increases breeding, why 
is the planet not submerged under the off-spring of the rich? In fact 
experience suggests that better conditions lower the birth-rate; that a man 
is more careful if he has something to lose. Malthus announces that the ''Laws 
of God" have condemned profligate paupers to starve, oblivious to the fact 
that the laws of God have been infringed for centuries by man, who tries to 
ensure that no-one should perish in want. Who has blasphemed? - philanthropic 
man or "misanthropic'' Malthus ? What the latter has done, in fact, is to call 
on God as a witness in his private prosecution of the poor without realising 
that in doing so he has libelled God. 
Hazlitt is on weaker ground whenever he hints at a more 
positive alternative to the visions of his opponent. He seems to regard 
population as a good, rather than an evil. In a manner which seems almost 
Utilitarian, he argues that if an island such as Britain was to suddenly 
appear out of the ocean, the increased number of people would have a 
73 
corresponding effect upon the sum of human happiness. This position is not 
argued out, but seems to require some explanatory support. Similarly, he does 
not contest Malthus's point that a rise in wages would be disastrous without 
an increase of productivity. He claims that he is only bringing common-sense 
to bear on the question, which is the normal apology of someone who is 
really carrying in ideological baggage of his own. When he refutes Malthus on 
his own terms his claims seem justified, but his evident belief that luxury 
(rather than wealth in general) corrupts mankind indicates a view of human 
nature different from that of Malthus. Whatever the ideological position 
Hazlitt held, it appears to be a moderate one, capable of being pillaged by 
the anarchist Godwin and the conservative De Quincey without much amendment. 
It seems most accurate to describe it as the same cautious liberalism which 
has been identified as his ideological stance in other writings. 
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Malthus himself was a liberal. Although he makes a suspicious 
show of reluctance when he attacks Godwin, it is probable that his "discovery" 
did cause him unease; his stubbunt adherence to the theory may in fact 
indicate an unconscious desire to find his prophecies refuted. By all accounts 
he was a man of some benevolence; like Goldsmith's "Man in Black" he did not 
altogether follow the letter of his views on charity. He was horrified by the 
suggestion that his theory supported the Slave Trade, although strictly the 
Africans left behind by the traders should have blessed such men as 
benefactors. He advocated public works in times of distress, and has been 
75 
hailed by Keynes as a great economist. 
This is not to say, of course, that despite the wrong-headedness 
of the Essay Malthus was "really" on the side of the angels. Rather, it is 
a clear indication that however much his views might have chimed in with the 
prevailing wisdom of the age, he was not a conservative in the ideological 
sense. The liberal arguments of the clasical economists dominated their field 
to such an extent that the dominant ideology of this period might be 
characterised as liberal conservatism. The government of Lord Liverpool, which 
included such figures as Canning and Huskisson, lends support to this view, 
although a full discussion of the issue requires more scope than is 
permitted here. The suggestion is, however, that Malthus was a representative 
of the spirit of the age, while Hazlitt's thought seemed increasingly dated. 
Eventually even the Tory Quarterly Review followed the Whig Edinburgh in 
applauding the work of Malthus, and critics such as Hazlitt and Coleridge, 
whatever the cogency of their objections, became more and more deafened in 
the hubbub of praise. 
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THE NAPOLEONIST 
Hazlitt's admiration for the Emperor Napoleon I was such an 
important factor in his writing career that a separate chapter is required in 
order to treat the subject properly. Critics of the essayist have always 
experienced difficulty in dealing with his fervent and lasting "hero-worship"-
a notable exception being Crane Brinton, who cunningly ignored it. A bolder 
line must be taken here, and an attempt will be made to explain Hazlitt's 
attachment, and to demonstrate how it is quite consistent with the 
general interpretation put forward in this thesis. 
The Life of Napoleon B''On~par~e was originally published 
in 1830, in four volumes. The first two had appeared in 1828, but the 
difficulties of his publishers, the problem of amassing his materials, and a 
decline in his health delayed their full publication. The reception of the 
completed work was disappointingly muted, and sales were poor. Twenty-two 
years after the author's death, however, his son could describe the Life as 
"my father's last, largest, and, upon the whole, greatest work'', and although 
the latter judgement would probably be disputed by most of Hazlitt's admirers, 
1 
the book is still a fascinating, if occasionally provocative, read. 
Although this is not the place to argue over the quality of the Life, some 
attention will be paid to earlier criticisms as the major task of 
interpretation progresses. 
There is an enormous amount of literature which deals with 
Napoleon's career, and yet the subject remains as controversial as it did 
when Hazlitt decided to respond to Sir Walter Scott's lengthly biography. 
The fact that no consensus exists presents a difficult methodological problem; 
if we are to assess the political implications of Hazlitt's biography, we must 
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be able to detect his bias. However, since most of the other writers on 
Napoleon have had polemical purposes it is difficult to establish an 
acceptable model for comparison. At least Peter Geyl, in the preface to his 
Napoleon; For and Against was honest enough to state that "my sympathies are 
2 
with the against rather than with the for category''. But Geyl had been 
incarcerated at Buchenwald, and many of his statements suggest that he was an 
unsuitable person to summarise the debate objectively. His book demonstrates 
how far the subsequent course of French history has inspired idolators and 
detractors in turn, just as Napoleon's statue in the Place Vend6me has been 
torn down and re-erected with every fluctuation in fortune. French historians 
are not alone in their guilt; unacceptable bias, for instance, mars a recent 
English biography, that of J.M Thomson(1963). His sympathies are clearly 
unmasked when he refers to the allies as ''us" throughout. 
It is especially fascinating that while historical developments 
have quite a predictable impact on interpretation, the effect of ideological 
commitment seems less clear. Napoleon has his admirers almost everywhere, 
except, perhaps, in Quaker Meeting Houses. His appeal to French Nationalists 
is obvious, but some case can be made for a Napoleon who inspired almost all 
of the nationalist movements in the nineteenth century. Needless to say, a 
case can be made against this, emphasising the examples of Spain and Poland 
which arraign him as the callous foe of nationalities. Conservatives can 
admire the order he brought after the Revolution, but equally it is open to 
them to detest the cynical exploiter of religion, the disturber and 
re-arranger of Europe. Marxists can exult in his apparent bourgeois 
prejudices, and recoil as he denounces the ideologists. Liberals, perhaps, are 
confronted with the sharpest dilemma of all. Here is the living symbol of the 
careers open to all talents, the scourge of annointed kings, the man who 
compromised between the arbitrary ancien regime and the anarchistic Jacobins, 
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tolerating both sides within limits. Yet the same tomb in the Invalides 
shrouds the centraliser, the enemy of a free press, the man of violence and of 
vaulting ambition, the sexist who believed that the world's greatest woman 
was she who had borne the most children, the racist who suppressed the slaves 
in Saint-Domingue, the Judas of Revolutionary idealism. Because these 
conflicting reactions can all be supported by reasonable evidence, the debate 
will continue. At the bottom line are the facts that for his admirers, 
Napoleon may have threatened much, but he fell; for his detractors, he may 
have fallen, and yet he threatened much. 
While the problem of bias appears insuperable, the subject is 
so important that the best must be done with the materials to hand. In view 
of the difficulties, the method of interpretation will concentrote on the 
internal argument of Hazlitt's book, and to indicate Hazlitt's bias only when 
it seems incontrovertible that he has distorted the facts available to him. 
********** 
The reputation of Hazlitt's Life has not thrived, even at the 
hands of his admirers. David Bromwich is pro-Hazlitt and anti-Napoleon, a 
problem he tries to solve by claiming that Hazlitt somehow "made" Napoleon 
into his ideal, presumably for want of a better, even though this was 
inconsistent with his normal political stand-point. Bromwich speaks of "the 
starkest and most general apology conceivable" presented by Hazlitt for his 
3 
hero in his chapter on the foundation of the Empire. Herschel Baker is more 
forthright, believing that ''In Napoleon's career Hazlitt found a precedent 
4 
and inspiration for almost all of his political ideals." Napoleon's fall, 
5 
however, he "implausibly construed as the destruction of reform". In other 
words, Hazlitt was not so much the victim of wishful, as of muddled thinking. 
Baker concludes that "As history, the Life of Napoleon Buonaparte, with its 
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sentimental view of Caesarism, is of course bizarre; but as Hazlitt's paean to 
the triumphant individualism that he regarded as the consummation of reform it 
6 
is extremely moving." Robert Robinson found the Life largely derivative, and 
opined that "the work deserves perhaps even less praise and attention 
than it has received"- a particularly harsh assesment of a book which has 
7 
rarely received either. According to Robinson, the Life's deficiencies are 
"attributable, no doubt, to the author's too firmly established convictions; 
deficiencies in knowledge and experience, ill-health, personal 
8 
disappointments, and premature old-age". Like the character which it 
portrays, Hazlitt's biography has therefore inspired criticism which appears, 
at least on first sight, to be contradictory. For Baker, Hazlitt's life-long 
radicalism remained unshaken even though he was taken in by Napoleon; for 
Bromwich, Hazlitt stretches his principles to embrace a tyrant. From 
Robinson's account it appears that Hazlitt distorted Napoleon's career because 
of his own inflexible pre-conceptions. The common theme of all these 
interpretations is never questioned - that Hazlitt was a radical; in early 
nineteenth-century terms, a democratic liberal. It is this theme which will 
receive most attention here, in an attempt to remove any confusion over the 
political message of the Life. As I have explained, it would be hazardous to 
do this by comparing Hazlitt's account with what is generally accepted as true 
today. There must be another caveat, in that Hazlitt was much too close to the 
events he chronicled for objectivity, even if that elusive standard had been 
his goal. Hence it is important to compare his biography with contemporary 
appraisals. Yet, with all these qualifications in mind, the Life can yield 
some valuable insights into Hazlitt's politics. 
********* 
After a brief history of Corsica, and a description of 
Napoleon's early life, Hazlitt tackles the French Revolution itself. Here, he 
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is largely concerned with a refutation of Burke's Reflections, but his account 
is by no means one of unrelieved triumph. It emerges that the Revolution was 
necessary, since the ancien regime had clearly failed at all levels of 
society. Like Burke, Hazlitt allows that the influence of intellectuals such 
as Rousseau and Voltaire was profound; but of course for him their posthumous 
rble had not been pernicious. Rather, they had prepared the French nation to 
question. The Revolution was a direct result of the invention of printing. 
Once the old abuses had been held up for scrutiny and ridicule, they were 
doomed. 
The outstanding characters in Hazlitt's tale are Louis XVI and 
Robespierre. His Louis XVI is a great advance on Burke's panegyric, in that 
the pervading tone - in this case hostility - is softened by sympathetic 
understanding. Louis could have done no other than he did. He was born an 
absolute king, which disqualified him from ever acquiescing in the 
constitutional r6le thrust upon him by the National Assembly. His behaviour 
in the face of the mob was sometimes brave, and almost always tactful. 
However, being an absolute king he could not resist intriguing for the 
restoration of his power. In the circumstances of 1793 his execution was 
inevitable. Not only was he a rallying point for the Royalists, but having 
agreed to the early constitutional changes in the hope of reversing them with 
the aid of foreign bayonets, he was a traitor to his country. Nevertheless, 
Hazlitt's portrait is a tragic one. He sees in Louis the impossibility of 
combining absolute power with virtue, however well-intentioned the ruler. By 
contrast, with his eye on Burke, he is compelled to cast Marie-Antoinette as a 
haughty schemer, driving her husband ever-faster along the road to disaster. 
But even she is permitted to show dignity and courage at the end. 
Robespierre emerges from Hazlitt's pages as a bloodthirsty 
fanatic, and is not even granted the consolation of an edifying exit. Even his 
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oratory left much to be desired; "his declamation was typically a disjointed 
tissue of rhapsodical common-places, forced into an abortive union by 
do~1atical assertions, and where, in the midst of an utter barrenness of 
thought or illustration, there is an appearance of corning to the point with 
9 
great directness and simplicity." "The truth is, in one word, he was a 
natural bigot, that is, a person extremely tenacious of certain feelings and 
opinions, from an utter inability to conceive of anything beyond them, or to 
10 
suppose that others do." Hazlitt proceeds to compare Robespierre's 
fanaticism to that of "monks and inquisitors", drawing a parallel much beloved 
by enemies of totalitarian democracy in the present century. "The religious 
and the political fanatic are one and the same character, and run into the 
11 
same errors on the same grounds", he writes. However, he shows rather more 
insight into the problem than those more recent commentators, who by equating 
political "messianism" with religious fervour have done little more than 
12 
demonstrate their hostiliy towards religion. Religious persecutions were 
undoubtedly terrible, but "to argue from hence that those who sanctioned or 
who periodically assisted at such scenes were mere monsters of cruelty and 
hypocrisy, would be betraying a total ignorance of the contradictions of the 
13 
human mind." This concession to Robespierre, one suspects, is wrung from 
Hazlitt because he does not want the reader to imagine that the Terror was 
solely the product of gratuitous evil from above. By contrast, Robespierre's 
enemies the Gironde, and later, Danton, are presented with mildly critical 
sympathy. The men who instigated the "Incorruptible"'s fall seem to have 
shared his guilt to a great extent, but Hazlitt can forgive this in his 
pleasure at the events of Thermidor. 
Hazlitt has two major explanations for the Terror. One, as 
Robert Robinson suggests,"is a restatement of the liberal or radical view of 
French affairs" - that a peaceful revolution was wrenched from its course by 
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14 
the aggressive interference of other powers. It is certainly true that the 
worst excesses of the Revolution took place when Paris was most threatened, 
and that enough of a fifth column existed in France to justify an atmosphere 
of mistrust. But, leaving this argument aside, Hazlitt provides a different 
solution to the problem in his discussion of French character. This 
theme crops up throughout the work; it appears that Hazlitt considered 
Napoleon's talents thrown away on the French. The stereotypic Frenchman he 
presents is easily bored, frivolous and vulgar. Consequently, "If a nation of 
a species lower than men had undertaken a Revolution, they could not have 
conducted it worse than this of France, with more chattering, more malice, 
15 
more unmeaning gesticulation, and less dignity and unity of purpose." Of 
course, he believes that the brutalization of the ancien regime had 
contributed much to this depraved national character, and explained the 
triumphant displaying of heads, the judicial murders and the indifference to 
suffering. But even this could be regarded as a product of Hazlitt's 
francophobia; the ancien regime had lasted so long, to his mind, because 
unlike the English the French were incapable of enjoying liberty for long. 
Although the Terror might be regarded as a success, in so far as France did 
repell the foreign invader under this regime, Hazlitt regarded it as a futile 
exercise. The Terrorists "made one grand mistake. They really thought that by 
getting rid of the patrons and abettors of the ancient regime they should put 
an end to the breed of tyrants and slaves; whereas in order to do this it 
16 
would be necessary to put an end to the whole human race." Hazlitt seems 
never to have lost his sympathy for the initial ideals of the Revolution, yet 
this type of remark indicates that he was certainly sceptical about the 
applicability of such principles at the time that the Life was written. 
Hazlitt's account of the Revolution, therefore, sets the scene 
for a favourable interpretation of Napoleon's career. The Directory which 
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emerged after the Thermidorian reaction is described as a total failure, with 
inept governmental intervention in many fields and bankruptcy only staved off 
by Napoleon's victories in Italy. Thus, although Hazlitt does not play down 
the extent of Napoleon's ambition, he makes it easier to comprehend that the 
nation might have cried out for the General as a welcome alternative to chaos. 
This point is essential if we are to understand Hazlitt's admiration of 
Napoleon; it is not too much to claim that by the time that the Life was 
written, its author approved of the Revolution mainly because it had produced 
17 
the Emperor. 
It is worth pausing briefly here to assess and explain Hazlitt's 
progress thus far. There seems little ground for dismissing the work as 
"bizarre", nor to claim that it deserves less attention t_han it has received. 
Hazlitt's prejudices do show through, but it is his hatred for the ancien 
regime which causes most damage. He reprints some of the cahiers presented 
to the Estates General, and outlines the Feudal Rights of the nobility, 
believing that this alone will establish the case against Louis XVI. There is 
no suggestion that the Revolution may have arisen from a clash between the 
monarchy and the nobility; the whole system of hereditary honours in France 
was tainted with corruption in his eyes. However, this mistake was not unusual 
in his day, and it was quite understandable, when both crown and aristocracy 
met identical fates, to assume that the third estate had been the instigators 
from the outset. Hazlitt, therefore, is not so much biased in favour of the 
Revolution, as against its enemies. For instance, he does not regard the 
assailants of the Bastille as heroes, even though he demonstrates his 
abhorence of the place. It is not difficult to guess the reasons for the even-
handedness ; firstly, he is happy to suggest that if Napoleon did betray the 
Revolution, he was not committing a glaring moral fault; and perhaps equally 
important, he was not obliged to condemn the movement out of hand, as someone 
who had once declared that it was bliss to be alive at its dawn. His original 
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reaction to the events may well have been exultant, but it was not recorded 
in black and white, as in the cases of Southey, Coleridge and Wordsworth. The 
reader is not led to assume that Hazlitt's hopes were wholly entangled with 
the fate of the Revolution, and the general tone of the book indicates that 
he ceased to identify himself with its fortunes when the Girondins fell at the 
latest. If historians today would be unhappy with the application of his 
belief that "one is concerned not only with what takes place, but with what 
ought to take place and which seldom actually does so", to the writing of such 
a biography, this fault is not missing from his great "competitor" Scott, nor 
18 
indeed from many of his successors. Hazlitt's work, therefore, is scarcely 
unique in telling us as much about the author as the events he relates. 
********* 
Instead of merely recounting Hazlitt's narrative of Napoleon's 
rule, it will be more useful to examine the possible reasons for his constant 
admiration. The Life opens with a Preface which presents Hazlitt's apology for 
the Emperor's actions. Napoleon's deeds may not have been invariably sound, 
but at least they "recoiled upon the head of the doer" - "they were not 
precedents; they were not exempt from public censure or opinion; they were 
not softened by prescription, nor screened by prejudice, nor sanctioned by 
superstition, nor rendered formidable by a principle that imposed them as 
19 
sacred obligations on all future generations." Napoleon was the child and 
champion of the Revolution, the one man who might save Europe from the curse 
of rule by legitimate monarchs. Hazlitt declares that he felt proud "to think 
that there was one reputation in modern times equal to the ancients, and at 
20 
seeing one man greater than the throne he sat upon." From this statement we 
learn that Hazlitt shared Napoleon's respect for the heroes of antiquity; we 
also begin to appreciate how far the former could stray from the ideals of the 
Revolution in praising the Emperor. As Augustine Birrell once noted, the 
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underlying principles behind such an outburst cannot even be squared with the 
21 
more moderate views which inspired the opponents of James II in 1688. The 
first quotation, at least, is also contrary to facts which Hazlitt must have 
known. 
First of all, the assertion that Napoleon's actions recalled upon 
the head of their doer is not much of an apology - the same could be said of 
Louis XVI. As suggested earlier, Hazlitt is taking refuge here in the fact 
that Napoleon failed in the end. Similarly, many of Napoleon's deeds were not 
precedents, softened by prescription, precisely because he did not secure the 
hereditary institution he had inaugurated. Of course, the Code Napoleon, the 
Concordat and the Legion of Honour were seized upon as precedents by his 
"legitimate'' successors, but Hazlitt prefers to imply that the whole 
Napoleonic edifice was swept away with its creator. It could be argued that 
the regime was sanctioned by superstition; and the Papal coronation, the 
Imperial Catechism Napoleon introduced, together with the celebration of St. 
Napoleon's Day, reinforce this impression. The most obvious distortion is 
Hazlitt's claim that Napoleon was not free from public censure or opinion. 
While men could think what they liked about the Emperor, it was a different 
matter if they wished to publicise these opinions. The liberty of the press, 
which Hazlitt extolls so highly in other contexts, is hardly mourned in the 
biography of its deadly foe. By 1811, there were only four newspapers left in 
22 
Paris, all of which were under close scrutiny. Napoleon prosecuted an 
English newspaper, and found it hard to believe that its contents had not 
been dictated by the government. Hazlitt does discuss these matters briefly, 
and demonstrates his conviction that both the religious and the press policies 
were mistaken, but it is hard to imagine that his protests would have been so 
muted had Bonaparte been a "legitimate" sovereign. Similarly, he dismisses 
Napoleon's treatment of his critics such as Madame de Stael, by saying 
that "Buonaparte is accused of having intermeddled too much and too harshly 
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23 
with literature; but not till it had first meddled with him." This acceptance 
of censorship as a legitimate weapon of government is further evidence that 
the p:r:intaL·y reason for Hazlitt' s admiration cannot have been a belief that 
Napoleon was inspired by the ideals of the Revolution. Talk of the Emperor's 
"intermeddling" should also remind the reader of the minimalist state 
approved by Hazlitt in his "Project for a New Theory of Civil and Criminal 
Legislation." Napoleon outraged liberals such as Benjamin Constant with his 
tendency to centralise power, and his marked extension of the limits of state 
interference. His wars required a heavy burden of taxation, his army was 
permanent and conscripted, and the imposition of the Continental System was 
an unprecedented intervention in trade. Napoleon's regime, in short, was 
about as far as one could get from Hazlitt's ideal, considering the limited 
means at the Emperor's disposal. Hazlitt does attack excessive government 
24 
interference in the Life, but his target is the Directory, not Napoleon. 
It might be anticipated that Hazlitt would disapprove of 
Napoleon's assumption of the Imperial title. This, however, is not the case. 
"Buonaparte's object almost from the first", he writes,"appears to have been 
to consolidate the Revolution by softening its features and mixing up its 
principles with others which had been longer and more widely established, thus 
to reconcile old to new France, the philosophers and the priests, and the 
25 
Republic with the rest of Europe." This, it might be argued, is a rather 
charitable view. D.M.G Sutherland has recently written that "The Revolutionary 
era began with men hoping they could place limits on the actions of an 
arbitrary government. It ended with some of the very same men creating a 
government far more arbitrary and despotic than the monarchy of the Old 
26 
regime." This verdict was common among Hazlitt's contemporaries. For 
Wordsworth, Napoleon was the "barbarian Ravager of Europe", the "enemy of 
mankind." Sir James Mackintosh saw him as the head of a "new nobility of 
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dishonour". Southey considered that "his acts of perfidy, midnight murder, 
usurpation and remorseless tyranny" had consigned him "to universal 
execration, now and for ever". Shelley thought of him as "a hateful and 
despicable being "; Keats said he had done more harm to "the life of liberty" 
27 
than all the kings of Christendom. These opinions were echoed by Coleridge, 
Sydney Smith, Francis Jeffrey and Thomas de Quincey. Indeed, after Waterloo, 
Henry Crabb Robinson recorded that of his extensive acquaintance only Hazlitt, 
Godwin and two others regretted the final fall. 
Why did Hazlitt fly in the face of contemporary opinion by 
remaining an admirer of the Corsican ? The critics listed above cover a wide 
ideological spectrum; some can be questioned, as their dislike for Napoleon 
was heightened by the guilt they felt for originally supporting the 
Revolution, but this does not apply to Shelley, Keats or Leigh Hunt. We have 
seen that the reasons adduced by Hazlitt himself are inadequate. It would be 
unwise to suggest that Hazlitt was simply mistaken in his man - after all, the 
materials which he collected for his book were gleaned from hostile sources as 
well as from the sycophants, and he spent many hours debating the point with 
friends who despised Napoleon. It is, of course, quite true that Hazlitt 
relished Napoleon's victories over the crowned heads of Europe. But we are 
left with the task of explaining why he should have preferred Napoleon to 
them, since many contemporaries who were critical of legitimacy found it 
impossible to follow him in this course. Since his own explanations are 
unsatisfactory, it is justifiable to seek more plausible ones elsewhere. 
Firstly, there is the suggestion thrown out by Georges Lefebvre in 
his own biography of Napoleon. He writes, "The romantics were not altogether 
wrong [in making him their hero], for what was classical in him was only his 
culture and the form of his intellect. The spring of his actions, however, was 
the imagination, the irresistable impulse of the temperament. This is the 
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secret of the charm which he will always excercise on men. If only in the 
passing fervour and confusion of youth they will always be pursued by the 
28 
romantic dream of power." This statement might lead to a discussion taking 
us beyond the limits of this paper, but it is relevant to notice an immediate 
difficulty here. First of all, Lefebvre seems to believe that there is a clear 
distinction between Classicism and Romanticism. But these are merely 
generalised tendencies, bearing scant relation to the beliefs and actions of 
real historical characters. If these constructs are regarded too seriously, 
they become obstacles, not aids, to understanding. Napoleon was deeply read in 
the classics, and he seems to have derived great inspiration from the deeds of 
Alexander and Caesar. But this would make him a Classicist no more than an 
octagenarian reading Wisden would thereby become an international cricketer. 
The Classicists are presumed to have been most interested in form, the 
Romantics to have placed great emphasis on spontanaeity and the imagination. 
But we should not follow the literary student into the trap of inferring from 
this that Pope had no imagination, and Byron no respect for form. 
Secondly, it is important to notice Lefebvre's point about a 
romantic "love of power", since many of Hazlitt's critics have paid great 
atttention to this trait in him. This, they believe, explains his admiration 
for Burke's style, and for Napoleon's rule. This line of criticism seems to 
receive support from a suggestion of Leigh Hunt's, but in his case, as in that 
28 
of the recent writers, it appears to be an evasion of the real issue. Human 
power is an abstraction, and can hardly be assessed in isolation from its 
effects. Hazlitt most certainly did not admire the power of the allies which 
overcame Napoleon at Waterloo; he did not appreciate the powers of the 
Inquisition, nor of the Tsar of Russia over his people. It would be fair to 
say that he was interested in powerful men and institutions, but that is a 
fairly characteristic feature of a political writer. It leaves us with the 
problem of deciding why Hazlitt admired power when it was exercised in a 
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particular way. Hence, Hazlitt's espousal of the Napoleonic cause cannot be 
wholly explained by an appeal to "Romantic" aspects of the Emperor's 
character, nor by referring to Hazlitt's love of power. 
A more promising suggestion is provided by David Bromwich in his 
book Hazlitt: The Mind of a Critic. According to Bromwich, the Life 
includes "Burkean assumptions about human nature which few readers could have 
30 
deduced from his Preface". As we have seen, Hazlitt's political beliefs do 
not present such a stark contrast to those of Burke as critics such as 
31 
Bromwich have asserted. It would be a mistake to describe Napoleon's own 
assumptions as "Burkean", although he paid due attention to customs and 
prescription during his Egyptian expedition, to take only one example. His 
introduction of the Legion of Honour, his respect for the power of religious 
conviction, and his hatred of the mob could all be described as "Burkean" 
without stretching the term too far- indeed Napoleon's politics should be 
classed as "aristocratic" if anything. Echoes of Burke can be found 
throughout the Life, even though Hazlitt was evidently concerned to rebutt 
many of his arguments. For instance, we find the phrase,"Those who instantly 
lose sight of the past can have no security for the future", and again, "Every 
state contains within itself the means of salvation, if it will look its 
danger in the face, and not shrink from the course actually necessary to save 
it", and also, "Nothing old can ever be revived; for if it had not been 
unsuited to the circumstances of the people, it would have been still in 
32 
existence." 
But these are not Burkean assumptions about human nature, 
however much they might logically follow from such assumptions. Bromwich (who 
evidently rejects these assumptions himself), is right in so far as the 
Burkean side of the debate over human nature was the pessimistic one; but 
Burke was hardly ever so gloomy as the Hazlitt of the Life. Most remarkable 
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from a so-called radical is his insistence that "No man is ever wiser from 
experience or suffering, or can cast his thoughts or actions in any other 
33 
mould than that which nature has assigned them." This cuts the ground from 
beneath many of Hazlitt's radical contemporaries, who believed that 
environmental factors largely determine character formation, and that by 
improving political and social institutions a similar amendment could be 
brought about in human nature. This is not all; his notion of the French as 
light-headed and changeable is paralleled by a picture of the English as the 
perpetual dupes of malicious leaders. One of Napoleon's faults, we learn, was 
not allowing for the ignorance of his subjects; Hazlitt extends the moral to 
all nations. "There is nothing that people resent more", he states,"than 
34 
having benefits thrust upon them." After recounting the behaviour of the 
35 
defenders of Moscow in 1812, he declares, "Ignorance is power". By 1826, 
Hazlitt had become bitterly disillusioned; but he had always admired the 
Napoleon who could say on St. Helena,"Men must be very bad to be as bad as I 
think they are", and of whom John Gibson Lockhart could truthfully say, "we 
doubt if any man ever passed through life, sympathising so slightly with 
36 
mankind." In short, there was a temperamental affinity between Hazlitt and 
the Emperor, illustrated further by their: shared love of glory and 
immortality. Bourrienne records a conversation with Napoleon, during which the 
latter congratulated his secretary on the future fame awaiting him; Bourrienne 
retorted by asking if he could name Alexander's secretary. Napoleon's 
proclamations to his armies, even his defiant Will, show his sense of history 
and the part he was playing in it. Hazlitt was always receptive to the desire 
for immortality in others, since he craved it for himself. This disposition 
can only be termed aristocratic, but most emphatically an aristocratic 
tendency that pays homage to merit rather than birth. It is an important 
reason for Hazlitt's unpopular enthusiasm for Napoleon, but it requires a 
further point to render it more plausible. 
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As we have seen, Hazlitt responded to the glory of Napoleon's 
deeds, although he was not normally a blind worshipper of power however it was 
exercised. It has been suggested that he could overlook Napoleon's absolutism 
because it was used both more efficiently and more beneficially than that of 
the legitimate monarchs of Europe. We must take it for granted that this was 
Hazlitt's view, although he does not produce much evidence for it. He also 
thought the French unfitted for the liberties enjoyed by Englishmen. In the 
earlier discussion of Hazlitt's patriotism, we saw that although he denied 
that love for one's country entailed hatred for foreigners, he occasionally 
demonstrated an inability to sympathise with the characteristics of other 
nationalities. The hostility to Frenchmen which he exhibits in the biography, 
together with his skimpy treatment of Napoleon's domestic policies, suggests 
37 
that he was unable to envisage the daily life of the Emperor's subjects. It 
is not entirely fanciful to claim that Hazlitt regarded Napoleon as a figure 
in a drama, whose victims merely existed for stage effect, and did not really 
suffer. But his contemporaries were unable to see things in that light; they 
could not view Napoleon objectively until the news of his death reached 
Europe. It is revealing that when the final fall occured, Plymouth harbour 
filled with Englishmen hoping for a glimpse of their greatest enemy on his way 
to St. Helena. Even the conservative John Gibson Lockhart could later reflect 
that "Napoleon was ... essentially and irreclaimably a despot ... but his 
succesor, whether a Bourbon or a Buonaparte, was likely to be a constitutional 
sovereign. The tyranny of a meaner hand would not have been endured after that 
38 
precedent." 
Similar sentiments were echoed by Hazlitt when he wrote to his 
publisher in 1827, "I thought all the world agreed with me at present that 
Buonaparte was better than the Bourbons, and that a tyrant was better than 
39 
tyranny." But Hazlitt had admired Napoleon when the Army of England was 
gathered at Boulogne, when invasion fears in England were so exaggerated 
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that Coleridge and Wordsworth fell under suspicion for studying a stream. The 
reason for Hazlitt's attitude at that time can be found in the biography 
written twenty years later. Here he wrote; ''If Buonaparte had made 
good his landing ... he might have levelled London with the dust, but he must 
have covered the face of the country with heaps and tumuli of the slain, 
before this mixed breed of Norman and Saxon blood would have submitted to a 
40 
second Norman Conquest." As usual, the courageous English are contrasted with 
the supine French; ''in England (dull as we are), a thousand enemies would 
41 
only call up a thousand champions to answer them". Hazlitt, therefore, did 
not fear that England would be successfully invaded, however the continental 
conflict might fare. His reference to the Norman Conquest is revealing, aside 
from the obvious fact that both threats came from France. There had been a 
successful invasion of England in 1688, which had been bloodless because 
James II had forfeited his popularity. Perhaps unconsciously, Hazlitt the 
defiant "revolutionist" is here conceding that the Hanoverians, for all their 
faults, were tolerable enough to justify the defence of their regime from 
external danger, at least. Hazlitt's admiration for Napoleon, one may guess, 
would not have survived long at close quarters; however justified the cause 
of reform in England, the right of the people to change their governors did 
not need to be exercised at this time. 
The conclusions to be drawn from Hazlitt's Life are manifold, 
and it is impossible to do much more than scratch the surface here. But I 
believe it is reasonable to suggest that the work has never been well received 
because it alienates both camps; it is too favourable to Napoleon to satisfy 
his enemies, and not radical enough to please those of Hazlitt's modern 
admirers who wish to reflect their left-wing beliefs back onto their hero. 
Hazlitt was not only never a strict Republican; he was not against arbitrary 
power so long as it was wisely exercised. Perhaps the greatest flaw in the 
Life is that Hazlitt concentrates upon the battles rather than the domestic 
- 201 -
affairs of France. This leaves a grand impression of Napoleon's strategic 
abilities, but does nothing to rebutt the argument that he was far from being 
a ~benevolent'' despot. However, in itself this helps us to understand the 
grounds for Hazlitt's admiration; it reveals once again how far apart he stood 
from the radicals who contested for forms of government. It appears to be 
most likely that commentators have been unable to appreciate the Life 
because, understanding that it would be difficult for a radical to praise 
Napoleon and remain consistent to their beliefs, they have preferred to 
sacrifice Hazlitt's consistency rather than his radicalism. But, in a field 
where political bias will probably never permit an authoritative assessment, 
Hazlitt's Life of Napoleon has a great deal of merit -after all, it could 
not avoid being derivative to some extent, since he was not a witness of 
events, nor privy to those inner thoughts which prompted the Emperor's 
endlessly controversial actions. 
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MUSINGS ON MISANTHROPY 
"Pure good soon grows insipid, wants variety and spirit. Pain is a bitter 
sweet, which never surfeits. Love turns, with a little indulgence, to 
indifference or disgust: hatred alone is immortal." 
1 
On the Pleasure of Hating (1825) 
During the course of this study, it has emerged that, while 
Hazlitt held many views which are characteristic of liberalism, his espousal 
of these opinions was often qualified. We have seen that while the responses 
of a political actor to the contingent events of his lifetime may provide 
clues which indicate his ideological position, the examination of his notion 
of human nature is the most likely way to establish his ideological identity. 
It remains for us to investigate Hazlitt's work on this subject, to discover 
whether the tentative label "conservative liberal'' has more solid 
justification. 
In a recent notable study of this period, Ian Christie has 
2 
remarked that Hazlitt was ''brilliant but misanthropic". Although Christie does 
not elaborate upon a verdict which has the most marginal importance for his 
book, the comment provides a convenient point of embarkation for this chapter. 
If borne out by the evidence, this judgement would imply that the prevailing 
bias of Hazlitt's thought was towards conservatism. But immediately the 
problem of definition arises. Misanthropy has not been extensively studied, 
presumably because it indicates an unattractive human disposition. Before 
deciding whether Hazlitt really was a "man-hater", it may be useful to 
investigate the nature of this trait, as exemplified in literary productions 
which Hazlitt knew and commented upon. From this we should learn much about 
Hazlitt's impression of human nature, which will assist us in providing him 
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with an ideological label. 
A misanthropic outlook is often associated with certain of 
the ancient Cynic philosophers, notably Diogenes of Synope. Shakespeare's 
Timon of Athens includes a portrayal of a Cynic - Apemantus, 
" ... that few things loves better 
3 
Than to abhor himself" 
Since it is treated by Hazlitt in his Characters of Shakespear's Plays, it 
represents a particularly suitable starting-point for discussion. 
Timon gives us three possible versions of the misanthropic 
temperament, for, along with Apemantus, there is Alcibiades, who returns from 
a brooding exile to destroy corruption in his native city, and Timon himself, 
who, bowed down by debts and ingratitude, shuns the world and lives as a 
hermit. Alcibiades' hatred is compassed by those who have harmed Timon and 
himself; he readily forgives those Athenians who are innocent of such crimes. 
As for Apemantus, Hazlitt notes that "The churlish profession of misanthropy 
in the Cynic is contrasted with the profound feeling of it in Timon, and also 
with the soldier-like and determined resentment of Alcibiades against his 
4 
countrymen." Apemantus, indeed, seems to have struck the pose of misanthropy 
voluntarily. He eventually tells Timon "thou art too bad to curse.'' Timon 
retorts, 
"Thy nature did commence in suffrance, time 
5 
Hath made thee hard in't" 
However, it is Timon who tells Alcibiades "I am 
6 
misanthropes, and hate mankind." When asked by Apemantus what most resembles 
the flatterers who have brought him low, Timon replies; "Women nearest, but 
7 
men, men are the things themselves." This implies that Timon has rejected the 
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whole of humanity. He treats his friend Alcibiades no better than the robbers 
who come to take his gold. His hatred for Alcibiades originated because "thou 
spok'st well of me~- Timon no longer cares whether his former flatterers were 
8 
sincere or not. 
It would be a mistake to ignore Timon's occassional lapses 
from this all-inclusive hostility. For instance, when the steward Flavius 
weeps, Timon declares ~then I love thee, because thou art a woman, and 
disclaimst flinty mankind; whose eyes do never give but through lust and 
9 
laughter.~ Flavius, according to Timon, is "more honest now than wise", which 
recalls an earlier remark by one of Timon's neighbours; "Every man has his 
10 
fault, and honesty is [Timon's)". Timon dismisses his old employee with the 
injunction to ''Hate all, curse all, show charity to none; but let the famished 
11 
flesh slide from the bone, ere thou relieve the beggar." 
We might, therefore, agree with Hazlitt's opinion that "All 
[Timon's) vehement misanthropy is forced, uphill work'', unlike that of 
Apemantus, who ''shows only the natural virulence of his temper, and antipathy 
12 
to good or evil alike." "Timon", he writes, "does not utter an imprecation 
without betraying the extravagant workings of disappointed passion, of love 
13 
altered to hate." His hatred does not extend to all humanity, and therefore we 
cannot admit him as an example of thorough-going misanthropy. Apemantus 
appears to be much closer to the mark. He seems never to have expected more 
from humanity than he receives; he hates and is hated in turn, and is not 
affected by this consequence. Even he declares that he loves Timon better 
when he curses mankind than he ever did before, but this is a temporary lapse. 
He tells Timon, "The middle of humanity, thou never knew'st, but the extremity 
15 
of both ends". He feels superior to Timon, because with Hazlitt he suspects 
that the latter's "sour-cold habit" has been put on "enforcedly"- "thou'dst 
16 
courtier be again wert thou not beggar." 
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Moliere's Misanthrope presents two possible models. 
Alcestes is embittered by the world. He hates 
"Some, because they are wicked and mischievous, and others for being 
complaisant to the wicked and not having that vigorous hatred for 'em, 
17 
which vice ought to give to all virtuous minds." 
Alcestes treats his well-wisher Philintes no better than Apemantus treats 
Timon in his prime. Yet he loves Celimine in spite of her apparent 
faithlessness. His desire is to to live with her on a desert island, and 
to forget the follies of men in their absence. Like Timon, he admits an 
exception to his hatred, which casts doubt upon his misanthropic 
characteristics. In his comments on the play, Hazlitt expressed his disbelief 
in the character of Alcestes: 
"What can exceed the absurdity of the Misanthrope, who 
leaves his mistress after every proof of her attachment and constancy, merely 
because she will not submit to the technical formality of going to live with 
18 
him in a desert?" 
Hazlitt might have added weight to this remark if he had said that such an 
odd request stretches our credulity because Alcestes has been shown to have a 
good heart at bottom. 
Philintes, however, might be claimed as a misanthrope 
himself. He tells Alcestes, "'tis an extremity of folly to busy ourselves in 
19 
correcting the world"- he sees defects as "vices linked with human nature". 
While Alcestes burns with idealistic love for Celimine ,Philintes is content 
to marry a woman who chooses him as second-best. Not expecting much from the 
world, he does not rail against it like his friend. His unflattering view of 
man is not ''uphill work"; he seems to be resigned to it. He is concerned for 
Alcestes' well-being, sure enough, but in Philintes' world relationships seem 
to be based upon calculation rather than emotion. 
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It may be in order to pause briefly here to examine what is 
already emerging. Timon and Alcestes are both characters of strong emotions, 
who have grown disillusioned in the world. In short, they loved man in the 
abstract, and, confronted by his "too solid flesh'', this enthusiasm has 
suddenly melted. But the habit of abstraction has not left them; now that they 
hate humanity they are likely to lapse whenever they uncover the inevitable 
exceptions to their rule. By contrast, Iago in Othello is motivated by his 
detestation of a single man. He is not given to philosophising about the 
species, but he might be seen as a representative of misanthropy in action. 
In order to acheive his end, he uses any means available, especially other 
individuals. In some ways, his assertion "I hate the Moor'' is a more effective 
declaration of war against humanity than Timon's "I am misanthropes". Hazlitt, 
indeed, compares the "ancient" with Apemantus; like Iago, the latter is 
"indifferent to good or evil", but rests "satisfied with the mischief existing 
in the world, and with his own ill-nature" while Iago takes great pains to 
20 
augment it. However, while all men come alike to the Cynic, Iago dupes those 
who are naive enough to trust him. In so doing, he shows himself to be aware 
that virtue exists in the world. This, I believe, establishes his psychopathic 
tendencies, rather than misanthropy. Hazlitt seemed to be aware of this; his 
major objection to Edmund Kean's portrayal of Iago was that it lacked mirth. 
Book IV of Swift's Gulliver's Travels is a familiar 
example of a jaundiced account of man. The description of the "Yahoo" 
provoked shuddering rage in many Victorian men of letters. Swift makes it 
clear that the Yahoos represent a deterioration from normal human behaviour. 
But this seems contradicted by the revelation that the Yahoos have only 
21 
"natural" vices; mankind has developed others through his "civilisation". 
Humans are blessed with a small amount of reason, but they use this to perfect 
their vices. Some comfort may be derived from the fact that the name of the 
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Houyhnhms meant ''the perfection of nature~. Swift is showing us a vision of 
an uncorrupt humanity, along with an exaggerated portrait of contemporary 
Englishmen, extremes between which Gulliver represents an acceptable 
compromise. Swift suggests that the modicum of reason possessed by man is 
being put to vicious purposes at present, but this still distinguishes him 
from the Yahoos, and makes him capable of future improvement. Swift's epitaph, 
which declares that ~He has gone where fierce indignation can lacerate his 
heart no more" sums up the reality behind his "misanthropic" mask. The hopes 
he took with him into public life had been thwarted by political friend 
and foe alike; but misanthropy was a struggle for him as for Timon. While the 
majority of mankind was beneath his lofty contempt, he found several kindred 
spirits with whom he could share his burden. Like the later satirist Byron, 
he might have claimed that he 
" ............ would also deem 
O'er other's griefs, that some sincerely grieve; 
That two, or one, are almost what they seem-
22 
'!'hat goodness is no name, and happiness no dream" 
La Rochefoucauld is another "misanthropic" writer who 
engaged Hazlitt's attention. Hazlitt believed that 
"The error in the reasonings of Mandeville, Rochefoucault (sic) and others, 
is; they first find out that there is something mixed in the motives of all 
our actions, and they proceed to argue that they must all arise from one 
23 
motive, viz., self-love." 
Yet Hazlitt wrote a set of maxims "In the Manner of La Rochefoucauld", and 
certainly was more cordially inclined towards Mandeville than others of his 
24 
generation, notably the political "apostate'' James Mackintosh. We can dismiss 
Mandeville as a misanthropist without much trouble, for although he believed 
that the virtues could be analysed into the "vice" of self-love, he leaves the 
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impression of being at peace with his fellows. His quarrel is with hypocrisy 
rather than with real virtue. La Rochefoucauld's cynicism also suggests acute 
observation rather than hatred. Like Mandeville, he believed that "some people 
are thought well of in society whose only good points are the vices useful in 
social life", and that "The virtues lose themselves in self-interest like 
25 
in the sea". He also writes, 
"When we work for the benefit of others, it would appear t.hat our self-love 
26 
is tricked by kindness and forgets itself." 
Yet he is inconsistent when he states, "There are more people free from self-
interest than from envy"; it is also not clear that a man may be envious 
27 
without taking his self-interest into account. In contrast to Mandeville, 
Rochefoucauld believes that "when all individuals seek their own interest 
28 
they neglect the public weal." Whatever his short-comings as a moralist, 
Rochefoucauld's purpose, if any, is to reform the subjects of his analysis. 
In this he resembles Swift, who once wrote, 
"As Rochefoucault his maxims drew 
From nature, I believe 'em true 
They argue no corrupted mind 
29 
In him; the fault is in mankind," 
and he acknowledged an intellectual debt to the Frenchman. Like Swift, 
La Rochefoucauld had nursed an unrealistic political ambition, and this 
appears to have produced some of his more biting work. But it would be wrong 
to call his later attitude misanthropic. The stance of the satirist, above 
the fray but not aloof from it, despairing at times but exhorting at others, 
does not square with the definition of misanthropy as a hatred for humanity. 
A final example may be drawn from the writings of 
Schopenhauer, although of course Hazlitt did not comment on his work. 
According to him, man's 




For him, the only way to supress hatred and contempt of man is to regard 
hi1n "as an object of pity." This met:hod was not always succesful, however, 
and he occassionally found himself feeling "a positive enjoyment" of man's 
31 
pain. Schopenhauer believes that self-interest lies "in the background" of 
most motives to action, and since he defines a good person as one who 
subordinates his own interests to those of others, he might be justified in 
seeing little good in the world. His doctrine that once a man's character is 
formed, the rest of his life follows by strict necessity, might also have 
deepened his natural pessimism. However, it would be difficult to describe him 
as a misanthropist. Like Mandeville, he sets a very high moral standard for 
the world, and his despair at man's incapacity to act from pure motives was 
always a likely result of this. The prevailing message is one of sorrow, not 
hatred. Schopenhauer takes pessimism to a radical extreme, but he still should 
be ranked with those who wished to change the world for the better, not merely 
to shun it. 
It appears, therefore, that what many have called 
misanthropy is often the result of an optimistic view of the world gone sour. 
The word carries connotations of disapproval which render it unsuitable in 
these cases. To this extent, therefore, all those con@entators who have sought 
to "clear" their favourites of the imputation are justified. But it is 
possible to go further, and to suggest that the word is scarcely applicable 
in any circumstances. This is because there will almost always be exceptions 
to an apparently universal hatred of mankind. Even in literary creations, the 
portrayal of such beings is difficult to sustain. Goneril and Regan have their 
Edmund, Franz Moor his Amalia, and even Turgenev's nihilist, Bazarov, falls a 
victim to something like love. In !ago, Shakespeare may have created a perfect 
model; but in doing so he renders the naivety of the other characters in 
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Othello implausible. If we are to be as precise as possible, therefore, a 
misanthrope should be regarded as a "monster, that the world ne'er saw." 
The disposition which has been termed "misanthropic" is 
certainly aristocratic in the classical sense. One person, at least, 
normally is excepted from the writer's anathema- himself. An example of this 
can be found in Lord Byron, who, fortunately for himself, was 
" ... only not to desperation driven 
Because not altogether of such clay 
32 
As rots into the souls of those whom I survey." 
We have already noted the unlikelihood of a democrat holding such views. We 
have seen at length that ideological positions are rooted in conceptions of 
human nature; the natural outcome of such an attitude to the average man 
would seem to be autocratic tendencies. Schopenhauer, for example, applies 
his pessimism to poltics as follows; 
"A constitution which embodied abstract right alone would be an excellent 
thing for natures other than human, but since the great majority of 1nen are 
extremely egoistic, unjust, inconsiderate, deceitful, and sometimes even 
malicious; since in addition they are endowed with very scanty intelligence, 
there arises the necessity for a power that shall be concentrated in one man, 
a power that shall be above all law and right, and be completely 
irresponsible, nay, to which everything shall yield ... a rule by the grace 
33 
of God." 
For Schopenhauer, a republic could never be a meritocracy; "For always and 
everywhere and under all circumstances there is a conspiracy, or instinctive 
alliance against [able) men on the part of all the stupid, the weak, and the 
34 
commonplace." By contrast, a monarch needs the best men to serve him, and can 
choose them without fear because he has no reason to envy natural talent. This 
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is a questionable assumption for Schopenhauer, as it assumes that the monarch 
is immune from mortal frailties. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer believes the rule 
of the best men can only come about under absolute monarchy. In many ways his 
theory is reminiscent of another reputed misanthropist, Thomas Hobbes, and 
also anticpates Ortega Y Gasset's Revolt of the Masses. A world populated 
for the most part by fools and potential cut-throats needs firm government, 
and it is absurd to speak of the "inalienable rights" of such a herd. 
We saw earlier that a dim view of human nature is the 
hallmark of conservative thinking. It would be a mistake, however, to assume 
that all the supposed misanthropes we have examined were conservatives. In 
most cases the purpose for such writing was to attempt some kind of moral 
reforrnation, and while the conservative may wish for such reform, in his case 
there are definite limits to possible improvement. Also, the violent language 
used by men like Swift and Schopenhauer is a hint of ideological instability. 
Conversions most often take place among such extremists; one feels, for 
instance, that Swift's view of humanity was dependent upon the prospects of 
35 
the Tory Party as much as his private life and his illnesses. Therefore, it 
is not enough to establish whether Hazlitt was a pessimist. If this can be 
shown convincingly, we must also carefully examine the nature of his 
pessimism. 
It may quickly be gathered that Hazlitt's case is similar 
to those discussed above. He also gives the impression of having hoped too 
much from mankind. The essay "On the Pleasure of Hating" closes with the words 
" ... Seeing all this as I do, and unravelling the web of human life into its 
various threads of meanness, spite, cowardice, want of feeling, and want of 
understanding, of indifference towards others and ignorance of ourselves .... 
. . . mistaken as I have been in my public and private hopes, calculating others 
from myself, and calculating wrong; always disappointed where I placed most 
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reliance; the dupe of friendship, and the fool of love; have I not reason to 
hate and to despise myself? Indeed I do; and chiefly for not having hated and 
36 
despised the world enough." 
Also to be found in this essay is the remark "the greatest possible good of 
37 
each individual consists in doing all the mischief he can to his neighbours." 
Elsewhere, in his "Common Places" of 1823, Hazlitt writes "Happy are they that 
can say with Timon - I am Misanthropes, and hate mankind! They can never be at 
a loss for subjects to exercise upon; their sources of satisfaction must hold 
38 
out while the world stands." The posthumously-published Aphorisms on Man 
show that contrary to the opinion of recent critics, Hazlitt never shed this 
element of pessimism. These pithy remarks include the statement, "I believe in 
39 
the theoretical benevolence, and the practical malignity of man.'' Hazlitt 
accounted for his bitterness in a conversation with the artist James 
Northcote; "When one is found fault with for nothing, or for doing one's best, 
one is apt to give the world their revenge. All the former part of my life I 
was treated as a cypher; and since I have got into notice, I have been set 
upon as a wild beast. When this is the case, and you can expect as little 
justice as candour, you naturally in self-defence take refuge in a sort of 
40 
misanthropy and cynical contempt for mankind." 
This pessimism seems to be as thorough-going as any we have 
examined here. Hazlitt does not baulk at extending his detestation to 
himself, and reverses the more usual outlook of hating man in the abstract 
and allowing exceptions in reality. His general tone is one of an embittered 
lonely outcast; most of his friendships were short-lived, and he suffered two 
broken marriages. Yet he asked for an exact definition of his outlook, he 
would not have described himself as misanthropic. In the "Common Places", he 
identifies this phenomenon as consisting 
"Not in pointing out the faults and follies of men, but in encouraging them in 
- 216 -
the pursuit. They who wish well to their fellow-creatures are angry at their 
vices and some at their mishaps; he who flatters their errors and smiles at 
their ruin is their worst enemy. But men like the sycophant better than the 
plain dealer, because they prefer their passion to their reason, and even to 
41 
their interest." 
This definition agrees quite closely with that put forward in this 
chapter, although it has also been argued that consistent misanthropy even on 
these grounds is an unlikely disposition. Hazlitt claims for himself the 
status of "plain dealer", by pointing out that contrary to their claims, men 
do not often make "rational" decisions. Unlike the true misanthrope, he is 
not satisfied with this situation, and his motive for writing is not merely 
to comment on the world, but also to change it if possible. For each quotation 
which seems to emanate from a spirit weary of the world and all its doings, 
several may be brought forward which show that he could appreciate the 
"mingled yarn" which wove the patterns of his life. Not long before his death, 
he told James Northcote that on an average day, "I rise when I please, 
breakfast at length, write what comes into my head, and after taking a rnutton-
42 
chop and a dish of strong tea, go to the play; and thus my time passes." 
Another anecdote may help to refute the "misanthropic" label. At the time of 
his ill-fated obsession with his landlady's daughter, he met an acquaintance 
by a coffee-house and poured out the whole story of his woes; then he 
encountered the son of a friend, and repeated his tale in full; finding the 
artist, Haydon, not at horne he made a confidant of his model; and, finally, 
while inspecting a new lodging-house the landlady asked him if he was not ill, 
at which point the whole story was blurted out from start to finish. A 
cynic like La Rochefoucauld would explain this episode in terms of a desire to 
repair his damaged self-esteem, but such a craving for human approval and 
43 
sympathy is difficult to reconcile with what has been called misanthropy. 
Overall, Hazlitt's attitude is best characterized by his own dictum: "To 
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think ill of mankind and not wish ill to them, is perhaps the highest wisdom 
44 
and virtue." 
It would be a mistake, therefore, to quote Hazlitt's more 
splenetic outbursts out of their context, and to write him down as an 
extremist of Schopenhauer's stamp. 1-Jazlitt believed that man's nature was 
"mixed". Human beings are capable of the purest sacrifices, even while 
contemplating deeds of a black dye. Genuine benevolence is possible, and the 
task of the moralist is to encourage it as much as lies in his power. But 
while we denounce wickedness, we should be conscious that it can never wholly 
be extirpated, since it too is an integral facet of the human character. 
It remains for us to discuss the ideological implications of 
1-lazlitt's ambivalent ideas about human nature. It emerged earlier that there 
was a tendency for thinkers of a pessimistic nature to favour authoritarian 
government. Most of the thinkers described above are difficult to label, 
however; in some cases their disillusionment cuts at the root of all 
government, as well as anarchy. They are individualists, too conscious of 
their moral superiority to hope much from individualism as a ruling dogma. As 
a result, they are normally leaders without disciples, and those who 
tread in their footprints, like the laissez-faire successors of Mandeville, 
are not over-anxious to acknowledge their guidance. Other isolated thinkers 
of both "left" and "right" might claim them, and in most cases it is debatable 
whether the prevailing bias is towards liberalism or conservatism. However, 
Hazlitt's leanings are unmistakable. The impression that he is best defined 
as a conservative liberal is confirmed by his views of human nature. The 
belief that the corruption of man is permanent prevented him from whole-
heartedly backing movements in favour of free institutions, and this 
consciousness led him to suspect that the success of such reforms would be 
short-lived. However, his hopes for mankind remained in spite of the 
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convictions derived from bitter experience, and this emotional support for 
those who desired lasting improvements places him within the liberal, rather 
than conservative ranks. 
This conservative liberalism was an excellent ideological 
position for a critic of Hazlitt's day. It provided him with the basis for a 
sympathetic understanding of both sides in the contemporary debate. For 
example, although his life might seem a reflection of Byron's defiant claim 
"I was born for opposition", his suspicion of government action was not the 
outcome of a belief that such institutions were "brute engines" incapable of 
good. Rather, he was constantly watching for instances when the governments 
of the day exploited the weak sides of human nature for their own advantage -
he could, of course, applaud such moves when he believed that this was done 
for less selfish reasons, as in the case of Napoleon. His principled 
reluctance to commit himself was unlikely to endear him to either side, and it 
is little wonder that he felt his intellectual isolation at a time of 
polarised views. Incapable of supporting the British governments of the time, 
and harshly handled by their literary supporters, Hazlitt was prevented from 
exercising the even-handedness that his position promised. Consequently, his 
angry rhetoric often distorts his true position, and has misled critics into 
the belief that he was a radical. Yet there were occasions when he 
demonstrated a genuine desire for objectivity, which produced in The Spirit 
of the Age a contemporary account full of a sympathetic understanding 
normally restricted to old men recounting the buried strife of their youth. 
Hazlitt longed for posthumous fame, and perhaps the knowledge that the 
ideological stance which caused his political isolation also made possible a 
lasting masterpiece might have comforted his tormented soul. 
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1) THE PROBLEM OF CONSISTENCY 
"I remember once saying to [Mr. Northcote], a great while ago, that I did 
not seem to have altered any of my ideas since I was sixteen years old. 'Why, 
then', said he, 'you are no wiser now than you were then!'" 
1 
On Consistency Of Opinion (1828) 
"A man whose opinions at fifty are his opinions at fourteen has opinions of 
very little value" 
2 
Leslie Stephen, Hours in a Library 
Since the approach of this study has been thematic it is only 
proper that a conclusion should include a chronological account of Hazlitt's 
writings. The major purpose of this will be to evaluate his repeated claims 
to consistency. It would not be fatal to his standing as a critic if he can 
be shown to have changed his views over time. Leslie Stephen's maxim quoted 
above is an exaggeration, but it is true that a stubborn entrenchment behind 
a position may be a disadvantage during a mobile war of opinion. However, 
Hazlitt's intellectual honour does seem to be involved, as he coupled his 
claims with jibes at others who had deviated from their original views. In 
the process of learning how consistent he was, we should learn a little more 
about the opinions he held. 
*********** 
First of all, we must be quite clear that we are speaking of a 
consistent ideological position, not of a rigid blue-print for government or 
of attitudes to contemporary political actors. It is not true, for instance, 
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to say as Hazlitt did that the Lake Poets must have changed their views 
simply because they allied themselves with men who had formerly been their 
violent opponents. He needed to prove that the latter group had not undergone 
a conversion themselves. Similarly, the various changes in the refor1n 
progra_mmes put forward by William Cobbett and John Cartwright do not prove 
that they were inconsistent; rather, they were flexible in their choice of 
means to an end which never changed. 
Comments on past events and dead men is a different matter. If 
there is a change over time in a writer's response to these, then it is 
likely that his underlying views have altered. This suspicion will be 
properly confirmed if we find that his ideas of human nature have been 
amended too. But in the absence of this or of new information which might 
have placed the event or character in a new light, we would be justified in 
denying total consistency to our subject. 
However, with a critic such as Hazlitt there is another 
difficulty to bear in mind. Living a hand-to-mouth existence as he did, 
hawking his talents from one publisher to another - and consequently shifting 
his likely audience from time to time - it is to be expected that at least 
the surface tone of his work will not remain constant. All of these factors 
must be remembered as we briefly chart his career as a political writer. 
The important works of Hazlitt's twenties are the Essay on the 
Principles of Human Action (1805), the Free Thoughts on Public Affairs (1806) 
and the Reply to Malthus (1807). The first of these, it may be recalled, makes 
no extravagant claims on behalf of human nature. There is evidently a strong 
desire that benevolence should play a wider role, but it is recognised that a 
man will normally prefer the interests of himself, his family and his 
neighbourhood to that of a stranger, however worthy. The Free Thoughts 
demonstrate a concern for existing liberties and suspicion of the government's 
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motives at home and abroad. The pamphlet seems to be designed to catch the 
eye of the Whigs, a suspicion which is re-inforced by his letter to William 
3 
Windham of 1809, which was an appeal for patronage. The ~was written 
for Cobbett's Political Register; it reveals a similar concern for existing 
institutions, rather than a wish to undermine them. In short, the bulk of 
Hazlitt's output during these years would not have disturbed a moderate member 
of the Whig party; its motivation, like theirs, should be termed conservative 
liberalism. 
Between 1809 and 1813 Hazlitt was relatively quiet. Our real 
problem concerns the period from 1814-19. These years saw the fall of 
Napoleon and the restoration of the Bourbons, the suspension of Habeas Corpus 
(1817), the agitation which led to "Peterloo", and finally the "Six Acts" 
which imposed restrictions on the press (1819). It was also the time when the 
"War of the Intellectuals" reached its height; Hazlitt was singled out for 
particular attack by Tory journalists such as William Gifford and John 
Gibson Lockhart. It is certainly the period of Hazlitt's angriest prose, much 
of which is contained in the Political Essays which were published in the year 
of Peterloo and the "Six Acts". "On Court Influence", "What is the People?" 
and "On the Regal Character" appeared in this collection. In the year 1819, 
Hazlitt also lashed back at his critics in his "Letter to William Gi"fford". 
This would appear to be straight-forward enough. However, prior 
to the Political Essays, the collected essays of the Round Table (written 
early 1813-early 1817) and the Characters of Shakespear's Plays (mostly 
1816) had been printed. There is political material in these works, and some 
of it is very pointed; but from what we know of Hazlitt, it might be expected 
that the greatest howl of outrage would have occurred at this point soon after 
Waterloo, and the tone of the majority of pieces in these collections is 
restrained. The explanation cannot lie in the respective vehicles for these 
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works; the Round Table and Shakespear's Plays both originally appeared in 
journals owned by the Hunt brothers (who had already fallen foul of the libel 
laws), and the Yellow Dwarf which published the most embittered Political 
Essays was in the same proprietorship. Speculation on this point cannot 
produce any certainty, but it is possible that Hazlitt realised the 
impossibility of publishing his thoughts on Napoleon in 1815. Even the Hunts 
were initially glad that he had fallen. But when discontent grew in post-war 
England, and liberal opinion began to wake up to the nature of the restored 
monarchies in Europe, his self-imposed restraint could be lifted. Marilyn 
Butler has noted that Hazlitt did not concentrate on domestic politics in 
these essays; the likely explanation for this is that he reserved his hatred 
for the conquerors of Napoleon rather than the supposed enemies of domestic 
4 
liberty. 
Hazlitt's work in the 1820's has a more mellow flavour, 
except for isolated pieces such as his "Essay on the Spirit of Monarchy", 
which probably contains more fireworks because it was published in the joint 
venture of Hunt, Shelley and Byron, The Liberal. Table Talk (1821-2) 
represents a turn to more contemplative work ("On the Pleasure of Painting", 
"The Indian Jugglers", etc.); when Hazlitt loses his temper here, his blows 
are aimed at the public as often as the government. No doubt he was feeling 
the strain from his relationship with Sarah Walker. But the essay ''On Paradox 
and Common-place" is a clear statement of a middle road between the extreme 
radicals and the Tories which he applauded in Francis Jeffrey, editor of the 
5 
Edinburgh Review. The collection of portraits in The Spirit of the Age, as 
we have seen, is his nearest approach to objectivity when dealing with 
contemporaries, indicating that the great rage had been killed in him by then. 
The Plain Speaker (1826) includes the odd outburst - "On the Pleasure of 
Hating" makes its appearance here - but the political content of these essays 
is slighter. The Life of Napoleon Buonaparte of his last years includes a view 
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of the French Revolution which would certainly find assent among members of 
the Whig Party at the time; his warm feelings towards the fallen Emperor 
would not be so popular, but contemporaries regarded his "apology" for 
Napoleon's more controversial actions as evidence that Hazlitt secretly 
leaned towards "the arbitrary side" in politics. This period also saw the 
publication of various maxims which hint at a growing cynicism, and a series 
of Conversations of Northcote conducted in a similar vein. 
A glance at the development of Hazlitt's thought, therefore, 
leaves the impression of moderate liberalism at the beginning and the end of 
his career, with a period in the middle when E.P Thompson's remark that 
Hazlitt was perhaps "the most "Jacobin" of the middle-class Radicals" might 
6 
make some sense. But this would rest upon a highly superficial reading of 
Hazlitt's work, similar to his own view that Burke was a blatant apostate. 
Some critics find it difficult to accept that moderate positions may be 
expressed in extreme language, but this is actually the case. We have seen 
that a careful reading of "What is the People?" falls into this category, and 
this is the most radical-sounding of his essays in the middle period. It 
reveals great hostility to the government in being, but very limited faith in 
improvement through constitutional change, and a definite belief that a moral 
reformation within the present systern would do as well. This, I believe, is 
Hazlitt's attitude from the Free Thoughts on Public Affairs to the Life of 
Napoleon; occasionally, however, the ''good hater" drowns out the cautious 
liberal. As a journalist who lived, in part, on his ability to comment on 
current events, Hazlitt found that different personalities and different 
governmental decisions required changing responses. He decided where he stood 
very early in his career, and if that position seemed threatened at one time 
more than another, he measured his own blows accordingly. 
However, we noted earlier that if our subject has clearly 
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changed his mind about a past event or a dead figure, it is prima facie 
evidence for an ideological conversion. There is an apparent instance of 
such a change in Hazlitt's Political Essays. In the "Character of Mr. Fox", 
reprinted from a work of 1806, we find a note which declares that if he were 
to write an essay on this subject now (1819), it would not reach such a warm 
conclusion. Fox's life, in fact, had been "deficient in the three principal 
7 
points, the beginning, the middle, and the end." Hazlitt here refers to Fox's 
early days in the Tory ranks, the alliance of 1784 with Lord North, and the 
similar coalition with the Grenvilles which brought about the ''Ministry of all 
the Talents." These facts were notorious when Hazlitt composed the essay soon 
after Fox's death; no new information appears to have reached him. How, then, 
do we explain this sign of inconsistency? 
The answer lies in the history of the Whig Party subsequent to 
Fox's death, and Hazlitt's own relations with them. The "Talents" left office 
soon after this, and the Whigs had suffered thirteen years of inglorious 
opposition since then. The sins of the disciples, therefore, were visited by 
Hazlitt on the memory of the figure-head. The faults which he was prepared to 
overlook in 1806 had to be emphasised in 1819. We have also seen that Hazlitt 
may well have hoped for Whig patronage as a result of the Free Thoughts 
which appeared not long before the "Character" was written. Even if the latter 
piece was not designed to refresh the Whig memory, it is likely that Hazlitt's 
party allegiance would prevent him from criticising tactics which had helped 
Fox's prospects of power. By 1819 he had decided that the intended result of 
such maneouvers did not justify them. The Whigs were interested in power for 
themselves, not justice for the people; the fact that Fox possessed "a social 
and generous sensibility, desirous of the love and esteem of others" did not 
8 
outweigh the bad impression left by his followers. This change of mind, 
therefore, is a sign that Hazlitt had lost faith in a party, not a creed. 
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We have noted that Hazlitt's ideological position was unusually 
appropriate for the production of incisive judgements on his times. It was 
also highly adapted to the maintenance of consistency. The more extreme 
liberals of his youth could not survive the shock of the French Revolution, 
and their conversion to a very different view of the world is unsurprising. 
The conservatives did not defect in droves to the liberal ranks, but there 
were times when domestic or foreign movements forced them to a more extreme 
and unstable position; they were induced to carry out innovations on the 
structure of the very constitution they wished to defend. Hazlitt, however, 
with his "mixed'' view of human nature, rode out the storm true to his maxim 
that "To think ill of mankind and not to wish ill of them, is perhaps the 
9 
highest wisdom and virtue." The events of his youth had taught him that one 
should not think too well of one's fellows; the troubled days of his maturity 
never challenged this conclusion. It must be acknowldged, therefore, that 
Hazlitt remained consistent throughout his life, in the most meaningful 
sense of the word. 
2) HAZLITT AND THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE 
"Many people have a strong desire to pry into the secrets of futurity: for 
our own parts, we should be satisfied if we had the power to recall the dead, 
and live the past over again as often as we pleased!" 
10 
On Actors and Acting (1817) 
Although Hazlitt was a highly appropriate thinker to reflect 
upon the Spirit of the Age, this by no means implies that he was in tune 
with it. Indeed he was essentially a backward-looking thinker. He did not seek 
constitutional remedies for current problems in a glorious free English past, 
as many liberals of the previous century had done. He seems to have lacked 
precise historical knowledge, and had little interest in constitutional forms. 
When he looked back for inspiration, it was to a moral community which had 
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existed over time; there was no golden age, so much as a group of golden 
beings. He admired Shakespeare, Milton, Marvell and others, because they were 
uncompromising individuals who had followed nature and expressed their views 
without fear. Thus the true genius was not a product of his age, but a man 
who could transcend it. Apart from Napoleon, he could say this for none of his 
contemporaries, and this goes a long way to explain his disillusionment with 
the age he lived in. It may also explain why Hazlitt nowhere clearly defined 
11 
what he took to be the spirit of his age. As is frequently the case in 
Hazlitt's writings, we learn about the opponents of this spirit than the 
phenomenon itself. While this vagueness might be regarded as a serious 
flaw in the book, a comparison with John Stuart Mill's later work under the 
same title reveals that it is more properly an advantage; Mill's clear 
diagnosis of the age's ills is obviously dictated by his personal beliefs, and 
the proposed remedies read like a manifesto for men like himself. 
Crane Brinton has suggested that Hazlitt had much in common 
with the ideas of the Victorians, but this is an unusual misjudgement on his 
part. Though his friend Leigh Hunt settled down with a pension to idolise his 
Queen, Hazlitt would have been a very restive survival into the new era. One 
might indulge in a paradox here, and suggest that if Hazlitt was forward-
looking at all, it is because some of his thoughts anticipate those of men in 
the future who were disillusioned with the trend of the times. He disliked 
the industrial system and the commercial spirit which went with it; his 
distrust of mere machinery led him to question the likely benefits of 
democracy. It is difficult to imagine Hazlitt in peaceful co-existence with 
the dogmas of Utilitarianism and of progress. Most fatally of all, the life 
of a Victorian man of letters would not have appealed to him. Just before his 
death, he wrote, 
"An author no longer, in the silence of retreat, and in the dearth of 
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criticism, appeals to posterity as a last resource, as in a flat and barren 
country we look at objects in the distant horizon; in the din and pressure of 
present opinions and contending claims, he must throw himself, like an actor 
at a fair, on the gaping throng about him, and seize, by the most speedy and 
12 
obvious means, the noisy suffrages of his contemporaries." 
These are very strange opinions from the man who once ridiculed Coleridge's 
fears of a reading public! 
Hazlitt may have been out of touch with his own age and the one 
which succeeded to it, but he will probably always evoke a response from 
individual spirits. There will always be a number who appreciate a good hater, 
and Hazlitt was among the best who has ever lived. This is not only because he 
was not afraid to express his emotions; he also appeals because his attacks 
hit home, even when reflection leads us to suspect his fairness. Although they 
are rarely appreciated at the time, those who are "nothing, if not critical" 
add spice to the ages in which they live. In these at least, Hazlitt will 
continue to find the posthumous admirers he so urgently hoped for. 
NOTES 
1. Works, Vol.XVII, pp.22-3. 
2. L. Stephen, Hours in a Library, London, 1892, Vol.II of III, p.84. 
3. For the text of this letter, see Letters, ed. H. Sikes, W. Bonner and G. 
Lahey, New York, 1978, pp.l06-7. It must be recalled that Windham was an 
ardent follower of Burke, and had described the radicals tried in 1794 as 
"acquitted felons." He was admired for his oratorical skills, but this 
seems insufficient to account for Hazlitt's flattery in his letter. 
4. M. Butler, Romantics, Rebels and Reactionaries, Oxford, 1982, p.144. 
5. Works, Vol. VIII, pp.146-156. It appears, however, that Hazlitt lost his 
job with the Champion newspaper because of his pro-Napoleonic stance; see 
S. Jones, op. cit., pp.168-70. 
6. E. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, Pelican, 1975 
reprint, p.820. R. Harris, in his otherwise excellent book Romanticism and 
the Social Order, (London, 1969), called Hazlitt "the only true "Jacob in" 





"a romantic radical born a little too late" (The Literary Critics, London, 
1973 ed., p.127). Watson's extremely hostile remarks on Hazlitt might be 
thought to be a refreshing contrast to the more usual adulation; however, 
since we are given little teason for sharing his animosity (aside from his 
evident dislike for Hazlitt's prose-style), the admirer of Hazlitt need 
not. fear the jibes of such a critic. 
Works, Vol.VII, p.313 note. 
Ibid., p.321. 
Works, Vol.XX, p.202. 
10. Works, Vol.IV, p.158. 
11. Hazlitt comes closest to defining the spirit of the age in his Plain 
Speaker (Vol.XII, pp.128-9), where he asserts that it is "the progress of 
intellectual refinement, warring with our natural infirmities." This might 
suggest to the unwary (or optimistic) that Hazlitt held a dialectical view 
of history to a reasonable degree of sophistication. But as in so many 
other cases we find him refuting this suggestion elsewhere. In his aptly-
misnamed "Trifles Light as Air" (Works, Vol.XX, p.282), he states that 
"The human mind seems to improve because it is continually in progress. But 
as it moves forward to new acquisitions and trophies, it .loses its hold on 
those which formerly were its chief boast and employment ... Neither is error 
extirpated so much as it takes a new form and puts on a more artful 
disguise." In short, Hazlitt cannot sustain his optimistic vision of the 
spirit of the age; rather, "Common Sense with a little reflection will 
teach us, that one age is as good as another; that in familiar phrase we 
cannot have our cake and eat it; and that there is no time like the time 
present, whether in the first, the tenth, or the twentieth century" (Works, 
Vol.XX, p.243). This view of history, which is too sketchy to treat at 
length here, supports the conclusion that Hazlitt's ideological position 
was a volatile combination of liberal and conservative elements. 
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